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MOROCCO IN DIPLOMACY

BY

E. D. MOREL

AUTHOR OF "AFFAIRS OF WEST AFRICA," "THE BRITISH CASE IN FRENCH CONGO,"
"KING LEOPOLD'S RULE IN AFRICA," "RED RUBBER," "GREAT BRITAIN
AND THE CONGO," "NIGERIA: ITS PEOPLES AND
ITS PROBLEMS," ETC.

WITH FIVE MAPS

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TO THOSE
WHO BELIEVE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
FRIENDLIER RELATIONS BETWEEN
BRITAIN AND GERMANY

TO BE ESSENTIAL TO THE PROSPERITY AND WELFARE
OF THE BRITISH AND GERMAN PEOPLES AND TO THE
MAINTENANCE OF THE WORLD'S PEACE

AND TO

THOSE WHO ARE PERSUADED THAT THE ACCEPTANCE OF
NATIONAL LIABILITIES TOWARDS FOREIGN POWERS BY
SECRET COMMITMENTS WITHHELD FROM THE BRITISH
PEOPLE, IS BOTH A MENACE TO THE SECURITY OF THE
STATE AND A BETRAYAL OF THE NATIONAL TRUST

THIS VOLUME
IS RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED

PREFACE

AN explanatory word or two regarding the construction of this volume may prove useful to the reader as a guide.

To clarify the masses of documentary evidence accumulated round a problem which has kept Europe on tenterhooks for seven years, and to bring out the issues clearly, I have sought to rivet the reader's attention to the main lines of the story.

Hence I have divided it into a number of sections each as self-contained as the nature of the subject allowed.

In the first section the reader is asked to cast a backward glance at the attitude towards, and the interests in, Morocco of the four Powers chiefly concerned (Britain, France, Spain and Germany), during what may be termed the normal period of Morocco's modern relations with the Powers, *i.e.* before French, British and Spanish diplomacy entered upon those secret courses which were destined to slay Morocco's independence and narrowly to avoid involving Europe in a great war.

With a brusqueness which I trust may be forgiven him, the author opens the second section by introducing the reader to a small German gunboat anchored off the South Atlantic coast of Morocco, sent thither by Germany as an intimation that she does not propose to acquiesce in the change which has come over the international position of Morocco. The author then explains what the

Public Law of Europe concerning Morocco was at the time Germany took that step, and shows, very briefly, how it had been infringed without Germany, who was primarily instrumental in getting that Public Law framed, having given her consent to its infringement.

In section three the author bids the reader plunge with him into the labyrinth of secret diplomacy preceding the elaboration of that Public Law, in order to be shown how the French and Spanish Governments had arranged, with the concurrence of the British Government, to absorb Morocco on the first convenient opportunity; when Germany, stepping in, had arrested the process even then begun, by insisting upon the elaboration of a Public Law, drawn up by the Powers, to preserve Moroccan independence and integrity.

That carries us to section four, in which, after inviting the reader to agree that this first intervention of Germany's was fully justified, the author proceeds to describe in detail how France and Spain—always with British concurrence—started destroying the Public Law they had participated in framing, and how they went on doing so until not even the bones and the beak of Moroccan integrity and independence were left.

And so, the author brings his reader back again to the little *Panther* rolling and tossing in that heavy Atlantic swell, and at this point he utters a plea for the reader's concentrated attention. He does so with trepidation, because he is about to steer the latter in and out of as tangled a skein as he might wish to see. And not only that. For the reader will be asked to abandon some of his most cherished beliefs—amongst them, that Germany did a very shocking thing in sending that miniscular war-vessel to Agadir; amongst them, that his own Foreign Office, which, like all respectable people, he

doubtless reveres, handled his affairs at that time with calmness, discretion and wisdom; amongst them, that German resentment is the unreasonable phenomenon he has been so often and so emphatically assured. And even then the reader has not come to an end of his trials, for the author will conclude by putting a number of things before him—bald things, naked things, plain things, ugly, uncomfortable, inconvenient things which polite persons do not usually trouble him about, but, on the contrary, take care to conceal from him in order not to disturb his digestion, or his prejudices.

And to crown all the author will wind up by appealing to his reader—and with that, take leave of him.

E. D. M.

February, 1912.

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INTRODUCTION

PERHAPS I should preface this volume by a brief profession of faith which is my justification—to myself—for having written it.

I believe that the greatest national interest of the British people is at this moment, and will continue increasingly to be, the establishment and maintenance of friendly relations with Germany; a full and frank examination by responsible statesmen in both countries of the national problems peculiar to each in their relations with one another, leading to an appreciation of their respective national necessities, and to a mutual adjustment of the same with the sacrifice neither of honour, nor prestige, nor legitimate needs on either side.

I believe that no greater disaster could befall both peoples, and all that is most worthy of preservation in modern civilization, than a war between them.

I reject the theories, based for the most part upon faulty and inapplicable historic similitudes, pointing to the inevitableness of such war.

In common with every Briton of ordinary intelligence, I perceive that in the early part of last year the relations of the two peoples which, after passing through a period of recurrent crises, were beginning to show visible signs of steady advance towards the old friendly feeling, have received a deplorable set-back.

The information which reaches me accords with that which persons of weight declare to be such as they themselves are in receipt of, viz. that not one school of thought only, but the whole German nation, is seething with an absolutely genuine sense of grievance against the British Government.

In common with every Briton of ordinary intelligence, I am aware that this set-back in Anglo-German relations is due to the view taken in Germany of the attitude adopted by the British Foreign Office, endorsed by a considerable section of the British Press, towards Germany last summer in the course of the negotiations between that Power and France relating to the question of Morocco—a question which had already given rise to considerable friction in 1905.

Moreover, it is now no secret—it has been publicly vouched for by several members of Parliament and naval officers—that the British Government had fully determined to support, if necessary, the French case against the German by force of arms, and had, indeed, undertaken naval and military preparations to that end.¹

¹ Recent Ministerial statements have been concerned in denying that the British Government meditated a gratuitous attack upon Germany last summer. This denial may have been necessary to calm German opinion. It was not required to convince home opinion of the inaccuracy of the allegation. The denial does not, from the British national standpoint, touch the kernel of the question. The incontestable facts remain: (1) that the British Government assured France last summer that France could count upon British naval and military support in the event of war arising out of a Franco-German rupture over Morocco, and had taken elaborate preparations to that end; (2) that this assurance went beyond any British national commitment, then or now avowed, towards the French Republic; (3) that the French Government's case was intrinsically bad since it reposed upon the violation by France of an International Treaty; (4) that this violation was committed with the approval of the British Foreign Office, and arose out of secret arrangements between the British, French

Holding the beliefs stated above, it seemed to me that the German view was deserving of careful study in the light of facts publicly accessible in order to ascertain whether it reposed upon any sort of foundation.

At an early stage in the investigation, I acquired the conviction that Germany's action in despatching the small gun-boat *Panther*, of 1000 tons¹ burthen and an equipment of 125 men, to anchor off an open roadstead on the Atlantic coast of Morocco, had been grossly misinterpreted; the step being an incident in a series of inter-connected circumstances extending over a period of nearly ten years, in the course of which Germany had had legitimate causes of complaint at her treatment by French and British diplomacy.

To this conviction I have already given utterance.²

But as more and more light was thrown upon the subject, as disclosures of secret arrangements, unknown to the British people, negotiated by the British Foreign Office with the Foreign Offices of France and Spain, assumed precision; as successive revelations in France showed both the inadequacy, and, in several important respects, the inaccuracy of the statement explanatory of the British official attitude given by Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons on November 27 last, the necessity of a fuller treatment became apparent.

and Spanish Governments contracted in 1904, and of which the British people, and the world, knew nothing until November, 1911; (5) that the attitude of the British Foreign Office in the early, and most critical, stage in the Franco-German negotiations was such as gravely to increase the possibilities of a Franco-German rupture.

¹ With two guns, calibre 10·5 cm., and six machine guns.

² Vide *The Nineteenth Century and After*, for November, 1911, and February 1912; a series of letters entitled "How Wars are Made," in *The Daily News* in October, 1911, etc.

It was increasingly obvious that the policy recommended in distinguished quarters of attempting to soothe German feelings by homeopathic doses in the shape of friendly speeches of a general character, combined with a studious avoidance of the source of the trouble, was somewhat lacking in courage, and, perhaps, not quite dignified. From another point of view, too, this policy was not one which, so it appeared to the author, could be regarded as adequate. It is of vital moment the nation should realise that in this matter it has been led blindfold to the very brink of war, *as the outcome of liabilities secretly contracted by its diplomatists without its authority*. Also that, in the final resort, the existence of these secret liabilities has only been acknowledged by the Foreign Office subsequent to their publication in a couple of Parisian newspapers.¹ To write *Finis* over the Morocco controversy, assuming that to do so were in other respects wise or even possible, would be, under these circumstances, for the nation to admit that it is prepared to assent to such treatment being meted out to it in the future, and for my part I cannot bring myself

¹ The existence, and in part the actual substance of Secret Articles attached to the Anglo-French Declaration over Morocco was revealed in *Le Temps* of November 11, 1911. A question was then put in the House of Commons; Sir E. Grey admitted in reply the existence of Secret Articles, and they were subsequently communicated to Parliament. The Secret Franco-Spanish Convention of October, 1904, was published in *Le Matin* of November 9, 1911, reproduced in *Le Temps* of the same evening, and afterwards published in a British White Book together with the Exchange of Notes between Lord Lansdowne and the French Ambassador concerning it. The effect of these two Treaties—the second arose out of the first and was, indeed, imposed upon France by the British Government—was to involve this country in approval and diplomatic support of a partition of Morocco between France and Spain, and thereby, to inevitable conflict with Germany, as explained in this volume. That is not the expression of an opinion; but a bald statement of fact.

to believe in so humiliating a confession of national impotence.

It seemed, then, advisable, to place in the hands of the British public a connected narrative of the dealings of their own diplomacy and that of the three other Powers chiefly interested in Morocco—France, Spain and Germany—together with a comprehensive appendix, foot-notes and maps which should enable the reader, at any rate to a very great extent, to exercise a check upon the statements of facts in the body of the volume and upon the conclusions drawn from those facts by the author.¹

His conclusions the author makes no attempt to conceal. They are that from first to last the British people have been systematically misled and misinformed as to the part played by Germany in the Morocco question. And for these reasons: first, because the genesis of German action has lain in the existence of secret conventions and arrangements between the British, French and Spanish Governments, withheld from the knowledge of the British people, who have, therefore, been induced to form their judgment upon incomplete data; secondly, because a concerted effort, inspired by certain influences connected with the British diplomatic machine, and conveyed to the British public through the medium of powerful newspapers, has been consistently pursued with the object of portraying German policy in the Morocco question in a uniformly sinister light. That effort, it is right to add, has been much assisted by a section of German chauvinists and German jingo newspapers, who have throughout striven to goad their Government into departing from the logical and

¹ This collection of documents will in itself constitute a sort of political hand-book to a comprehension of the problem.

straightforward, if sometimes clumsy, policy it appears to me to have steadily followed.¹

The Morocco problem itself, and that of the Congo which (in another aspect than the one the public is familiar with) has now been grafted upon it, still contain numerous elements of international friction—possibly of very grave friction. As a French writer of repute has put it—

“The arrangement of 1911 is either the prelude to a real understanding between France and Germany, or it is the prelude to war.”

In a considerable, it is not perhaps too much to say in a preponderating measure, the issue one way or another is on the knees of the British people and their Government.

If this book succeeds in carrying conviction to the mind of the Briton possessed of normal common-sense and sanity that, on the one hand, Germany's actions throughout this entire controversy *have* been misrepresented, and on the other hand, that the British and French peoples alike have been led to the verge of war with Germany, not because of alleged deep-rooted antagonisms or conflicts due to “elemental forces,” but through the intrigues, the lack of straightforward dealing,

¹ In the *Economist* of December 30, 1911, and January 8, 1912, will be found a “valuation of the leading newspapers of Germany” which may be commended to all who desire to appreciate the international significance attaching to the utterances of specific German Press organs. The writer of these interesting articles accentuates a circumstance to which sufficient importance has not been attached in this country, viz. That during almost the entire course of the Morocco crisis of last summer the German Government had a hostile Press, some papers attacking it for not claiming a portion of Morocco; others because the French Congo was not regarded as worth the abandonment of the German diplomatic position in regard to Morocco, and—at one time—all of them because they believed the German Government had lacked firmness in its diplomatic dealings with Britain.

and the absence of foresight on the part of a diplomacy working in the dark and concealing its manœuvres from the national gaze—the author will have achieved his purpose.

P.S.—This book was already in the printers' hands when Lord Haldane's visit to Berlin was announced. That visit has been followed by official expressions on either side of good augury for the future. Every one will rejoice at these first-fruits of a resolute public pressure upon Downing Street during the past four months. I am tempted to think that a detailed history of the Moroccan imbroglio, far from being less necessary, is now more than ever required. And for these reasons. If a genuine movement for an understanding has really begun in the official world as the result of public insistence, it is essential that the popular feeling provoked should be reinforced by additional arguments reposing not on admirable but more or less vague desires, but upon a study of concrete facts on the specific issue which has caused the ill-feeling it is proposed to attempt to remove. It is essential, too, for the durability of any understanding that may be reached, that the British public should thoroughly apprehend the reasons which have brought about a situation all now realise to be fraught with the gravest peril. Finally, the circumstance that so happy but so brusque a change in the British official attitude should be possible, and should be (again, happily) supported by influential British newspapers which only a few weeks ago were replete with sentiments completely at variance with those given utterance to in their columns to-day, constitutes in itself the most convincing of reasons why the nation should appreciate the events and the influences responsible for the opposite policy so long followed, and

with which the nation—without altogether understanding it—is clearly out of sympathy. The welcome change indicated by Lord Haldane's visit to Berlin is a tribute, first and foremost, to the popular will in Britain. Let but the reflecting members of the community apply themselves to a comprehension of what preceded this change, and a lesson will have been learned, the outcome of which should serve to place Anglo-German relations upon a footing of permanent friendliness and security—to the inestimable advantage not of the present generation only but of generations to come.

The Morocco problem is not settled. In one sense it may be said to be only beginning. It will loom largely on the horizon during the lifetime of the present generation.

E. D. M.

29th February, 1912.

PART I

Explanatory of the respective attitude towards Morocco of the four interested Powers—Britain, France, Spain, and Germany—prior to the events of the past decade.

CHAPTER I

BRITAIN AND MOROCCO

"I enclose for your confidential information the accompanying volumes of printed correspondence respecting the affairs of North Africa and Morocco. . . . You will observe that it has been the *constant aim of Her Majesty's Government, and of your predecessors at Tangier, to preserve the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of Morocco*, while neglecting no favourable opportunity of impressing upon the Sultan and his Ministers the importance and advantage of improving the government and administration of the country. Unfortunately, their efforts in this direction have hitherto been unsuccessful, and herein lies the great danger of the situation, as the decease of the present Sultan will, in all probability, give rise to internal disturbances, the issue of which it is impossible to foresee."

(Extract from Lord Salisbury's general letter of instructions to Sir Charles Euan-Smith upon his appointment as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Emperor of Morocco. May 16, 1891.) [C—6815.]

THE policy of Great Britain towards Morocco in what may be termed modern times was inspired, until the opening years of the present century, by the sentiment that the national interest required an independent Morocco. The view dictating this policy was primarily the strategic one that were the coasts of Mediterranean and North-Atlantic Morocco to fall into the hands of a European Power, the route to India would be threatened and the British position in the Mediterranean compromised.

The larger policy, that of an independent Morocco,

has now been wholly abandoned, although it was nominally revived by the Act of Algeciras in 1906, as will subsequently be explained. The strategical view has undergone a profound modification. Retained to the extent of excluding a first-class Power from occupying the sea-board referred to; it has altered to the extent of allowing that occupation by a second-class Power under certain conditions. Those conditions are that no fortifications or strategic works shall be erected on the part of the aforesaid sea-board whence the security of the Straits of Gibraltar might conceivably be menaced. It does not appear beyond the bounds of possibility that the limits within which such menace was held to be possible in 1904, may be restricted as the result of the Franco-Spanish negotiations now proceeding with the cognisance of the British Government.

Whether these changes of policy were avoidable or unavoidable, wise or unwise, from the point of view of the national interest, it would be futile to discuss. The circumstances under which they have come about will appear as this narrative proceeds.

The secondary but nevertheless extremely important consideration influencing British policy, until the opening years of the present century, was that of our commercial interests in Morocco which were, and are, extensive. The desire to preserve Morocco as an open market for British trade, and to remove the numerous disabilities under which British trade suffered at the hands of the Moorish Government, were matters regarded as worthy of attention by British diplomats in the latter half of the nineteenth century. With these united ends in view, Sir John Drummond Hay, the British representative at the Moorish court, laboured for many years: in the main successfully as regards the larger policy: with scant progress so far as

inducing the Sultan to follow a more liberal line in his treatment of European commercial interests.

In 1891 Lord Salisbury decided to make a serious effort in this direction. He despatched a special Mission to Fez, attended by some pomp and circumstance,¹ under Sir Charles Euan-Smith. The chief object of the Mission was the conclusion of a commercial Treaty; but it was arranged that the slavery question should be tentatively referred to, and also that if the Sultan showed a friendly disposition, the good offices of the British Government should be used with the other Powers to diminish the evils connected with the system then, and still, existing, whereby Moorish subjects shed their allegiance to the Sultan by becoming the "protected" subjects of this or that European Power.² Lord Salisbury was at special pains to emphasise that the British Mission had no ulterior or secret motives, and impressed upon his envoy the necessity of so conducting himself that suspicions of British motives should not be aroused either in the mind of the Sultan or among the representatives of other European Powers.³

¹ Sir C. Euan-Smith was accompanied by three members of the British legation, and by a military staff consisting of Colonel Hallam Parr, Major Monds, Surgeon-Captain Macpherson, Lieutenant Kirkpatrick, Lieutenant Wilson, and D. Beaufort, Esq. The Sultan deputed *Kaid* Harry Maclean to take charge of the Mission, which was received with military honours as it progressed towards the capital. Four ladies—members of Sir C. Euan-Smith's family—also accompanied the party.

² The system had given rise to gross abuses, indeed to a species of blackmail at the expense of the Sultan, of which he justly complained.

³ *Vide* quotation at the head of the chapter. To Sir C. Euan-Smith's early request that he should be authorised to use vigorous language to the Sultan were the latter intractable, Lord Salisbury demurred: "I should wish you to abstain from anything in the nature of a menace, which would be doubly dangerous, because, if resisted, it might bring about a serious crisis, and, if successful, would place her

The Mission entirely failed. It was delayed for many weeks at Fez, while the Sultan tergiversated in the most approved Eastern style. That the failure was partly due to Sir C. Euan-Smith's somewhat autocratic bearing, a perusal of the Despatches suggests. But the chief cause was unquestionably the misrepresentations which, as Lord Salisbury afterwards remarked, "attended the Mission from the first."¹ Nor is it possible to doubt whence came the numerous intrigues which wrecked the effort. Lord Salisbury, who acted throughout with the utmost straightforwardness towards the Powers, had communicated the draft commercial Treaty Sir C. Euan-Smith had drawn up for presentation to the Sultan, to the German, Italian, Spanish, French, and Austrian Governments,² and had suggested to these Governments that their support for a measure calculated to serve the interests of all the Powers, and in no way aimed at securing "the slightest privilege in favour of England," would be welcome. The German,³ Italian, and Austrian

Majesty's Government in the position of having undertaken the protection of Morocco." (Despatch to Sir C. Euan-Smith, March 2, 1892.) "You should bear in mind the risk of leading other Powers to suppose that you are endeavouring to obtain exclusive advantages for this country." (Despatch, March 28, 1892.) [C—6815.]

¹ C—6821.

² Yet so important a French paper as the *Journal des Débats*, which had openly accused the British Government of ulterior motives on July 21, actually stated on August 12 that Sir C. Euan-Smith's object was "to insert the thin end of the wedge which would force Morocco to accept her (Britain's) authority," adding that *France intended to maintain Moroccan independence and integrity in spite of England*. How passing strange it is to recall these utterances when contemplating present events!

³ The German and Italian ministers at Tangier showed themselves particularly anxious to assist the British Mission. (Sir C. Euan-Smith to Lord Salisbury, April 20, 1892.) The British Mission "was supported by the representatives of Germany, Austria, Spain, and Belgium." (*Times* Tangier Correspondent, July 18, 1892.)

Governments had at once responded, the two former with marked cordiality. Spain, after slight delay, had followed suit. France alone had held aloof, M. Ribot contenting himself with the statement that the draft Treaty would be studied. A later request had met with the repetition of the former statement, accompanied by the expression of a doubt as to the Mission's intentions being confined to the subject-matter communicated. Meantime, the French Colonial press had started a fierce campaign against the British Mission, and throughout its stay at Fez, had published a series of untruthful rumours as to its proceedings, inspired by the French representatives at Fez and Tangier, and followed, on one occasion, by a visit to the Foreign Office on the part of the French Ambassador.¹ At his last interview with the Sultan, Sir C. Euan-Smith was told by the latter that he "acknowledged to the full that he had made many promises regarding certain articles in the Treaty, and regarding the signing of the Treaty, which he had not fulfilled. He said that other people had advised him that the promises he had made would have evil results for himself, and, therefore, he could not act up to them."²

¹ July 15, 1892.

² "The action of the Moorish Government is attributed to French intrigue." (Reuter's Agent at Tangier, July 18, 1892.) "French action in this matter is, apparently, purely selfish, if not vindictive, as their Mission is prepared to start for Fez in September, expecting to obtain credit for negotiating a treaty and other proposals on the same lines as the British envoy." (*Times* Special Correspondent with the Mission, *Times*, July 22.) "News from Fez states that the Moorish Ministers who prevented the Sultan from concluding the British Treaty have each received \$10,000 from the French agent." (*Times* Tangier Correspondent, August 13.) (In this connection it is worthy of note that the Sultan offered Sir C. Euan-Smith £20,000 if he would drop certain clauses in the commercial Treaty, and when the offer was declined expressed surprise, seeing that he had often induced certain representatives of other Powers to withdraw objectionable requests by the simple method of squaring them in this way. C—6815.)

Referring to the intrigues directed against the British Mission, Lord Salisbury added, rather contemptuously: "It is not necessary to inquire with what object these inventions were framed, or from what source they came."¹ Assuredly it was unnecessary. The French Press—even its leading organs—openly expressed its delight at the defeat of an unselfish attempt to save Morocco from itself and from the designs of its enemies.

"The correspondence which has now been published"—concludes Lord Salisbury in his closing despatch to Sir C. Euan-Smith—"will sufficiently establish that there was nothing in your Mission prejudicial to the independence and integrity of Morocco, or threatening in any way the Sultan's prerogative, or his territorial rights. It was conceived and carried out in a spirit entirely conformable to the policy which her Majesty's Government have uniformly pursued, of upholding the Moorish Empire, and discouraging all efforts either to diminish its extent or to precipitate its fall."²

¹ C—6821.

² "As usual, France stood out. The Power which 'protects' the Shereef of Wazan, and which with scarcely any disguise supports him in his attitude of something like rivalry to the Sultan of Morocco, has yet obtained influence enough with the latter to put a stop to negotiations which were directed to the common advantage of Europe. Probably this will be represented to-morrow, by the Parisian journals, as 'a triumph of French diplomacy.' That Spain, Austria, England, and France herself are not to be allowed to import corn or horses from Morocco is 'a triumph for French diplomacy.' What it really means is that, even for a great common gain to Europe, France will not permit Great Britain to obtain influence at Fez lest, perchance, at some future time the claims of the mistress of Algeria to succeed to the Sultan's dominions should find themselves barred. The object is very problematic, and the immediate loss is very real. But there are some people to whom no present advantage counts in comparison to some sentiment of *amour propre*, especially of a national kind, and among these, we fear, are to be reckoned the French consular and diplomatic agents in backward countries, almost without exception, together with a large portion of the official and journalistic world of Paris." (*Times Leader*, July 19, 1892.)

Sir C. Euan-Smith's Mission constituted the last serious effort made by Britain to maintain the integrity and independence of Morocco, although British influence continued to preponderate until about 1902.

Nine years later (1901) the Moorish Government, filled with dismay at the sudden attitude assumed by France,¹ appears to have decided to throw itself upon the protection of Britain, and arranged to send a Mission to London. But here again French diplomacy effectively intervened. A Mission did come over, it is true, but another one accompanied it . . . to Paris,² and the envoys to Britain merely talked commercial affairs, Lord Lansdowne securing a few of the minor advantages for international trade urged upon the Sultan by Sir C. Euan-Smith.

¹ *Vide* Chapter II.

² *Vide Ibid.*

CHAPTER II

FRANCE AND MOROCCO

FRENCH interest in Northern Africa was confined until 1881 to Algeria, which after nearly twenty years' incessant and sanguinary fighting had been definitely declared French territory in 1848. From that time until 1870 the problems of Algerian administration proved sufficiently intricate and absorbing to keep in check the growth of ambitions in other directions. The disasters of the Franco-German war ensured a further period for the maintenance of the *status quo* in Northern Africa. But with that marvellous and rapid recovery which earned the admiration of the world, France entered upon a career of colonial activities which were to carry her far indeed.

In this course of action Jules Ferry, who incarnated the new colonial spirit, was personally encouraged by Bismarck, not, it may well be supposed, from altruistic motives, but because the grim German calculated that the more the interest of the hereditary foe he had overcome was immersed in oversea enterprises, the less fiercely would burn the fires of "La revanche" at home.

The aspirations of the new colonial party turned westwards towards Morocco and eastwards towards Tunis upon which Italian statesmen were casting covetous eyes. The scheme of a great North-West African Empire which should in time rival the lost Empire of the Indies, and

which Prévost-Paradol had, long before, predicted it must be France's destiny to found, began to take firm root.

In 1881, fearing a previous move by Italy, but on the flimsiest of intrinsic pretexts, Tunis was invaded, its ruler reduced to the position of a puppet, and French control established.

There remained Morocco. A long conterminous frontier with Algeria, vague and undetermined, offered an excellent basis for those multifold measures which precede political absorption. The opportunities were not neglected. But here France had to reckon not merely with the Moors themselves—very different material to handle from the more peaceable inhabitants of Tunis¹—and with a European Power which she could afford to defy, whose claims were no better than her own, but with Britain, with Spain, and with Germany. The task confronting her diplomacy was very similar to the secular policy of the Moorish Government. While the ingenuity of the latter was exercised in playing off one Power against another in order to preserve the integrity of his dominions, French diplomacy had to bring its designs to fruition by “feeling” the three other interested Powers with the purpose of purchasing the acquiescence of one or more of them at the expense of the other or others.

The motives inspiring the French were neither better nor worse than those which have animated other nations, or governments, from the remotest times. There will be eternal differences of opinion as to whether the control of their destinies by a race advanced in arts and crafts, conduces to the happiness and welfare of a race less advanced. There will be everlasting disputes as to whether a nation in the position of the French, *i.e.* with no surplus population and not essentially commercial, is strengthened or

¹ The subjugation of Tunisia was over in two years.

weakened by such enterprises. Assuredly no one dreams of blaming France for entertaining ambitious projects; but the methods taken to bring them to fruition become a matter for detailed discussion when they affect the interests of other Powers and international Treaties.

In its dull and inefficient manner the Moorish Government was fully alive to the intentions of the French, and despite the lavish expenditure of money, the activities of an admirably organised intelligence department working from Algiers, and incessant intrigues at Fez, the French cause advanced but slowly.

It was not until 1901 that under the impulse of an energetic Minister, then burning to avenge the final collapse, at Fashoda, of the French challenge to the British position in Egypt, and profiting by our embarrassments in South Africa, determined to force the pace. The annexation of the Tuat oases, threatened in 1891, was proclaimed, together with that of Igli and the Zufana oases. The French Minister at Tangier informed the Moorish Government that France would herself take action against the periodical invasion of her frontier by roving bands nominally under Moroccan suzerainty, and "engaging directly the responsibility of the Moorish Government." Providentially (for M. Delcassé) a French subject got himself murdered by a Moor at the psychological moment, and the French Minister at Tangier demanded the despatch of a couple of French men-o'-war.

Seized with panic the Sultan sent an embassy to Paris, and an agreement was drawn up giving France satisfaction on a number of points, including assurances as to the peace of the frontier. This "Protocol" was based upon—

"respect for the integrity of the Shereefian Empire on the one hand, and, on the other, an improvement in the

situation affecting the close neighbourhood (*de voisinage immédiat*) which exists between them, by all the special arrangements which the said neighbourhood necessitates.”¹

On July 27, 1901, M. Delcassé dotted the *i*'s and crossed the *t*'s in a communication to the new Minister at Tangier. After referring to the “evident proof of the frankly friendly feelings towards Morocco” displayed by France according to the terms of the “Protocol,” M. Delcassé went on to say that France could be, as the Moorish Government should decide, “either the most reassuring of friends, or the most redoubtable of enemies.” Then occurs the following passage typical of French diplomacy from that period onwards:—

“You should make the Sultan understand that it will depend upon himself to find in us friends the surest, the most anxious for the integrity of his power, the most capable of preserving him in case of need from certain dangers. Our loyalty as also our interest are guarantees to him that we shall not encroach upon it.”²

Thus was heralded the policy of “pacific penetration.” The time had not come for France to place her cards upon the table. But it was rapidly approaching.³

¹ French Yellow Book.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Vide* Chapter VIII.

CHAPTER III

SPAIN AND MOROCCO

CENTURIES upon centuries of strife and enmity ; the scars of wounds beyond the power of time to heal ; the bitterest remembrances of racial hatred and of terrible deeds committed on either side ; the cumulative memories of a struggle lasting for nearly eight hundred years—such is the history of Spanish relations with the Moors. It is a strange history in the sense that both participants have so curiously dwindled in stature. Of the erstwhile splendour of Moorish civilisation, only the monuments in Spain, the Alhambra, the Cathedral at Cordova, and so on, remain. The grandeur to which a consolidated Spain attained has likewise waned and passed away. While Morocco crumbles into decrepitude and dust, Spain's connection with the land of her ancient enemy to-day serves but the temporary uses of British insurance against a potential French peril.

Before the events of the past few years, which it is the purpose of this volume to narrate, made of Spain a factor of some importance in the European dispute over the Moorish carcass, her interests in Morocco had fallen to vanishing point, although sentimentally the link is still powerful enough. The proverbial Spanish pride may still have to be reckoned with.

Apart from their settlement at the Rio del Oro—

probably so-called because no gold ever came out of it—on the Saharan coast of nominal Morocco, and the ensuing undefined claim to that coast as far north as Cape Bojador with an undelimited strip of interior sand-dunes, the Spaniards possessed in 1900, on the Mediterranean littoral, the four *présides* of Ceuta,¹ Melilla,² El Penon de Velez de la Gomera,³ and Alhucemas,⁴ plus a small group of islands at the mouth of the Muluya, the Zaffarinas. On the Atlantic coast of Morocco proper the Sultan had consented to cede to Spain her ancient settlement of Santa-Cruz-de-Mar-Pequena, which modern geographers have doubtfully identified with Ifni; useful, perhaps, like the settlement at the Rio del Oro further south, to the picturesque fishing-boats from the Canary Islands which, at certain seasons of the year, make great catches along the dreary, surf-bound sea-board of Atlantic Morocco.

From time to time fierce and purposeless combats had taken place with the Riffians round Melilla. Spanish honour was apparently satisfied, and possibly the Riffians were equally pleased to recall their daring exploits of past ages by indulging in powder play.

A few privileges resulting from ancient treaties, of an economic kind, in some of the ports—when one has said this, one has said all of Spain's modern concern with Morocco, until M. Delcassé, in his anxiety to secure the prize, sought to convert her into the instrument of his designs. Of this more anon.

¹ An inhospitable, rocky promontory, upon which stands a fort, with a tiny strip of land around it.

² An island, insignificant in size, with 500 yards of hinterland.

³ A rock.

⁴ An island.

CHAPTER IV

GERMANY AND MOROCCO

IF I contribute a little more detail to Germany's interests in Morocco it is because the average Englishman appears to imagine that she had none at all until the gunboat *Panther* cast anchor, early last July, opposite Agadir,¹ and that her appearance upon the scene as a contestant was purely gratuitous, provocative, and unjustifiable. Germany's interest in Morocco is, of course, a modern interest, just as United Germany is a modern product, and although, even in Germany's case, research would show us old connections and relationships between certain German ports and principalities and the Moors, this volume is only concerned with the interested Powers and Morocco in modern times.

Two of the foremost explorers of Morocco were Germans, Lenz and Rohlf, and, in the sixties and seventies, their narratives attracted much attention in Germany, especially from the point of view of possible trade development. A German Resident to the Shereefian Government was first appointed in 1873.

Germany not only participated but played an active rôle in the first international Conference on the affairs of Morocco held at Madrid, and known as the Madrid

¹ On the South Atlantic coast of Morocco.

Convention, in 1880,¹ and her influence, joined to that of Britain, it was which resulted in the most useful outcome of that Conference being secured, viz. the extension of the "most favoured nation treatment" (hitherto confined to France and Britain) to all nations. Thenceforth international trade in Morocco was placed upon an equal footing for all countries.

In 1887 Germany acquiesced in the tentative proposals for a renewed Conference put forward by Spain with the object of improving and amplifying the Madrid Convention in sundry respects. Nothing, however, came of these proposals.

In 1889 the Moorish Government sent an embassy to Berlin.

In June, 1890, the German Minister at Fez signed a commercial Treaty with the Moorish Government for five years, the text of which is given in the Appendix.² It is worthy of note that the German Government informed the other signatory Powers of the Madrid Convention that it would not ratify that Treaty unless they gave their adhesion to it. The British Government raised no objection to its ratification, and ratified it was.

In 1892 Germany cordially supported, as we have already noted, Sir C. Euan-Smith's Mission to Morocco.³

¹ Appendix I.

² Appendix II.

³ "The actual dealings between the British Minister and the Sultan, who, by the law and practice of Morocco, takes personal cognisance of every detail of public diplomatic business, are believed to have been amicable, as are those between the Mission and most of the other European representatives. Germany, in particular, which negotiated the last commercial Treaty in 1890, has supported British diplomacy, and Spain and Italy are stated to have done the same. . . . The support of nearly all the interested Powers was accorded very freely to the British Envoy; and it is believed that Count Tattenbach, the German Minister, has been especially prominent in supporting the British attitude to obtain rights which would benefit all European nations." (*Times*, July 19, 1892.)

This co-operation did but perpetuate the spirit of the Anglo-German African settlement of July 1, 1890, characterised as follows by the then German Chancellor, Von Caprivi, when attacked for his undue friendliness to England: "We have desired above all to ensure our understanding with England."¹ In this connection it is instructive to bear in mind that even at this early period the policy of the German Government in regard to Morocco was vigorously criticised by the Pan-German party and the advanced colonials, who desired that Germany's rôle in Morocco should exceed the limits set to it by the German Government. This kind of pressure, from jingoes who wished to drag Germany into territorial adventures in Morocco, has never been lacking throughout the last decade, and now that the problem has been finally settled, in a sense, contrary to these aspirations, chagrin, as we see, has led to virulent onslaughts. Whether successive German Chancellors have invariably displayed the wisest tactics in dealing with these influences, only the most intimate knowledge of the internal difficulties German statesmen have had to face from these sources would enable an opinion to be formed of any value. And that knowledge no Englishman possesses. But there can be no serious doubt that the German Government and the German Emperor have repeatedly disavowed these attempts to force them into such channels, and have steadily refused to allow their Moroccan policy to be deflected from its normal and proclaimed course.

It can be asserted, without fear of contradiction, that

¹ "Our relations with England form one of the most important guarantees for the maintenance of European peace, and our Government cannot support colonial enterprises which, with no benefit to Germany, are directed against the interests of England." (*North German Gazette*, July, 1890.)

not one iota of proof from any quarter has been adduced that the rulers of Germany ever formulated or endorsed the wider aims of the German colonials: ever sought or laboured for the acquisition of coaling stations, or for a share in a dismembered Morocco.¹ Considering the determined efforts made in recent years to portray the policy of the German Government towards the Morocco question in the blackest of lights, and the god-send which a calculated indiscretion revealing the existence of such designs would have proved to those desirous of scoring off Germany, we may safely assume, I think, that if there had been anything to disclose to this effect, the world would certainly have been informed of it. At the same time Germany made it perfectly clear, from the first warning addressed to M. Delcassé by Prince Radolin, the German ambassador at Paris, in June, 1901, onwards, that she stood for an independent Morocco and complete commercial equality within it, and when the force of events had compelled a modification of the first of those

¹ For the utmost that can be said in a contradictory sense the reader is referred to a recent article by *Diplomaticus* in the *Fortnightly Review*. The article, which sets out to prove that the German Government's fixed idea for years has been the acquisition of a part of Morocco, fails to produce anything whatever in the nature of proof. On the other hand, it serves the very useful purpose of showing with what obstinacy the German Government resisted the persistent agitation of the Pan-German Colonials, who, of course, have continuously preached this policy, although opposed by several well-known German naval strategists. The article in question appeared before the frank admission of the French Foreign Minister in the Chamber in December of last year (*vide* Part V.), to the effect that from the very outset of the Franco-German negotiations which ensued after the *Panther's* arrival at Agadir, the German Government expressed its complete willingness to admit a French Protectorate over Morocco, subject to economic pledges and compensation elsewhere—an admission which effectually disposes of the whole story, and corroborates from a source beyond suspicion, the good faith of the German Government in the matter.

desiderata (even as they had compelled a change in the identical policy of Britain) Germany made it equally plain that she would not suffer such a modification without being consulted, and without exacting her price.

That she was intrinsically justified in taking up that position has, curious to relate, been more freely acknowledged in France than it has in England, although the official policy of France collided with the German standpoint, and although the bitter recollections of a great war still cast their shadow over the relations of the two peoples. Speaking in the French Parliament¹ M. Deschanel, President of the French Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, in the course of an explanation of the reasons which had led the Committee to recommend a ratification of the Franco-German Convention of November, 1911, by the Chamber, observed—

“Could we affect to ignore the efforts of Germany in Morocco for half a century, the travels of her explorers, the activity of her colonists, her agricultural and mineral enterprises, her steamship lines, her post-offices, and especially that movement of ideas which gravitated towards the Shereefian Empire, not in Pan-German circles and colonial committees alone, but in intellectual circles among that *élite* which, to the honour and power of that nation where all co-operate for the same ends, prepares the work of the diplomatists and soldiers.”

M. Deschanel was right. German interests in Morocco have steadily grown during the last ten years, and, potentially, are very considerable. They are being assisted in every possible way by the German Foreign Office and Consular staff, as is the case in South America, and, in fact, all over the world.

In the domain of Moroccan finance Germany is a

¹ On December 16, 1911.

large creditor upon Morocco, and a participant to the extent of no less than 20 per cent. in the 1910 Loan (as compared with France's 40 per cent. and Britain's 15 per cent.) negotiated through the Morocco State Bank, in whose capital she shares and on whose Board she is represented. She is a participant in the tobacco monopoly, formed as a supplementary guarantee to the bondholders of the 1910 Loan, and is represented on the Board. Through the Krupps, the Mannesmanns, and other firms, she holds such a preponderating position in the mining interest (at present virtually confined to the extraction of iron ore) that the German share-capital in the international *Union des Mines* will, it is understood, be no less than 40 per cent. if and when the negotiations now proceeding are finally completed. In the share capital of the *Société Marocaine des Travaux publics*, whose purpose, as its name implies, is the construction of sundry public works in Morocco, Germany is represented to the extent of 30 per cent., and has four representatives on the Board. The enlargement of the port of Larash is due to German enterprise.¹ Upon German enterprise² has devolved the construction of the projected harbour works, lighter basin and breakwater at Tangier, and also the drainage of that town. German enterprises at Tangier include a tobacco factory which employs one hundred and fifty hands, a bank, and a newspaper published in German.

Germany maintains nine Consulates in Morocco, which are also entrusted with the defence of Austrian interests.

The actual volume of German trade is not enormous, but has steadily grown, as the under-noted details show,³

¹ Messrs. Sager and Wörner, of Munich.

² Messrs. Holzmann & Co., of Frankfurt-on-Maine.

³ Morocco's commercial statistics are notoriously untrustworthy and difficult to ascertain, and the ceaseless alarms and excursions of

and she is everywhere actively pushing it as the lamentations of French official reports—echoed in the Chamber

the last three years have greatly interfered with normal trade. Consul White's report for 1909 states that German trade retains its rank of third on the list, Great Britain being an easy first, and France second. The French figures, however, include the trade of the Algerian ports with eastern Morocco, which is given on that account as "French," which is misleading, since a portion of the so-called French trade *via* Algeria is of British and German origin. The totals given in the British Consular report for 1909 show an export from Morocco to Britain of £800,030, to France of £629,818, to Germany of £339,428. Germany's total trade with Morocco for that year is given as £564,147, against £2,204,771 for Great Britain, and £2,195,109 (including Algeria) for France. According to the trade statistics of the German Empire, vol. 242, XIV., the following is the table of German trade with Morocco for the past ten years in millions of marks, but these figures are exclusive of precious metals; neither do they include the German trade with Melilla and the Riff (Spanish territory) or the German trade through the Algerian ports, but only the direct traffic with German ports:—

	<i>Exports from Germany to Morocco.</i>	<i>Exports from Morocco to Germany.</i>	<i>Total Trade (exclusive of precious metals).</i>
	<i>(In Millions of Marks.)</i>		
1901 . . .	3,632 . . .	1,564 . . .	5,196
1902 . . .	3,645 . . .	1,438 . . .	5,083
1903 . . .	4,651 . . .	1,664 . . .	6,315
1904 . . .	5,577 . . .	1,283 . . .	6,860
1905 . . .	6,017 . . .	1,725 . . .	7,742
1906 . . .	6,219 . . .	2,181 . . .	8,350
1907 . . .	10,134 . . .	1,673 . . .	11,807
1908 . . .	10,156 . . .	2,399 . . .	12,555
1909 . . .	8,589 . . .	4,175 . . .	12,764
1910 . . .	9,634 . . .	5,770 . . .	15,404

From all I can learn German trade is very much more extensive than this table would appear to suggest, although the growth it indicates is in itself considerable. The system pursued in elaborating these statistics seems to be thoroughly faulty. Thus, the Swiss, Italian, and Hungarian imports and the Italian, Levantine, and American exports appear as French or British trade, Marseilles on the one hand and Gibraltar on the other being the last (or first, as the case may be) port from (or to) which merchandise has been shipped. Similarly goods exported to Morocco from West Germany through Dutch and Belgian ports appear in the statistics as Dutch and Belgian goods; and

last December—bear witness. German merchants are to be met with in nearly every trade centre, such as Fez, Mogador, Marakesh, Agadir, Tangier, Larash, Casablanca, Saffi, etc. In 1907 the Germans held 40 per cent. of the trade of Casablanca, where there are a German bank and some fifty German residents. Three German steamship

goods exported from Morocco to Germany by British and Belgian boats *via* England and Belgium go to swell the British and Belgian trade figures. Then, again, Belgian sugar, Indian tea, etc., are consigned to Morocco direct on account of German firms, and, once more, figure as either Belgian or British imports. The fact is that German trade with Morocco, like that of the British firms, is largely international, German and British merchants not merely trading with Morocco direct from Germany and Britain, but between Morocco and France, England, Spain, America, and Italy. In this general world-trade of Morocco the British and the German share is, I gather, pretty equally divided, amounting to about 30 per cent., on either side, of the total, while 20 per cent. passes through Moorish-Jewish houses. In this general trade French trade plays very little part indeed. The French possess, however, the largest banking business in Morocco, and have an important place in the local retail business. According to the Berlin publication, *Murokko und Persien*, the local statistics of the two ports of Hamburg and Bremen combined show a total turn-over of business with Morocco of 14,940,119 marks in 1907, and 14,621,166 marks in 1908. It will be seen from these figures that Germany plays a very much larger part in the genuine trade of Morocco with the outer world than would appear from the statistics issued by the British Foreign Office. I have taken a good deal of trouble to get at the true facts as regards Morocco's international trade, and I believe that impartial investigation will confirm in a general way the statements made in this footnote. It should be added that a number of German firms, such as the Mannesmann Bros., Marx & Co. of Hamburg, Victor Sperling of Leipzig, Dörken of Gevelsberg, Hauss of Weissenburg, Herrman of Nurnberg, to mention a few, have invested a considerable amount of capital in Morocco. Mr. Rosher, who is thoroughly well acquainted with Morocco, records in his interesting little booklet, "Light for John Bull on the Morocco Question," that "The Germans hold more land in Morocco *paid for in cash* than all other nations combined, and without massacre or pillage they have established industries and performed genuine pacific penetration."

I hope that these figures will be borne in mind by the reader as he peruses the singular story developed in this volume.

companies call at Moroccan ports, and in 1907 three hundred and twenty-four German vessels, with a combined tonnage of 350,777 tons, were registered as having entered or cleared at eight Moroccan ports.

The German post-offices are admittedly, I believe, the most numerous and best equipped in Morocco.

German prospectors for minerals are now numerous in Morocco, and have penetrated regions supposed for many years to be inaccessible to European travellers. The importance which Germany attaches to the potentialities of mineral enterprises in Morocco is shown in the clauses of her recent Convention with France.¹

¹ Appendix XVI.

PART II

The Public Law of Europe regulating the international position of Morocco and its violation.

CHAPTER V

THE ACT OF ALGECIRAS

ON July 3rd last it became known that the *Panther* had cast anchor off Agadir, a small village of three hundred inhabitants on the inhospitable, storm-tossed, surf-cursed coast of Atlantic Morocco.

The event, which in itself seemed hardly worth chronicling in a newspaper paragraph, possessed, nevertheless, considerable international importance, insomuch as it was interpreted, and rightly interpreted, to mean that Germany was not prepared tacitly to acquiesce in the changed condition of affairs in Morocco.

How changed?

To answer that question we have first to consider what was the Public Law of Europe regulating the international position of Morocco when the *Panther* anchored off Agadir.

We have then to consider what alterations had been brought about in the position of Morocco since the Public Law was framed, and whether those alterations had received the sanction of the Powers which framed that Public Law.

The Public Law of Europe regulating the international position of Morocco at the time the event mentioned in the opening lines of this chapter occurred was known as

the General Act of Algeciras,¹ framed conjointly by the representatives of the Sultan of Morocco, and by the representatives of the following Powers in the order given under the Act, viz. Germany, Austria, Belgium, Spain, the United States, France, Great Britain, Italy, Holland, Portugal, Russia, and Sweden.

The immediate origin of its promulgation was as follows:—

On May 30, 1905, the Sultan of Morocco had invited the Powers² to a Conference to discuss the reforms which the internal State of Morocco required. That Conference³ had met at Algeciras early in 1906. An Act had been drawn up in April, "In the name of God Almighty"—

"based upon the threefold principle of the sovereignty and independence of his Majesty the Sultan, the integrity of his dominions, and economic liberty without any inequality."

The Sultan's representatives having declared that they could not sign the Act with the representatives of the other Powers as time would not allow of their receiving the Sultan's reply to the points they had thought it necessary to refer to him, the Italian Minister at Tangier, as Senior Member of the Diplomatic Body at Tangier, had been requested to assume the duty of obtaining the

¹ Appendix XII.

² "On the invitation which had been addressed to them by his Shereefian Majesty . . . in order to arrive at an understanding respecting the said reforms, as well as to examine the means of providing the resources necessary for their application." (Act of Algeciras. *Vide* also Appendix IX.)

³ Besides the four interested Powers, viz. Britain, France, Spain, and Germany, the following powers also signed the Act: Austria, Belgium, Italy, Holland, Portugal, Russia, Sweden, and the United States (with reservations).

Sultan's ratification and to convey to him : "the great advantages which would result for his Empire . . ." thereby.¹

This request the King of Italy had transmitted to the Sultan in the following communication :—

"Victor Emanuel III., by the grace of God and the will of the nation King of Italy, to the most High and Mighty Prince His Majesty Abd-el-Aziz, Emperor of Morocco.

"Most High and Mighty Prince, my dear and good friend. A Conference having met, by your Majesty's invitation, at Algeciras, at which there assembled the Representatives of the Powers friendly to your Empire, the decisions reached by common agreement are now collated in a General Act to which the signatures of your Majesty's Delegates only are wanting, they having wished to reserve its acceptance for the high judgment of their Sovereign. The Conference have therefore desired, and I have most willingly consented, that my Minister accredited to your Court, who is also doyen of the Diplomatic Body at Tangier, should repair to the presence of your Majesty, should present to your Majesty the General Act which has been agreed upon, and, speaking in the name of all the Powers assembled at Algeciras, should ask for your Majesty's adhesion and your Majesty's entire ratification.

"Your Majesty is aware of the affection which, as a tradition bequeathed us by our ancestors, unites me to your Majesty's person; these sentiments and the conviction that, by the adoption of the General Act in its entirety, much honour will accrue to your Majesty, and incalculable good to your Majesty's Empire, make me rejoice that the Powers should have intrusted this important duty to my Minister, whom I recommend by these presents to your Majesty's favour. I further wish your Majesty every happiness, while assuring

¹ Act of Algeciras.

your Majesty of my high esteem and my unalterable friendship.¹

“ Given in Rome, the 26th day of April, 1906.

“ Most affectionate and good friend,

“(signed) VICTOR EMANUEL.”

The Sultan had ratified the Act on June 18 as being—

“ based in the first instance on three principles, namely : maintenance of our sovereignty (in the text ‘ of our sovereign rights ’) of the independence of our aforesaid Empire, and of economic liberty in the matter of public works.”

The reforms stipulated in the Act affected (*a*) the organisation of the police, (*b*) the illicit trade in arms, (*c*) the creation of a “ Moorish State Bank,” (*d*) an improved yield of taxes and the creation of new sources of revenue, (*e*) the regulation of the customs and the suppression of fraud and smuggling, (*f*) the public services and public works. They may be summarised here.

As to the police, the Act provided that a force of from 2,000 to 2,500 men should be raised “ under the sovereign authority of the Sultan,” recruited by the Moorish Government from among Moorish Mohammedans, commanded by Moorish chiefs, and distributed among *eight ports* of commerce; that from forty-six to sixty French and Spanish officers and non-commissioned officers approved by the Sultan should be appointed as instructors to assist in the organisation of the force *for a period of five years*; ² that the

¹ The one thing lacking in this effusive message was, it will be perceived, an inquiry for his Shereefian Majesty’s personal health at the moment.

² The arrangement was, therefore, due to expire on June 18, 1911, if the period of its duration is reckoned from the date of the Sultan’s ratification, or in December, 1911, if the period is reckoned from the date of ratification by all the signatory Powers.

force should be placed for the same period under a Swiss Inspector-General, who would report to the Moorish Government, with whom his contract would be entered into, a copy of the same, together with a copy of his reports, to be communicated to the "Diplomatic Body" at Tangier.

As to the illicit trade in arms, the Act contained eighteen Articles, of which it is unnecessary here to speak except the last, which provided that in the "region adjoining the Algerian frontier" the enforcement of the regulations shall be the "exclusive concern of France and Morocco"; and similarly that in the neighbourhood of the Spanish possessions the matter shall be the "exclusive concern of Spain and Morocco."

As to the State Bank, the Act provided that a Bank called "The Morocco State Bank" should be established with power to exercise for forty years certain privileges "granted to it by his Majesty the Sultan." The privileges comprised the sole duties of "disbursing Treasurer of the Empire," and the position of "financial agent of the Government," but "without prejudice" to the right of the Government applying to other banks for its public loans, although with a "right of preference, other conditions being equal, over any other" banks. Other provisions on this head were that Spanish money should continue to circulate as legal tender: that the Bank should be constituted a limited liability company "subject to the law of France governing the matter": that it should be administered by a board consisting of as many members "as there are allotted portions in the initial capital": that the German Imperial Bank, the Bank of England, the Bank of Spain, and the Bank of France should each appoint a Censor: that the Moroccan Government should exercise "its

high control over the Bank¹ through a Moorish High Commissioner."

As to the improved yield of taxes and the creation of new sources of revenue, the most important provisos of the Act were that as soon as the *tertib*² tax was regularly enforced upon Moorish subjects, the subjects of the Powers settled in Morocco should also pay it: that foreigners should be free to acquire real property throughout the Empire³: that taxes might be imposed on town buildings on Moorish and foreign proprietors without any distinction: that in regard to the complaint of the Moorish Government that foreigners held Moorish Crown lands without regular title-deeds or revisionary contracts, an equitable settlement should be effected between the Diplomatic Body and "the Special Commissioner whom his Shereefian Majesty may be pleased to appoint": that 2½ per cent. customs duty should be imposed upon foreign goods, the revenue thus obtained to be expended on "public works undertaken for the development of navigation and trade generally in the Shereefian Empire," the programme and execution of these works to be settled by agreement between the "Shereefian Government and the Diplomatic Body at Tangier": that export duties on certain articles should be reduced: that a general coasting trade should be authorised: that any modifications in these and kindred provisions must be arrived at between

¹ The capital of the Bank is £616,000 divided into 30,800 shares of £20 each. The capital is distributed into fourteen parts, each part consisting of 2200 shares. Twelve of these parts are held by the twelve participating Powers, Messrs. Glyn, Mills, Currie & Co. representing the British group, and Mendelsohn & Co. the German group. A number of French banks hold the remaining two parts.

² A tax imposed, in lieu of the old Koranic taxes, upon arable land; fruit trees, and cattle. It is unpopular on religious and other grounds.

³ A reform vainly urged by Sir C. Euan-Smith.

the Moorish Government and the Diplomatic Body at Tangier.

The regulations as to customs and suppression of fraud and smuggling it is unnecessary to detail, but they provided *inter alia* for the creation of a mixed Customs Valuation Committee and a Mixed Customs Committee. On the French and Spanish frontiers the application of the regulations as to cases of illicit trade in arms was exclusively left to the Moorish and French and Spanish Governments respectively.

As to the public services and the construction of public works, the Act declared that in no case should the rights of the "State over the public services of the Shereefian Empire be alienated for the benefit of private interests": if the Moorish Government had recourse to foreign capital or industries in connection with the public services or public works, the Powers undertook to see that "the control of the State over such large undertakings of public interest remain intact": tenders "without respect to nationality" should regulate all orders for public works or the furnishing of supplies: no specification for tenders should contain either "explicitly or implicitly any condition or provision of a nature to violate the principle of free competition or to place the competitors of one nationality at a disadvantage as against the competitors of another": regulations as to contracts should be drawn up by the Moorish Government and the Diplomatic Body at Tangier.

The concluding Article (123) read as follows:—

"All existing Treaties, Conventions, and Arrangements between the signatory Powers and Morocco remain in force. It is, however, agreed, that in case their provisions be found to conflict with those of the present general Act, the stipulations of the latter shall prevail."

Such, then, had been the Public Law of Europe regulating the international position of Morocco since June 18, 1906.

Two Powers, France and Germany, had since that date signed a Declaration between them concerning Morocco, on February 8, 1909.¹ In this Declaration both Powers had described themselves as "equally anxious to facilitate the execution of the Act of Algeciras." With that proclaimed end in view, France had undertaken "not to obstruct German commercial and industrial interests" in Morocco; Germany had asserted the pursuance of "only economic interests in Morocco," had recognised "that the special political interests of France in that country are closely bound up with the consolidation of order and internal peace," and had declared herself "resolved not to impede those interests." Both Powers had mutually stated that they did not "pursue nor encourage any measure of a nature to create in their favour or in that of any Power an economic privilege," and that they would "endeavour to associate their nationals in affairs for which the latter may obtain a concession." France had, moreover, declared herself:—

"firmly attached to the maintenance of the independence and integrity of the Shereefian Empire."

This Declaration while in itself implying, therefore, on the part of France the admission of a very special German interest in the Moroccan question; and while in itself implying on the part of Germany a recognition of very special French interests in the Moroccan question, did not in the least modify or affect the Act of Algeciras. It merely indicated that the two Powers

¹ Appendix XIV.

treated one another on a footing of equality in their discussions on the subject of their joint and several concerns in facilitating the execution of the Act.

Our first question is thus answered. The integrity of Morocco and the independence of its Government had been solemnly proclaimed by the Powers. Discussions centring round the application and execution of the reforms, eventually agreed upon between the Powers and the Moorish Government, were to be conducted by representatives of the Sultan on the one part, and by the diplomatic representatives in Morocco of the Powers on the other, and this control of the foreign Diplomatic Body as a whole was even made to apply to the working *in eight ports* of the Police force, in which a limited number of French and Spanish officers, under a Swiss Inspector General, were to serve as inspectors. Only in matters such as the illicit traffic in arms and contraband were two European Powers—France and Spain—authorised to act with the Moorish Government independently of the General Diplomatic Body, and then only on the frontiers of their respective possessions.

Whether, in practice, the programme was, as a whole, workable or whether it was not, the fact remains that it was the programme which the Powers had themselves elaborated, and in which the Sultan had concurred.

CHAPTER VI

THE CRUCIAL ARTICLE OF THE ACT OF ALGECIRAS

"Nothing less than a general renunciation of all rights to individual interference on any pretext in the affairs of Morocco *and a common agreement collectively to require the reforms so much needed*, will ever accomplish the regeneration of the Moorish Empire. In face of such a united demand, with offers of support if needed, no refusal could be expressed, and provided that too much was not asked at once, and capable advisers were found, these reforms might be as peacefully carried out as under the English in Egypt. *But will Europe make this possible?*"¹

"ALL existing Treaties, Conventions, and Arrangements, between the signatory Powers and Morocco remain in force. *It is, however, agreed that, in case their provisions be found to conflict with those of the present General Act, the stipulations of the latter shall prevail.*"

This, as we have seen, was the 123rd and concluding Article of the Act of Algeciras.

Continuing the prosecution of our inquiry in the Socratic manner, what, let us ask, could the final and italicised sentence of the above Article mean? All through the Act of Algeciras there runs one continual refrain—coupled with insistence upon the collective control of the Diplomatic representatives of the Powers at Tangier²—viz. the integrity and independence of

¹ Budgett Meakin, "The Moorish Empire," 1899.

² Except in regard to the illegal traffic in arms and smuggling on the French and Spanish frontiers.

Morocco. The preamble explicitly declares that the reforms embodied in the Act are "based upon the sovereignty and independence of the Sultan and the integrity of his dominions." The Police force is placed under the sovereign authority of the Sultan; the nomination of the foreign Officers are to be submitted to the Sultan; the foreign Inspector-General reports to the Sultan and to the Diplomatic Body at Tangier. Even in the matter of the control of the State Bank, the Sultan's dignity and position are alike pointedly emphasised and international Censors are appointed. In the Articles dealing with improvements in the taxation and methods of raising revenue, the discussion and application of these reforms are left to the Moorish Government and to a majority vote of the Diplomatic Body; and similarly the regulations affecting changes in the Customs. The question we have asked admits, therefore, of but one reply. In laying down that no provisions existing in precedent treaties, conventions, or arrangements between the signatory Powers and Morocco should be allowed to prevail over the stipulations of the Act, the Powers laid down that no change in the political *status* of Morocco as declared in the Act should take place without their consent. On the face of it, Article 123 gave to any Power or Powers signatory to the Act the right of objecting to any such change. On the face of it, Article 123 made it incumbent upon any Power or Powers desirous of changing that *status* to obtain the consent of the other signatory Powers.¹

¹ This, moreover, was quite unquestionably accepted in the Report of the French Parliamentary Committee appointed by the Chamber to draw up a report on the Algeciras Act. M. Hubert, the Reporter, points out that the Act, while abolishing none of the antecedent conventions, must be held to predominate over them in the event of a

It was important to bring this out clearly, for, as the narrative proceeds, we shall find that Article 123 is the true basis upon which the German case reposes, and whatever views may be entertained as to the manner in which Germany has urged her case or as to her motives in urging it, the solid fact remains that in holding out as long as she could for an independent and territorially inviolate Morocco, Germany's position has been based upon the Public Law of Europe, and has been intrinsically unshakable on that account. That in doing so Germany pursued her own national interest; that in doing so she was no more concerned than were the other Powers in upholding Moroccan independence, from any altruistic considerations towards the Moors and their Ruler, such as might have inspired a united Europe animated by the high ideals described in Mr. Budgett Meakin's words at the head of this chapter; that she finally abandoned her position for compensations elsewhere—these things cannot impair the fundamental legality of her attitude.

Had the rôles been reversed; had British interests, in the opinion of those charged with defending them, lain in the direction in which Germany's interests lay during the years succeeding the Conference at Algeciras; had the policy of Britain in 1907-11 been concerned, as it was between 1880 and 1900, to maintain an independent Morocco, Britain would have urged her case upon precisely the same ground as Germany has urged hers, and those

dispute. The Act, he goes on to say, has the character of a Charter imposed upon Morocco, and postulates as its essential basis what the Reporter describes as the "traditional" (!) French policy of the sovereignty of the Sultan and integrity of his dominions. The Reporter goes on to recognise that the Madrid Conference of 1880 "*made of Morocco an international question.*" The importance of this admission, however obvious, will appear later.

who have denounced Germany for doggedly sticking to the stipulations of the Act, would have been employed in denouncing her for allowing them to be violated. But on its merits Britain's case would have been equally unanswerable.

CHAPTER VII

THE PROGRESSIVE VIOLATION OF THE ACT OF ALGECIRAS—IN BRIEF

WE have now to consider what alterations between June, 1906, and July, 1911, had been brought about in the position of Morocco, *i.e.* since the Public Law of Europe regulating its international position was framed, and whether those alterations had received the sanction of the Powers which framed that Public Law.

The answer can be given in a single sentence. In the five years which had elapsed since its ratification by the Sultan, the Algeciras Act had been, in effect, although without international sanction, torn across and reduced to waste paper, partly as the result of internal conditions in Morocco, mainly as the external result of the political action of France concurred in by Britain (and to a lesser degree of Spain) combined with the operations of international finance exercised through the medium of the French Government, to which the internal condition of Morocco was in the largest measure due. The circumstances under which the changed state of affairs had been brought about must be briefly outlined at this stage in our inquiry. They will be referred to more fully later on.¹

¹ *Vide* Chapter XV.

The young Sultan—Abdulaziz-ben-Hassan—was well-meaning, but extravagant and unpopular. He had become, to a great extent, Europeanised, and, in a national sense, debauched, by those whose interest it was to debauch him. Moreover, he had already contracted—*i.e.* before the Act of Algeciras—heavy cash liabilities. In the course of 1893 he had borrowed £800,000 from French, Spanish, and British syndicates. In the summer of 1904 these loans had been paid off, but only at the price of contracting a much heavier liability towards France *alone*, amounting to £2,500,000, bearing interest at 5 per cent. I say towards France alone advisedly, because the loan was confined to French banking establishments¹ and practically forced upon Abdulaziz by M. Delcassé. According to M. Jaurès' unchallenged statement made in the French Chamber on March 24, last year,² the emission of this loan was attended by such clever manœuvring on the part of the French banks that Morocco actually obtained £1,920,000 (forty-eight million francs), the Banks made a profit of £500,000 on the transaction, Morocco paying interest on the full amount, of course. To secure the interest on this loan the Sultan had been induced to consent to set aside 60 per cent. of the Customs receipts, which virtually gave France control over the Customs to that extent. Further smaller loans and liabilities were contracted in various directions during 1905 and 1906. A proportion of these monies was expended in purchasing guns and ammunition from the great French manufacturing house of war material, *Le Creusot*, in order to crush tribal risings which were becoming increasingly frequent, especially in the neighbourhood of the Algerian frontier. Indeed, there seems to have been a close connection

¹ All the leading French and French Colonial banks participated.

² *Journal Officiel*.

between the willingness of French finance to oblige Abdulaziz and the willingness of Abdulaziz to oblige *Creusot* on the one hand, and the willingness of the tribes in closest proximity to the Algerian-Moroccan frontier to play the game both of French finance and *Creusot* on the other. It was not surprising under these circumstances that various Pretenders should have arisen in Morocco and that the authority of the Sultan should have become more than habitually undermined.

But all this was merely a preparatory disturbance in the growing womb of the future.

On March 22, 1910, a Frenchman had been murdered at Marakesh, a town in the far interior of Southern Morocco. France had immediately used this regrettable incident as a pretext for invading Moorish territory and occupying the town of Udja and neighbourhood, situate just over the Algerian boundary. There she had remained (despite frequent pledges to evacuate the place), the first step in the process of infringing the integrity of Morocco.

The next step in the process had been far more comprehensive. A Franco-Spanish syndicate had obtained a concession for building a railway from Casablanca, an important trading town on the Atlantic coast of Morocco. Outside and to the east of Casablanca lay a vast Moorish cemetery of great antiquity. Through this cemetery the company, despite local protests, determined to drive their line. A collision occurred between the population and the European workmen in the company's employ, in the course of which several of the latter were killed. This led to a confused *melée* inside and outside of Casablanca. The French thereupon bombarded Casablanca¹ and overran the whole of the extensive

¹ Thousands of Moors were killed in Casablanca alone.

Shawiya district which lay behind it. Further and sanguinary fighting involving the slaughter of a great number of Moors took place.¹

French troops settled down in the occupation both of Casablanca, of Rabat, another important coast-town north of Casablanca, and of the entire Shawiya district, and there, notwithstanding repeated public pledges to evacuate, they had remained (and remain).

The integrity of Moroccan territory had gone by the board.

The financial strangulation of Morocco had thereupon been resumed. France presented the Moorish Government with a bill of £2,400,000 for the expenses she had incurred by her own conduct in seizing Moroccan territory and killing thousands of the Sultan's subjects. A further bill was presented embodying the claims for compensation for losses suffered by European and Moorish merchants through the bombardment of Casablanca! Morocco had to pay that too!²

"The incalculable good to your Majesty's Empire" which the King of Italy as mandatory of Christian Europe (through his representative), to secure the Sultan's ratification of the Act of Algeciras, had assured the Sultan would accrue to him as the result of his acceptance of that Act, was, as will be seen, already in a fair way of being realised.

The natural consequence of these cumulative occurrences had been an outburst of fury against Abdulaziz, which was to cost him his throne. Mulai-Hafid, his brother, was proclaimed Sultan at Fez on January 4, 1908.

¹ "*La pacification du pays des Choouias a fait couler beaucoup de sang.*" (M. Augustin Bernard, at the North African Congress held in Paris in October, 1908.) Spain co-operated in the Casablanca operations; but her co-operation was merely nominal.

² They were eventually settled for £522,784.

Morocco became rent with civil war. In August, 1908, Abdulaziz was decisively and finally defeated by his brother's forces.

Almost at once international finance, used by the French Government as a convenient lever, had dug its talons afresh into now dying Morocco. (Spain also undertook a small campaign against the tribes near Melilla and presented a bill for £240,000.) France had pressed the Sultan to contract another loan. After innumerable intrigues all liabilities contracted since the consolidated French loan of 1904 were merged into a £4,040,000 loan—secured upon various sources of Moorish revenue including the remaining 40 per cent. of the Customs—by an international syndicate in which France held the lion's share. Morocco's indebtedness to Europe by the autumn of 1910 was thus £6,520,000 !

This loan, like the previous one, was literally forced upon the Sultan. It was negotiated outside the Sultan altogether, insult being added to injury through the nomination by France as so-called guardian of Morocco's interests of a Coptic journalist! Mulai-Hafid refused to ratify the agreement, and only yielded in the face of a French *ultimatum*. The French interest in the loan was 40 per cent., the German 20 per cent., the British 15 per cent., the Spanish 15 per cent., the balance being distributed among other countries. The bonds, of 500 francs, were issued to the public at 485 francs, and in Berlin and Madrid were many times over-applied for. According to M. Jaurès' unchallenged statement in the French Chamber on March 24 last year, the participating French banks were allowed to take up the bonds at 435 francs, the public was not permitted to come in at all even at 485 francs, and in the afternoon of the day of issue the bonds went up to 507 francs. The

remaining 40 per cent. of the Customs, certain harbour dues, and the tobacco monopoly were mortgaged as security for the bondholders—thus depriving the Moorish Government of all its resources save those which it might succeed in raising by direct taxation. The loan itself the Sultan could not touch, for it was already earmarked to pay off Morocco's previous debts.

In order to carry on the machinery of Government, indeed to keep up any form of native Government at all, the unfortunate Sultan had no alternative but to spend his remaining strength in wringing tribute by violence from the tribes. By this time he had become a helpless puppet in the hands of France, and the exactions and cruelties to which he was driven in order to make both ends meet, resulted in the last vestige of his authority being flung off. His surrender to the European financial octopus was described by the *Times* Tangier Correspondent as having "humbled" his "arrogance in the eyes of Europe and of *his own people*." A few weeks later we find the same Correspondent exclaiming that the "greater part of the country has been driven almost desperate by Mulai-Hafid's exactions." But what else could have been expected? What else, it may be added, was desired? It was merely the operation of cause and effect. Europe had emptied his exchequer and prevented him from refilling it. He was faced with an ever increasing anarchy and with the desertion of the troops he could no longer pay. And all the while, France pressed her "reforms" and extended the area of her military occupation. The condition of Morocco became absolutely chaotic, and the Sultan, unable to fight, unable to rule, unable to move, finally appealed to France. The French were only too ready to oblige!

In April, 1910, General Moinier, at the head of 30,000 troops, had marched upon Fez, meeting with little or no opposition, occupying Mequinez and other places *en route*, and had finally entered the capital where he proceeded to settle down.

Spain, alarmed at the now open consummation of French designs, had, despite French protests, proceeded on her part to occupy Larash and El-Kasr, the former an important seaport on the North Atlantic coast of Morocco, the latter an important inland place in the Gharb, and also Ifni¹ on the South Atlantic coast, and had flung 20,000 men into the Riff (Mediterranean Morocco).

Such was the position when Germany sent the *Panther* to anchor off Agadir, neither landing a man, nor occupying a yard of territory, still less shooting down a single Moor; but intimating to the world that she did not propose to allow the Act of Algeciras to be set aside through the action of France and Spain without discussion.

Before considering the step taken by Germany and its international effects, our inquiry must be directed towards ascertaining how it has come about that the Public Law of Europe affecting Morocco, embodied in the Algeciras Act, has been so flagrantly set aside, and why the British Government in particular has been the passive spectator not only of the violation of an Act ratified by Britain, but of the systematic destruction of the independence and integrity of Morocco, which for long years it had been the traditional policy of successive British Governments to prevent.

To do this we must unravel the history of the events leading up to the Conference of Algeciras, and display in their unattractive nakedness those complicated evolutions

¹ *Vide* Chapter III.

which, when the destinies of nations are concerned, go by the name of diplomacy, and whereby the happiness, the prosperity, and the lives of millions of men and women are often placed in deadly peril without their knowledge or consent.

PART III

The Antecedents of the Act of Algeciras.

CHAPTER VIII

FRENCH POLICY TOWARDS THE MOORISH GOVERNMENT, 1900-1903

NOTWITHSTANDING the failure of Sir C. Euan-Smith's Mission in 1892—owing, as we have seen,¹ to French intrigue—Great Britain continued to enjoy greater moral influence in Morocco than any other Power. The Moors, at any rate the ruling classes, dislike all Europeans, but they, nevertheless, trusted us, because they knew that we stood between them and French absorption. They were aware that we had no designs on their country, and that we treated them fairly in commercial matters. For the French they entertained both fear and hatred. The cause of this fear was obvious enough, and hatred went along with it, heightened by recollections of the past. The long and bloody struggle between the French and Abd-el-Kadr had had its repercussion among his co-religionists in Morocco, whence, at one period in the contest, the Arab patriot had drawn many recruits: certain incidents in that struggle,² such as the forging of Abd-el-Kadr's Seal, whereby the French forces gained a passage through the "Iron Gates," and the tragedy of the caves on Dahra

¹ *Vide* Chapter I.

² For an impartial account of these episodes, and the general story of the Franco-Algerian Wars, see Sanderson's "Africa in the Nineteenth Century."

plains had never been forgotten. After ourselves, but a long way after, came the Germans in Moorish estimation, owing to their honest commercial methods, their habit of paying for land in cash, and their genuine enterprise free from political intrigue. Later on, when the Moors found themselves left to French devices by Britain, it was to Germany, as we shall see, that they turned for help,¹ only to be forsaken when it no longer became Germany's interest to protect their independence,² which, however, it is but fair to add Germany could only have then defended at the cost of a European war.

Absorbed in wider schemes of African conquest in the western and central equatorial regions, France had not forced the pace in Morocco during the seven years following the failure of the Euan-Smith Mission. The recrudescence of her activity was contemporaneous with the prolongation of the Boer War. In 1900 she annexed the Tuat oases,³ to which Morocco laid nominal claim. In 1901 she signed a treaty of friendship with the Moorish Government, followed by M. Delcassé's formal declaration of attachment to Moorish integrity and independence given in Chapter II. In 1902⁴ a further arrangement was signed on the same lines, accompanied by the same assurances and especially concerned with ensuring peace in the continually troubled Moroccan-Algerian frontier region. By Article I. of this arrangement the Moorish Government undertook to—

“consolidate its authority by every possible means throughout its territory from the mouth of the Kiss to Figig.”

¹ 1905–1910, especially in 1905. *Vide* Chapter XV.

² 1911.

³ At a cost to the French tax-payer which, by 1910, had reached £2,400,000, *vide* Colonial Budget Report for that year: the occupation was then costing £140,000 per annum for a total trade of £60,000.

⁴ April 20.

The French Government undertook, for its part, to assist the Moorish Government, if necessary, in the task. Article I. further provided that—

“The French Government will establish its authority and peace in the regions of the Sahara, and the Moorish Government, its neighbour, will assist by every means in its power.”

The establishment of “mixed Franco-Moorish markets” in the frontier regions, and mutual assistance in the collection of customs dues were also stipulated in the arrangement. In other words, there was to be Franco-Moorish control in the vague undetermined region bordering the common frontier which, from time immemorial, raiding bands had crossed and recrossed in search of plunder; a system of “dual and mutual support.” Such was French policy in appearance, and very possibly in intention at that time, at least among some of the governing elements in France; but not, undoubtedly, in conformity with the views either of the French Colonial Party in Paris or of the forward school in Algeria. At the close of that year (1902) Abdulaziz began contracting his loans upon the French market.¹ In April, 1903, M. Loubet, the President of the French Republic, paid a visit to Algiers, and the Sultan despatched a special Mission to Algiers to salute him. The Yellow Book gives the speech delivered by the Moorish envoy, of which the following sentence may be quoted as crystallizing in Moorish eyes, the policy embodied in the friendly arrangements of 1901-1902—

“To increase the prosperity of the two neighbouring countries (Algeria and Morocco), to develop and improve their relations, to extend their trade by reciprocal penetration and definitely to establish peace and security in the

¹ *Vide* Chapter VII.

frontier region, such is the object we are pursuing, and which does not appear impossible of attainment between two countries naturally united by their geographical positions, and which are destined mutually to help and assist each other."

A French author of repute, and an expert on the Moroccan question, writing of these events at the time of the Conference at Algeciras,¹ whose vigorous attacks upon Germany absolve him from any charge of *lèse-patriotism*, but who, like many other Frenchmen, blames the precipitate transformation of a policy of honest and progressive influence exercised from outside, and consistent with formal and reiterated pledges, into one of aggression and intrigue, tells us that the Moorish envoy expected to hear from M. Loubet's lips a confirmation of his own words, *i.e.* "a formal guarantee of territorial and sovereign authority, of Moroccan integrity, of the Moorish Government's independence, neither invasion nor annexation nor Tunisification, but the system of 'dual and mutual' support," in accordance with the arrangements of 1901 and 1902, which had had the effect of lulling Moorish suspicions of French designs. In his reply, says the French writer, the Moorish envoy was to have declared that—

"Satisfied with French friendship and needing no further guarantee, since Morocco had no other (European) neighbour, Morocco would no longer require to lean upon other Powers for the proclamation and the maintenance of Moroccan integrity."²

And he adds on his own account—

¹ M. Bérard.

² The substance of this proposed public exchange of pledges was discussed between the Sultan and the French representative at Fez—doubtless with the authority of Paris—as an inducement for the former to send a special mission to greet M. Loubet.

"If this exchange of promises had taken place, how much easier the work of the Conference would have been to-day!"

But M. Loubet disappointed the Sultan's expectations. He gave no such pledge, contenting himself with a few pleasant common-places. The influences in France and in Algeria inimical to the policy consecrated in the arrangements of 1901-1902 had become too strong, as events in Algeria and in Morocco were speedily to demonstrate. Uprisings against the Sultan's authority had again occurred on the Morocco side of the Algerian frontier, and two months after the Loubet interview Figig was bombarded by orders of the Governor-General of Algeria, thereby ruining the prestige of the Sultan in a district recognised as Moorish by the arrangement of 1901. The General commanding the French troops informed the leading men of the place after the bombardment that France was not concerned in the dispute between the Sultan and his subjects, thereby further damaging the Sultan's authority. From that time onwards the influence of Algiers succeeded step by step in negating the efforts made by the French representative at Fez, who desired to uphold the spirit of the arrangements of 1901 and 1902. None of the stipulations of the agreement in regard to mutual assistance in preserving order and collecting customs revenues were kept. The Sultan's authority suffered humiliation after humiliation. Incessant demands came from Algiers to Paris for "energetic action" and incitements for further military displays.

So far the contents of this chapter have wholly been taken from French sources. From British sources worthy of credence it has been constantly asserted that the "stirring up" of the tribes on the Algerian-Moroccan

frontier partook then, and since, of the nature of a fixed policy on the part of the French authorities in Algiers.

So much for the characteristics which marked the recrudescence of French activity in Morocco itself from 1900 to 1903. On the European stage French diplomacy was engaged in preparing the way for the first "combination" contemplated by M. Delcassé, viz. a Franco-Spanish protectorate accompanied, there is some reason to suppose, by formal guarantees of an economic order towards Germany to ensure her neutrality in the transaction, but to the total exclusion of Britain, which "for twenty years"—in the words of M. André Tardieu—"had been in Morocco our (France's) most redoubtable adversary."¹

¹ At the National African Congress, held in Paris, October, 1908.

CHAPTER IX

M. DELCASSÉ'S ATTEMPT TO PARTITION MOROCCO WITH SPAIN, 1900-1903

THE cynicism of a certain school of diplomacy has seldom been better illustrated than in M. Delcassé's public professions towards Morocco in 1901 and 1902, and his concurrent secret negotiations with Spain. To moralise upon it would be superfluous. Not to profit by the lesson it conveys would be foolish. However easily it can at times be led astray upon international affairs, Public Opinion in Britain is essentially a healthy one, and so much prejudiced nonsense has been written during the past twelve months on the relative straightforwardness of French and German diplomatic methods that, apart from its historical interest, this particular chapter of the Moroccan affair is worthy of the most careful attention by Englishmen.

Having insured himself (in 1900) against any possible trouble on the Italian side by giving Italy a free hand in Tripoli so far as France was concerned, M. Delcassé proposed to Spain the following year a partition of Morocco. To what extent Germany may have been cognisant of the scheme is as yet unrevealed. Possibly there is nothing to reveal. Certain indications, however, would seem to suggest the contrary, but as no public documents are accessible—at least to the writer's knowledge—which

would throw light upon the subject, it seems useless to wander in the domain of speculation and surmise. The nature of the negotiations with Spain was, however, placed beyond all doubt by the speeches of the Duke d'Almodovar del Rio, the Foreign Minister in the Sagasta Cabinet,¹ and of Senhor Maura, the then Premier, in the Spanish Cortes, in June, 1904, two months after the conclusion of the Anglo-French "Declaration." The story as disclosed by these high personages and by the publication of Senhor Silvela's² letter to the Duke d'Almovodar del Rio in the *Imparcial* on June 10,³ was as follows:—

The scheme submitted to the Sagasta Cabinet by M. Delcassé proposed a division of Morocco in the following manner: Spain was to obtain North Central Morocco, including Fez and Taza, and the North Atlantic Coast, France the remainder. The negotiations, begun in the summer of 1901, continued all that year, and were prosecuted throughout 1902. M. Delcassé's main idea was to settle the Moroccan question once and for all, and behind the back of Great Britain, and the fact was not concealed in the debates to which I am alluding. Senhor Sagasta hesitated a long time, and during the late summer and autumn of 1902 M. Delcassé pressed the Spanish ambassador in Paris repeatedly to hasten the proposed solution, promising that the "diplomatic support" of France would be assured to Spain in case of difficulties with a third Power. At the end of September it seemed as though the matter were going through, and the Treaty was put into final shape. In December Senhor Sagasta suddenly resigned, and his successor, Senhor Silvela, who, when in Opposition, as he himself admits in his letter to

¹ March, 1901, to December 6, 1902.

² Premier from December 7, 1902, to December 5, 1903.

³ 1904.

the Duke d'Almovodar del Rio, had been taken into the fullest confidence of the Sagasta Cabinet, and had at one time approved the project, refused to ratify the Treaty, and broke off the negotiations.

What had happened? The explanation was explicitly and implicitly avowed in the Cortes, and in Senhor Silvela's letter. Britain had been left out in the cold, and the British Government, having got wind of what was in the air, did not conceal its displeasure.¹

The attitude of Britain determined the Sagasta Cabinet to resign at the last moment rather than make itself responsible before the country for the consequences, and Senhor Silvela took the same line. "For the remainder of my days I should have been unable to sleep" —exclaimed Senhor Maura in the Cortes²—"if I had belonged to a Government which had affixed its signature to the Treaty." "It was Providence which intervened at that moment to show its love for Spain," added the Spanish Premier, with unconscious humour.³ In his letter Senhor Silvela says bluntly—for a Spaniard—that for weak nations it is especially indispensable that "the most complete loyalty towards neighbours and interested parties in international affairs must be an inflexible rule of diplomacy." He was not satisfied on that score:—

"France offered us her diplomatic support, but this was not sufficient to comfort me under the circumstances."

He had, therefore, determined to suspend his signature

¹ Englishmen who consider unreasonable Germany's displeasure at having been treated in the same cavalier fashion by M. Delcassé in 1904, may do well to bear this in mind. Our annoyance in 1902 was as justifiable as that of Germany two years later.

² June 9, 1904.

³ Senhor Maura was a member of the Silvela Cabinet.

to the Treaty until he had taken steps to remove all doubts as to the views of "friendly Powers" by sounding them. Having done so he preferred that Spain should, if necessary, content herself with lesser gains rather than run the risk of "adventures."

Thus was frustrated M. Delcassé's first attempt secretly to secure a French protectorate over the greater part of Morocco.

CHAPTER X

THE ANGLO-FRENCH DECLARATION OF APRIL, 1904, AND ITS SECRET ARTICLES

ON April 8, 1904, the numerous outstanding causes of friction which had arisen between France and Britain in various parts of the world were simultaneously settled by a series of separate arrangements. A Convention regulated the Newfoundland fisheries¹ and the West African boundaries problem²; a Declaration put an end to the Siamese, Madagascar and New Hebrides disputes,³ the former of which, under Lord Rosebery's administration, had brought us to the eve of war. Finally, and most important, a Declaration concerning Egypt and Morocco had rid us of irritating pin-pricks in Egypt at the price of surrendering our traditional policy in Morocco. To the latter arrangement were attached secret articles which only saw the light last November (1911).⁴

Public opinion rightly regarded these collective understandings with a favourable eye. But the last of them found a strong critic in Lord Rosebery, who scandalised a great many people by denouncing it as the most "one-sided agreement ever concluded between two Powers at

¹ Cd. 2383.

² Cd. 2383, completing the Convention of June 14, 1898---C. 9334.

³ Cd. 2385.

⁴ Cd. 5969 and Appendices III. and IV. *Vide* also Introduction.

peace with each other," and adding thereto an expression of hope "that the Power which holds Gibraltar may never have cause to regret having handed Morocco over to a great military Power."¹

The agreement regarding Egypt and Morocco differed from the others inasmuch as it affected, while the others did not, the interests of third parties. The British Government, as the party more particularly interested in the Egyptian section of it, formally notified the Powers—notably Germany. A similar courtesy was incumbent upon the French Government as concerned the Morocco section of the agreement. But, for reasons which appear to have been purely personal, M. Delcassé failed formally either to notify Germany or Spain, the two other particularly interested Powers.² In the case of Spain this breach of diplomatic courtesy, which was the subject of criticism in the course of the debate in the Spanish Cortes in the ensuing June, was subsequently rectified in the manner which will be explained hereafter. In the case of Germany it was never rectified, and from this incident, coupled with the nature of the agreement itself, and aggravated by further proceedings which will be described in due course, dates the Franco-German dispute, which in its later phases has brought France, Germany, and Britain, and with them all Europe, to the very brink of war.

The crucial Article (2) of the arrangement, made public at the time, concerning the future of Morocco was this—

¹ Queen's Hall, June 10, 1904.

² *Vide* Chapters III. and IV. "The declaration of April 8, 1904, between the United Kingdom and France was not officially communicated to the German Government, and there was no communication between H.M. Government in regard to it, so far as it had reference to Morocco." (Lord Percy, in the House of Commons, April 6, 1905.)

"The Government of the French Republic declare that they have no intention of altering the political status of Morocco.

"His Britannic Majesty's Government, for their part, recognise that it appertains to France more particularly as a Power whose dominions are conterminous for a great distance with those of Morocco, to preserve order in that country, and to provide assistance for the purpose of all administrative, economic, financial, and military reforms which it may require.

"They declare that they will not obstruct the action taken by France for this purpose, provided that such action shall leave intact the rights which Great Britain, in virtue of treaties, conventions, and usage, enjoys in Morocco, including the right of coasting trade between the ports of Morocco, enjoyed by British vessels since 1901."

As in the case of many agreements arrived at between diplomatists, it is possible to argue various shades of significance from the above stipulations. Paragraph One appears to constitute a categorical pledge on the part of France to maintain the independence and integrity of Morocco. Paragraph Two appears to convey no more than the recognition on the part of the British Government of an obvious truth, and is in no sense incompatible with the public declaration of the French Government in 1901¹ or with the tenor of the Franco-Moorish "Protocol" of that year and the Franco-Moorish agreement of 1902.² From this point of view Article 2, while undoubtedly conveying a declaration of British political disinterestedness in Morocco, and thereby indicating a notable change in British policy, cannot be interpreted as implying British assent to a French Protectorate over that country, which

¹ *Vide* Chapter II.

² *Vide* Chapter VIII.

could not come about without "altering the political status of Morocco." On the other hand, it may equally be contended that the term "political status" is vague: that it does allow of an actual, although not a nominal, French Protectorate being exercised over Morocco, and that in recognising that it appertained more particularly to France to "preserve order" in Morocco, the British Government clearly bound Great Britain to recognise a French Protectorate.

That the latter interpretation is the one which accurately represented the views of the diplomatists concerned is evident from the secret articles and from subsequent events. But in 1904, and in the years that followed, the wording of Article 2 of the published part of the agreement was sufficiently anomalous to complicate our share in these transactions in the event of any international trouble arising out of them—which, in fact, was what happened.¹

By Article 4 the British and French Governments declared themselves, both as regards Egypt and Morocco, "equally attached to the principle of commercial liberty"; that they would not "countenance any inequality either in the imposition of customs duties or other taxes, or of

¹ That anomaly was emphasised by the public Franco-Spanish Declaration of October 3, 1904, which is dealt with further on, and which contains an explicit mutual adherence to the "integrity of the Moorish Empire." But since November *last* the world has become aware that the Franco-Spanish Declaration was merely a blind—so far as the independence and integrity of Morocco were affected—to a secret Convention postulating partition. Taken together both *public* Declarations uphold the independence of Morocco; taken together the *secret* arrangements tacked on to them provide for the destruction of that independence. Therein has lain the root of the entire mischief. It was a dishonest policy; it was dishonest diplomacy; and it has brought its own inevitable Nemesis. It has cost the British and French tax-payers millions of money.

railway charges"; that the trade of both nations should "enjoy the same treatment in transit through the French and British possessions in Africa," and that "concessions for roads, railways, ports, etc., should only be granted on such conditions as would maintain intact the authority of the State over these great undertakings of public interest." These provisions were to hold good for thirty years only.

How entirely inadequate was this Article to protect and safeguard the commercial interests of Britain, and those of other Powers concerned in the trade and general economic development of Morocco, may be seen at a glance. The prohibition of differential tariffs upon trade in favour of the Power politically predominant in Morocco did not extend beyond thirty years—a very small fraction of time in the life of a nation. At the end of thirty years it was open to France to put into full vigour those processes which have so greatly hampered British trade, and trade other than French, in Algeria and Tunis, and virtually strangled it in Madagascar and French Congo. Not the slightest provision was made in the Article to ensure for international enterprise a participation, on equal terms of contract and tender, either in the construction of public works in Morocco or in the future mineral development of the country whose mineral wealth was known to be potentially immense. So far as Britain and other Powers were concerned, Morocco was in future and in an economic sense handed over to French industry by the British Government to the detriment of British and foreign—other than French—industry and enterprise.

Article 9 provided that the two Governments should "afford to one another their diplomatic support in order to obtain the execution of the clauses of the present Declaration."

Their "diplomatic support." Let the words be retained.¹

But while content to abandon its traditional policy of an independent Morocco and to leave British commercial interests in that country to the tender mercies of French *entrepreneurs* and French *fiscalitis*, in exchange for the immense advantage of relief from perennial difficulties in Egypt, the British Government was not prepared to compromise the safety of the Straits altogether. Article 7 stipulated that neither Government should "permit the erection of any fortifications or strategic works on that portion of the coast of Morocco comprised between, but not including, Melilla and the heights which command the right bank of the River Sebou."² Article 8 stipulated that France should come to an understanding with Spain, bearing in mind the latter's interests derived from her "geographical position and her territorial possessions on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean."

Now for the secret Articles. Article 1 foresees the possibility of either Government "finding themselves constrained by force of circumstances to modify this policy in respect to Egypt or Morocco." In that event the provisions of the public Declaration are to hold good. Article 3 is of capital importance, prefiguring as it does a French Protectorate and imposing upon that French Protectorate a permanent Spanish mortgage on the Mediterranean and North Atlantic coasts of Morocco. It reads as follows :—

¹ "An agreement to afford diplomatic support *does not impose on any Power an obligation either to give or to withhold military or naval support.*" (Mr. Acland, replying for the Foreign Office to a question in the House on November 27, 1911.)

² See Map.

"The two Governments agree that a certain extent of Moorish territory adjacent to Melilla, Ceuta, and other *présides* should, whenever the Sultan ceases to exercise authority over it, come within the sphere of influence of Spain, and that the administration of the coast from Melilla as far as, but not including, the heights on the right bank of the Sebou shall be entrusted to Spain.

"Nevertheless, Spain would previously have to give her formal assent to the provisions of Articles 4 and 7¹ of the Declaration of to-day's date, and undertake to carry them out.

"She would also have to undertake not to alienate the whole, or a part, of the territories placed under her authority or in her sphere of influence."

Having thus disposed of France's "most redoubtable adversary in Morocco,"² M. Delcassé turned once more to Spain.

¹ The economic stipulations and the non-erection of fortifications between Melilla and the Sebou River.

² *Vide* closing paragraph of Chapter VIII.

CHAPTER XI

THE FRANCO-SPANISH DECLARATION OF OCTOBER, 1904, AND THE SECRET CONVENTION ATTACHED THERETO

IF the character of the Anglo-French Declaration of April, 1904, *i.e.* the understanding come to between Britain and France, as the world was permitted to know it, was modified by the secret Articles of which the world was not apprised; the public Franco-Spanish Declaration¹ of the ensuing October 3 was a mere blind for the secret Convention signed at the same time. The Declaration consists of two sentences. Its purport, the solitary assertion that both Powers—

“remain firmly attached to the integrity of the Moorish Empire under the sovereignty of the Sultan,”

and on the part of Spain a declaration of adherence to the Anglo-French Declaration of April 8.

In the secret Convention,² France and Spain calmly arrange for the partition of Morocco. They do so, of course, with British concurrence, in accordance with Article 8 and secret Article 3 of the Anglo-French understanding,³ and the secret Convention is communicated by

¹ Appendix V.

² Appendix VI.

³ *Vide* Chapter X.

M. Delcassé to the British Government, which acknowledges receipt of it on October 6.¹

The chief provisions of the secret Convention are these—

Article 2 establishes the—

“sphere of influence which falls to Spain by virtue of her possessions on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean,”²

and where she shall possess the same “right of action” as France has acquired by the Anglo-French understanding in the remainder of the country, *i.e.* “to preserve order in” and to “provide assistance for . . . all administrative, economic, financial, and military reforms which it may require.”³ Spain, however, undertakes not to exercise her “right of action” for fifteen years without the consent of France, unless, and here Article 3 leaves the way clear for a cynical breach of the public Declaration, whenever it may suit the French purpose.

“In case”—says Article 3—“the continuance of the political status of Morocco and of the Shereefian Government should become impossible, or if, owing to the weakness of that Government and to its continued inability to uphold law and order,⁴ *or to any other cause,*⁵ the existence of which is acknowledged by both parties, the *status quo* can no longer be maintained, Spain may freely exercise her right of action in the territory defined in the preceding article, which henceforward constitutes her sphere of influence.”

¹ Cd. 6010 and Appendix VII.

² See Map.

³ Article 4, *vide* Chapter X.

⁴ Which the French Government, the Algerian Administration and French finance had combined to bring about. *Vide* Chapter II.

⁵ These words are really worthy of being italicised.

Article 4 defines the Spanish sphere in Atlantic Morocco.¹ Article 8 provides that if in the course of exercising this above-stated "right of action" one or other Government is—

"obliged to take military action, the other contracting party shall at once be informed. In no case shall the assistance of a foreign Power be invoked."

Article 10 provides that all schemes for public works, railways, etc., mineral development and "economic undertakings in general" in the French and Spanish spheres respectively, *i.e. in the whole of Morocco*, "shall be executed" by French and Spanish enterprise.

Thus British enterprise, and all international enterprise other than French and Spanish (Spanish "enterprise" being what it is—read French), was doubly mortgaged in favour of the French, first by the Anglo-French understanding, secondly by this Convention.

The further secret Franco-Spanish Accord (September 1, 1905),² although antecedent to the Act of Algeciras, and in one sense belonging to that period of our inquiry, may more fittingly be touched upon at a later stage.

We may now summarise the preceding chapters which will focus more readily to our intelligence the antecedents to the Act of Algeciras.

¹ See Map.

² Appendix XI.

CHAPTER XII

SUMMARY OF THE EVENTS OF 1900-1904 AND REFLECTIONS THEREON

A REVIEW of the events of 1900-1904 must be a review covering three distinct factors, viz. the public and secret diplomatic commitments which three out of the four Powers specially interested in Morocco had undertaken towards one another; the position in which the fourth was left through those commitments, and the obligations entered upon by those three Powers towards the independent State of Morocco and its ruler.

The latter point may be taken first.¹

France had in 1901 and 1902 publicly assured Morocco upon repeated occasions that she had not the least intention of threatening the independence or the integrity of that State. France had formally and publicly declared in an agreement with Great Britain that she had no intention of altering the political *status* of Morocco. France and Spain had formally and publicly declared

¹ At the close of 1904 no international agreement, collectively signed by all the Powers, explicitly proclaiming the independence and integrity of Morocco, existed. But the Madrid Convention of, 1880 (Cd. 3503) implicitly recognised that independence since the Powers had on that occasion negotiated with the Sultan on a basis of equality. Moreover, the independence of Morocco had never been questioned any more than the independence of Persia, or Russia, or the United States. Morocco *was* independent.

their firm attachment to the independence and integrity of Morocco. France and Spain, and, by implication, Great Britain, were, therefore, publicly pledged towards Morocco and towards the world at large to maintain the independence and integrity of Morocco.

In point of fact, France, Spain, and Britain had privately entered into contracts with one another whereby the destruction of the independence and integrity of Morocco was decreed, the date of the event to depend upon circumstances.

I understand that in the current jargon of diplomacy that sort of thing is called "high politics." The plain man may be permitted to dub it by one word only—dishonesty; and to contend that dishonesty in diplomacy, even as dishonesty in business or in ordinary social life, does not ultimately pay. It certainly has not paid the British people in this particular case. On the contrary it has involved them in enormous expenditure. If only the citizen of education and intelligence would shake himself free from the superstitions with which custom has invested the functions of the diplomatist; if only he could be brought to understand that the mental powers of those engaged in diplomacy are really no greater than his own, and that he is quite as well able to arrive at sound conclusions, if the facts are placed before him, as these highly but narrowly trained persons to whom he blindly confides the negotiation of his affairs with foreign Powers, the peace of the world would rest upon a surer foundation than it does to-day. Because if he did awake to the truth of those simple facts the citizen of education and intelligence would treat the diplomatists he employs, just as he does other public functionaries, not as supermen, but as servants of the State, of which he and they are members. He would not for one moment tolerate that they should,

unknown to him and his fellow-citizens, commit the nation to which he belongs to secret arrangements with foreign Powers calculated, under given circumstances, to involve him and his fellow-citizens in war, and lower the national standard of civic morals. He would not sanction one standard of honesty for the magistrate, the civil servant, the naval and military officer, and a totally different one for the diplomatist. The secret diplomacy of 1904 in connection with Morocco makes a revolting picture. That it was in the interests of the nations concerned, common sense and a robust belief in honesty alike reject.

I resume the narrative with apologies for the digression.

A secret sentence of doom had, therefore, been pronounced against Morocco. France was to play the rôle of executioner, Spain that of interested assistant, and Britain that of interested witness.

What had each Power obtained as the result of the deal?

France had removed British opposition to a French absorption of four-fifths of Morocco at the price of a Spanish mortgage over Mediterranean and North Atlantic Morocco.

Spain had secured a mortgage over Mediterranean and North Atlantic Morocco.

Britain had acquired two things, at the price of surrendering her traditional policy of an independent Morocco, viz. relief from an irritating incubus in Egypt, and the exclusion of France from Mediterranean and North Atlantic Morocco.

But in thus disposing, contrary to their public pledges, in the real or fancied interests of the peoples they represented, of the future of an independent African State

219,000 square miles in extent, containing eight million inhabitants, and of great natural wealth, the British, French, and Spanish diplomatists had acted without any international sanction, and had, moreover, deliberately deceived the world.

The only feature in the deal of which the world at large, outside the three contracting Powers, had public cognisance so far as Morocco was concerned, was that Britain had declared her political disinterestedness in that country, and had recognised a special French interest within it—on certain conditions.

Even the British, French, and Spanish peoples immediately concerned were allowed to know no more than that! The Spanish form of government permits of democracy playing but a microscopic part in the affairs of the country. But Britons and Frenchmen who boast of their democratic constitution, may well feel resentment as they look into this history, at having been treated like babes and sucklings by the men they indirectly, at least, nominate for office, and whose salaries they directly pay. For what was the upshot, to the British and French people, of the secret manoeuvres of their diplomatists in the assumed interest of those people?

To Frenchmen it meant *inter alia* this. Inveiglement blindfolded into a policy of precipitate absorption and conquest in Morocco as opposed to the advertised policy of "peaceful penetration" which had secured for their ephemeral and constantly shifting rulers the support of virtually all classes in the nation, and which consistently, honourably and peacefully pursued might well have led to a slow evolution and assimilation more in conformity with the nation's real interests. Blindfolded because they were unaware that their Foreign Minister had heavily mortgaged their potential interests to a third Power—

Spain. Blindfolded because—supremely important among all things—they were being led, without knowing it, into a collision with Germany.

To Britons it meant *inter alia* this. Inveiglement within the orbit of the continental system of alliances; commitment to a revival of the era of British participation in the pursuit of that elusive phantom known as the balance of power, and aggravation of Anglo-German relations. For let it be well understood. It was *not* the general settlement of 1904 with France of our outstanding disputes with her which was the cause of these happenings. That was an excellent and desirable thing in itself and it received national sanction. It was the unsanctioned secret commitments to France and Spain which worked the mischief. It was those unsanctioned secret commitments which marked the abandonment of Lord Salisbury's policy of the Concert, for the policy of entangling so-called "*ententes*."

This secret diplomacy has already involved the British and French peoples in an unproductive expenditure of millions sterling. Its future consequences may be even more disastrous, especially for the French people, perhaps. And when I speak of the British and French peoples, I do not refer to the governing classes, nor to the financiers, nor to the manufacturers of war material: I refer to the equally deserving and hard-working middle classes and labouring classes who pay and who suffer, for a state of things which, through lack of proper leadership, they continue to tolerate.

From what precedes it must be perfectly clear that despite what I have termed the "Crucial Article" of the Act of Algeciras,¹ *i.e.* the Article which provided that in

¹ *Vide* Chapter V.

the event of the provisions of any antecedent treaties, conventions, or arrangements conflicting with the Act, the Act should prevail; the secret commitments of Britain, France, and Spain (Spain, of course, has only been the British Government's cat's-paw in the matter) were of such a character as to make the loyal fulfilment of that Article by those Powers in the highest degree unlikely.

The Public Law of Europe affecting the *status* of Morocco, embodied in the Algeciras Act, publicly proclaimed the independence and integrity of Morocco.

Britain and France were signatories to that Act.

Secretly France, with British concurrence, had previously arranged for the partition of Morocco between herself and Spain.

Technically, in law, from the standpoint of international morality the Act of Algeciras superseded this secret arrangement, and any assault by one or more Powers upon the independence or integrity of Morocco would be an offence against any other Power or Powers who chose to regard it as such.

A strong British Foreign Minister would have found in the Algeciras Act, signed by his instructions, not only the duty but the obligation of so directing his policy and so influencing the policy of France and Spain as to prevent complications with any other Power interested in Morocco from arising out of a conflict between the antecedent secret commitments¹ of Britain towards France and Spain, and the stipulations of the Act adhered to by Britain. No strong British Foreign Minister would have allowed his country to be placed in the invidious position of adhering to an international Act proclaiming the

¹ It should be constantly borne in mind that the secret Articles of the Anglo-French Declaration, and the secret Franco-Spanish Convention only became publicly known in *November*, 1911.

independence and integrity of Morocco, and laying down specifically that the provisions of the Act must prevail over the provisions of any arrangements previously arrived at between various Powers, unless he had seen his way clear to reconcile mutually destructive pledges.

Sir Edward Grey proved himself incapable of breaking through the vicious circle in which British and French policy was involved by the secret evolutions of their respective diplomats.

And, as subsequent events were to show, two out of the four Powers specially interested in Morocco, with a third following in their wake, assisted in elaborating the Public Law of Europe embodied in the Algeciras Act, with the firm intention on the part of one of them to flout that Public Law, and on the part of the others to condone and support its violation even to the point of risking a great war. Ere the signatures were affixed to the document, the capital provisions of the Act of Algeciras were doomed to sterility, and the process of tearing them up was begun soon after their formal ratification by the Powers, *i.e.* early in 1907.¹

¹ *Vide* Chapter VII.

PART IV

Germany's First Intervention [1905]

CHAPTER XIII

THE GERMAN EMPEROR'S VISIT TO TANGIER AND ITS EFFECTS UPON BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION

To judge impartially, nay, even to examine with intelligence, the attitude of Germany in the Morocco question from the date of the Anglo-French (public) Declaration to the despatch of the *Panther* to Agadir, it is necessary, I submit, that we should divest ourselves of such prejudices as we may individually entertain and honestly study the proceedings of that Power in the light of *facts*.

Britishers lay claim to the possession of a sense of fair play, and, in the main, justifiably. The above suggestion is, therefore, peculiarly adjustable to the national character, even if the national interest were not closely concerned in its adoption.

At this stage of our inquiry we are only called upon to deal with the first German intervention which led to the Morocco problem being brought before the Areopagus of the Powers, and which culminated in the elaboration of the Public Law we have analysed and explained.

If the facts, covering that first period of German action, as here stated are inaccurately or incompletely stated, public opinion will rightly reject the arguments drawn from them by the author of this volume. If, on the other hand, they remain unchallenged, it may be that British public opinion will be disposed to modify, if not to reverse,

the adverse judgment it has formed. In that event the British people, being essentially a great people, will not hesitate to admit that they have been induced through lack of information and through misrepresentation, to form an unjust estimate of German conduct. They will do so spontaneously, impelled by their sense of fair-play. It is only the small-minded man who declines to allow that he can ever be liable to error. The same holds good in the case of nations, at least in a democratic State where the nation has means of expressing itself. But hard upon the heels of that spontaneous acknowledgment will come the consciousness that British relations with Germany have suffered acutely through this misunderstanding, and the British people will set to work resolutely to heal the sore, hew out the path to an understanding, and compel their diplomatists to follow it.

I assume that a perusal of Chapter IV. of this volume has already convinced the reader that Germany was entitled to a voice in the future of Morocco, and I shall not, therefore, labour the point further.

The attitude of the German Government upon becoming informed of the Anglo-French (public) Declaration appears to have been one of friendly expectation. Before the Declaration was signed, but when it was known that negotiations were proceeding between London and Paris, the *North German Gazette*, the recognised official organ of the German Government, stated (March 25, 1904) that in view of the "reiterated assurance" that France had in view "neither the conquest nor the occupation" of Morocco, German interests were, "so far as can be gathered at the moment," in no jeopardy. How emphatic have been these assurances we have seen.¹ But those already quoted were given to the Moorish Government and, incidentally,

¹ *Vide* Chapters II. and VII.

to the world. Were there others? Yes. Similar statements had been made by M. Delcassé himself in the Senate and Chamber.¹ Moreover the German ambassador in Paris, Prince Radolin, had asked M. Delcassé on March 27 whether it were true that he was negotiating a general understanding with England, and M. Delcassé had replied in the affirmative. After a reference to Newfoundland, Prince Radolin had inquired if Morocco had been mentioned, and M. Delcassé again answered in the affirmative, adding—

“But you already know our point of view on the subject. *We wish to uphold in Morocco the existing political and territorial status*; but that status, if it is to last, must obviously be sustained and improved.”²

On April 12 the German Chancellor, Count Bülow, questioned in the Reichstag on the subject of the just published Anglo-French agreement,³ replied that he had no reason to believe that it was directed against Germany in any way, but that he had no official notification of it. Germany had no interest in the existence of unfriendly relations between Britain and France “which would be a danger to the peace of the world of which we sincerely

¹ French Yellow Book.

² It is perhaps interesting to point out how closely this statement approximates to Lord Salisbury's instructions to Sir C. Euan-Smith in 1892 (*vide* Chapter I.): “It has been the constant aim of her Majesty's Government . . . to preserve the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of Morocco, while neglecting no favourable opportunity of impressing upon the Sultan and his Ministers the importance and advantage of improving the government and administration of the country.” The difference between the two statements consisted in the intentions behind them. Lord Salisbury meant what he said and had acted up to it. M. Delcassé did not mean what he said, and had already taken steps in a directly contrary sense.

³ *Vide* Chapter X.

desire the maintenance." So far as Morocco was specially concerned, Prince Bülow said :—

"We are interested in that country, as, moreover, in the rest of the Mediterranean, principally from the economic standpoint. Our interests therein are, before all, commercial interests ; also are we specially interested that calm and order should prevail in Morocco. We must protect our commercial interests in Morocco and we shall protect them. We have no reason to fear that they will be set aside or infringed by any Power."

The German Press took, in the main, the same line. Thus, apparently, peace and harmony.

On March 31, 1905, the *Hamburg* with the Emperor William on board, escorted by the cruiser *Friederick Karl*, cast anchor at Tangier.¹ The visit had been planned early in the year and thus constituted a deliberate act of policy.

The Emperor landed at Tangier and spent two hours there. Welcomed with much enthusiasm by the natives, the Emperor received the Diplomatic corps, held a conversation with the Sultan's representatives, who had come from Fez to meet him, then received the German residents, and wound up with a further conversation with the Sultan's representatives. The following is the authorised version of the gist of the Emperor's remarks to the latter—translated from the French account :—

"The object of my visit to Tangier is to make it known that I am determined to do all that is in my power to safeguard efficaciously the interests of Germany in Morocco. I look upon the Sultan as an absolutely

The previous day the *Hamburg* had called at Gibraltar and the Emperor had dined with Sir George White.

independent sovereign, and it is with him that I desire to come to an understanding as to the best means to bring that result about. As for the reforms which the Sultan intends to introduce into his country I consider that he should proceed with much precaution and should take into account the religious feelings of his subjects so that at no moment shall public order be troubled as a consequence of these reforms."

Germany through the mouth of its Emperor had thus challenged, *not that which (since November of last year) we now know he actually and in fact did then challenge*, but what the world, ignorant of the secret Franco-Spanish *cum* British arrangements, imagined that he alone challenged, viz. the Anglo-French (public) Declaration with regard to Morocco.

Public opinion in Britain, knowing nothing of the secret arrangements, was astonished and incensed. It contrasted Prince Bülow's friendly reception of the Anglo-French settlement on April 12 of the previous year with the "tempestuous" intervention of the Kaiser. It had neither forgotten nor forgiven the Kruger telegram, and was inclined, naturally enough, to read in the Emperor's dramatic entry upon the scene an act of studied and unjustifiable unfriendliness. It was in a mood to believe almost any sinister interpretation with which the British diplomatic and other elements inimical to Germany chose to inspire the British Press. The stokers were numerous and only too willing to stir up the flames. A series of charges were hurled at Germany (furiously and, often, brutally rejected by the German Press) and readily, and naturally, accepted by the British public as gospel.

All through 1905 the clamour continued, and—no careful student of the journalistic literature of that period can entertain the slightest doubt upon the subject—was

incited both in England and in France by the "diplomatic machine"¹ concerned in working for and executing the secret arrangements of 1904.

¹ The "man in the street" is apt to suppose that the Foreign Minister of the day incarnates in his person the foreign policy of the country subject to Cabinet approval. That, of course, is a delusion. He only does so nominally. Foreign policy is the work of many—not of one, with very rare exceptions. There are the embassies abroad, and it happens that some one or other of the ambassadors may have different views from those entertained by the Foreign Minister at home on a specific issue. If the latter has no very decided views one way or another, or if he does not keep a tight hold over his mouthpieces abroad, the influences directed from a particular embassy in a certain direction may have the most far-reaching effects upon policy. That, to my own personal knowledge, has occurred within the past four years, in two questions of foreign policy. Then there are the permanent officials at home, some of whom have decided views, and consider themselves the real directors of the nation's foreign policy and not only exercise that influence to the uttermost upon the Foreign Minister of the day, but impose it upon the public (and so, indirectly, exercise pressure upon their chief) through social circles and by the medium of the journalists *de confiance* with whom they are permanently in touch. It may even be—here again I speak in one such case from personal knowledge—that certain events may be prepared and worked for by members of the Foreign Minister's *entourage* entirely without the latter's knowledge. So that to speak of a diplomatic machine is strictly accurate. Among the units composing the machine are to be met with rivalries, private grudges, exaggerated notions of personal prestige and dignity, personal ambitions, and all the concatenation of ills to which ordinary flesh is heir. Among the embassies abroad, promotion may depend, often does depend, upon keeping on good terms with a particular permanent official at home. In that you have the usual inconveniences from which Government Departments can never be free, doubly aggravated in the case of the Foreign Office by the close caste system therein traditionally prevailing which makes of it the glorious preserve of a favoured few, and the lack of any real, effective control from the outside. All Foreign Offices are more or less tarred with the same brush. Some are worse than ours in certain respects (*i.e.* indiscretion and personal corruption, from the latter of which we are free), but in several cases (notably in the United States and in France) there is an effective outside check in the shape of a Parliamentary Committee which can often cut the knot of personal intrigue, or at least expose it, and so prevent further mischief for a time. In our case there is no such corrective.

Editorials and despatches from special correspondents, written for the most part, one may well believe, in complete good faith because for the most part in ignorance of facts, ridiculed the idea that Germany's interests in Morocco were sufficient to account for the Emperor's action. Morocco was merely a pretext. Germany's aim was to break up the Anglo-French *entente* by "brow-beating" France. Why, if so, she had not acted on the morrow of the publication of the agreement was very easily explained. Russia had not then been beaten to her knees. The Battle of Mukden had not been fought. The parlous state of Russia was Germany's opportunity, for, crippled by the temporary loss of her Eastern ally, France was "at the mercy" of Germany, and must be made to see that her safety depended upon breaking with Britain and allying herself with her Teutonic neighbour as a preliminary step to that famous combined onslaught¹ upon Britain which should end by dictating terms in London to the shattered remnant of a British Parliament driven to seek refuge upon Exmoor or somewhere in the Welsh hills.

And when it became apparent that all Germany was aiming at was an international Conference to adjudicate upon the future of Morocco, and that every one of M. Delcassé's colleagues and the overwhelming majority of the French Parliament² was in favour of treating Germany less cavalierly than M. Delcassé had treated

¹ One wonders vaguely sometimes whether those who cultivate this particular mania, ever stop to think with what preposterous rubbish their bogey is stuffed.

² The French Parliament was, of course, ignorant, as a body, of the secret Articles of the Anglo-French Declaration and of the Franco-Spanish secret Convention. So, indeed, were some of the Foreign Minister's colleagues. The Minister of Marine, and also the Minister for the Colonies in the Rouvier-Delcassé Cabinet of 1904, publicly protested in November last, *i.e.* when the secret Convention with Spain was published, that they had been kept entirely in the dark.

her, the clamour instead of lessening, redoubled. The "diplomatic machine" worked full time through its chosen organs. M. Delcassé was represented as the unhappy victim of German resentment for the leading part he had played in concluding the Anglo-French general settlement, and France as being harried at the point of the bayonet into compassing his fall. As upon a more recent occasion, we were goaded into being more French than the French, and the powerful occult influences which move behind the scenes and mould public opinion did their utmost to counteract the more moderate sections of French public life.

I commend a perusal of the foreign pages of the *Times* of this period—say from May to November, 1905. They make astonishing reading. The insults and threats to Germany mingled with personal abuse of the Emperor William, in the Paris and Berlin telegrams, especially the Paris telegrams, are incessant. No less remarkable is the partisan bias in favour of M. Delcassé against his home critics. Praise of M. Delcassé is the test of statesmanship, and the rare expressions of it are religiously recorded; criticism of his policy and the numerous expressions thereof are rigidly curtailed, or explained as evidence of the narrowest party politics. Germany's right to a say in the Moroccan settlement is scornfully denied. The idea of a Conference is violently opposed. "It ought not to be entertained for a moment."¹ It would be a "humiliation," a "capitulation," the "sooner the whole matter is negatively disposed of the better."² The correspondents cease to be impartial or even faithful recorders of events to become vehement units of the machine bent upon forcing again and again a particular view upon the public. Observe these typical despatches:—

¹ June 12.

² June 9.

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"There is no Moroccan question. It was finally settled by the Anglo-French *entente*." (*Times*, April 7: Paris despatch.)

"The idea of a Conference can never have been seriously entertained even in Berlin. If Germany wants to court another failure, she has only to propose or get it proposed by the Sultan of Morocco." (*Times*, April 10: Paris despatch.)

"Germany is evidently retiring as gracefully as she can . . . and as to M. Delcassé's position, it has certainly not been weakened." (*Times*, April 12: Paris despatch.)

"The international Conference which it is suggested should be proposed by the Sultan of Morocco, and which Count von Tattenbach (the German Minister at Fez, the same official whom the *Times* praised in 1892 for helping the British mission) says will be supported by Germany, will probably never take place. . . . Its object could only be to revise or stultify the agreement recently concluded by France and to give Germany a voice in matters with which she has nothing to do."¹ (*Times*, May 2: Paris despatch.)

"Consequently it may be announced with confidence that the Moroccan proposal for a European Conference will be entertained by only one of the Great Powers—namely, Germany. On all sides it is recognised that Germany must have foreseen that an invitation coming from Morocco would meet with no response, and this confirms the general opinion as to Germany's whole Moroccan policy being a mere blind for something else." (*Times*, June 5: Paris despatch.)

The more French opinion gravitates towards a Conference the more bitterly is the Conference condemned. When the British Foreign Office, through the mouth of its representative at Fez, informs the Sultan that Britain will not attend a Conference, a pæan of triumph is set up

¹ Let it be repeated again and yet again, that the public to which this sort of thing was ceaselessly repeated, was in entire ignorance of the secret agreements, which only saw the light in November 1911.

in the editorial columns. I do not question for a moment the good faith of all this. I assume that the writers of these despatches and editorials were unaware of the secret arrangements in existence. But those that inspired them undoubtedly were not, and the whole affair illustrates the dangerous lengths to which a secret diplomacy is willing to go in the manipulation of public opinion in order to save "face," or promote specific ends even at the risk of precipitating a great war. The motives may be of the highest. But the whole system involves the nation in terrible dangers and is vicious and unhealthy in the extreme.

In this particular case the secret policy of France and Britain can fairly be described as having been Machiavellian, and the object pursued by its promoters (when they found it openly and resentfully challenged) was to inspire the public mind with the belief that it was on the contrary the policy of Germany that was inspired by the precepts of the great Italian.

Englishmen have, apparently, failed so far to grasp how fundamentally the entire history of the Morocco affair—as interpreted to them in the course of the last seven years—has been altered by the now revealed secret Anglo-French and Franco-Spanish (insisted upon by the British Government) compacts. We have a curious inability to credit that our nationally uncontrolled diplomacy can be anything but honest and straightforward; although ready enough to believe that Continental diplomacy is invariably dishonest and tortuous. The plain truth of the matter is that the Anglo-Franco-Spanish secret diplomatic arrangements of 1904 constituted a breach of trust towards the peoples of Britain, France, and Spain. The House of Commons does not appear to have realised the nature and effect of these commitments, since they were avowed at

the close of last year by the British Foreign Office, or the painful impression caused by their revelation in France. The numerous allusions thereto in the French Chamber and Senate, have been studiously withheld from the British public. It is well, perhaps, that one or two extracts from the speeches of French Senators in the debates of February, 1912, should be here appended.

Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, speaking on February 6th, remarked—

“The French Parliament, by an abuse morally, if not constitutionally, unpardonable, was kept in ignorance of this policy. . . . Far from ensuring general peace, the arrangements of 1904 tended to compromise it. . . . Why was the French Parliament told only half the truth when it was asked to pass its opinion upon our arrangement with England? Why was it not allowed to suspect that this arrangement had as its complement and corrective some secret clauses and other secret Treaties? It is this, it is this double game towards Parliament and towards the world which becomes morally an abuse of trust. . . . Now the whole effort of the arrangement of 1904 appears to-day in its truth and in its vanity. It was a Treaty of friendship with England recognising the freedom of our political action in Morocco and also proclaiming our will to respect the integrity of that country; that was what the public knew and approved. But the public was ignorant that at the same time, by other Treaties and by contradictory clauses hidden from it, the partition of Morocco between Spain and France was prepared, of that Morocco of which we guaranteed the integrity. There existed two irreconcilable French policies in Morocco, that of public arrangements, that is to say, a policy of integrity which was not the true one; and that of secret arrangements postulating a Protectorate and the partition of Morocco.”

M. de Lamarzelle was even more emphatic—

“This secret Franco-Spanish Treaty interests Spain, no

doubt, but it interests still more England, by whom and for whom it was made. . . . Why was this secret Treaty hidden? I can find no other reason than this, that perhaps if Parliament had been told all the sacrifices which were imposed upon us by this secret Treaty, the public Treaty would not have been voted." (Feb. 7.)

M. Ribot, the "Father of the House," speaking on the 9th, also accentuated the cynical contradiction between public professions and private commitments—

"In 1904 a Treaty was signed—a secret Treaty—whose clauses we have only recently learned . . .; it was a Treaty of partition and has created difficulties which are not yet all cleared away. Spain was bound to consider, and did consider, that it was a partition of sovereignty between France and Spain at the very time when a public Act declared that the two nations were profoundly attached to the independence and to the integrity of Morocco."

British and French tax-payers have paid a heavy bill. One wonders whether they have learned a lesson.

No desire to crush and humiliate France; no designs upon the Anglo-French *entente*; no personal dislike to M. Delcassé were *needed* to explain the change in the attitude of Germany. The facts germane to the subject immediately at issue were fully sufficient not only to explain but to justify that change. For in the interval between Prince Bülow's first references in the Reichstag to the Anglo-French settlement and the German Emperor's visit to Tangier, Germany had gradually awakened to the fact that she had been flouted in a way seldom meted out to a great Power and which no great Power could by any possibility tolerate, ever has tolerated, or ever will tolerate. This, I venture to think, the next chapter will make abundantly clear.

CHAPTER XIV

THE GERMAN CASE IN 1905

THE initial and gratuitous offence committed against Germany by the French Foreign Minister was his deliberate failure officially to *notify* the Anglo-French (public) Declaration of 1904 to the German Government; a policy repeated by him in the ensuing October in connection with the Franco-Spanish (public) Declaration. In the case of the former of these arrangements, even the courtesy call upon the Wilhelmstrasse of the French ambassador was delayed for three weeks after the publication of the Declaration in the *Journal Officiel*. Whether M. Delcassé did or did not enter upon negotiations with Germany in the 1901-1902 period—*i.e.* when his policy was directed at partitioning Morocco with Spain behind the back of Great Britain¹—is immaterial. Of course, if he did, his attitude in 1904 was the more inexcusable.

But apart from that consideration altogether, Germany as a party, and an active one, to the first (and, at that moment, the only) International Conference which had been held on the affairs of Morocco, was entitled to have the opportunity given her, which an official notification alone afforded according to the unwritten law of diplomatic etiquette between States, to ask questions and to discuss the tenor of an agreement arrived at between two Powers

¹ *Vide* Chapter IX.

concerning the territory of a State in which Germany was interested and in whose concerns she had already, and upon several occasions, intervened. In addition to this technical and unquestionable right, Germany's commercial Treaty with Morocco; her friendly participation with and assistance to Lord Salisbury's envoy in his endeavours to strengthen the "open door" for trade in Morocco, to improve the Shereefian administration, and to uphold the independence of Morocco against French designs; her own Missions to the Sultan's Court; the fact that she maintained a legation at Fez as well as at Tangier; her not inconsiderable and growing commercial interests in the country; her quarter of a century's active relations with it¹ were, in themselves, more than sufficient to justify her claim to be advised and consulted. Those who have argued the contrary can only have done so in ignorance of facts publicly accessible.

Can it be seriously contended that because France had succeeded in inducing Britain, for a consideration, to disinterest herself in the future of Morocco and to recognise a special French interest therein, that France was, therefore, entitled to proceed as though the interests of other Powers were of no account? We know that she did not do so in regard to Spain, whose economic interests were much smaller than Germany's, because the British Government, in the interest of British policy, had not only willed otherwise but had imposed upon France² a Mediterranean Morocco in the hands of Spain. Yet, not only had France concluded an arrangement with Britain closely and, indeed, vitally affecting the future of an independent State with which Germany had long historical connections and important interests, both existing

¹ *Vide* Chapter IV.

² Unknown to the French Parliament and people.

and potential, but she had not even given Germany the chance of having a friendly discussion as to its purport after its conclusion. She had followed this up by signing a joint Declaration with Spain, treating Germany in regard thereto with the same conspicuous aloofness.

It is no secret—indeed, the documents printed in the French Yellow Book virtually admit it—that the French ambassador at Berlin would have personally preferred that the Declaration should have been notified in the usual manner. When the omission and its significance became known in France, subsequent to the German Emperor's entry upon the scene, M. Delcassé's countrymen almost unanimously took the same view. When at the famous Cabinet Council which led to his resignation, M. Delcassé defended his action and vehemently opposed any modification in the French official attitude towards Germany, he was overruled by his colleagues without a single exception. His fall from power was not due, as a mischievous legend has attributed it, to German intrigue, but to the disapproval of his methods entertained by Frenchmen quite as patriotic as himself. I defy any one who has impartially studied the French published literature on the point—Parliamentary, Press, and other—to arrive at any other conclusion. Moreover, to credit the legend is to display an abysmal ignorance of the French character with which the author of this volume may claim to be closely acquainted. The French are a very proud and a very sensitive¹ people, and had they really believed, as M. Delcassé's friends and British journalists inspired by the British embassy in Paris, or by the Foreign

¹ It is a pity, for the harmonious relations of the two peoples, that this characteristic is not more generally recognised by the German Press.

Office, ceaselessly dinning into the ears of the public, viz. that their Foreign Minister was being hounded from Power by German pressure upon the French Cabinet, nothing would have induced them to part with him.¹ The fact was, of course, that M. Delcassé had become impossible; for French common sense, and French logic too, desired to arrive at an understanding with Germany, and M. Delcassé's policy was leading direct to an open rupture. That is why M. Delcassé disappeared, and for no other reason. Indeed, M. Delcassé's obstinacy had made the problem so acute that even before his resignation, M. Rouvier, the French Premier, as the Yellow Book reveals, had found it necessary to enter into direct *pour parlers* on the situation with the German ambassador at Paris.²

Prince Bülow subsequently explained German sentiment on M. Delcassé's action in several quarters³ and notably in a despatch to the German ambassador at Paris,⁴ from which it may be useful to make the following extracts:—

¹ In an incautious Paris despatch in the *Times*, describing, not indeed, as it purported to do, the "general feeling" in France, this truth was incidentally admitted: "The general feeling here is that whoever might succeed M. Delcassé would be the nominee of the German Emperor, a fact which is alone likely to prolong M. Delcassé's term of office." (*Times*, May 16, 1905.) In point of fact M. Delcassé resigned three weeks later (June 7). In passing—could anything be more offensive than that message—both to Germany and to France? It is a revelation in itself of the desperate efforts of the "machine" to keep M. Delcassé in power.

² *Vide* Prince Bülow's despatch April 28, 1905. M. Delcassé resigned on June 7. In other words, M. Rouvier acted in 1905 as M. Caillaux acted in 1911. In both cases the motive was the same, to come to an understanding—a peace policy instead of a war policy.

³ *Inter alia* to a correspondent of the *Petit Parisien* and to M. Georges Villiers of *Le Temps* (October, 1905).

⁴ May 1, 1905. Yellow Book.

"A diplomatic document so far-reaching as the Morocco Convention cannot be judged on the strength of oral and fragmentary statements: it is not necessary to prove this. For overtures of such importance the written formula is that which diplomatic usage consecrates. The formal and material insufficiency of the allusions and indications communicated here last year by your Highness and by M. Bihourd (the French ambassador) from M. Delcassé, is a fact which neither of the two parties concerned can remove. . . . It would have been, as we have already said, conformable to international usage for France, upon the conclusion of the Anglo-French accord concerning Morocco, to communicate this accord in the usual manner, to all the interested Powers which are sufficiently designated as such by their signatures at the bottom of the Act of the Madrid Conference."¹

"But," one can imagine a reader at this stage reflecting, "if you have proved to my satisfaction that Germany had a legitimate grievance in her treatment by M. Delcassé, I still do not altogether understand why she waited for the best part of a year before giving expression to her resentment." The question would be reasonable, and the answer is not far to seek.

M. Delcassé's attitude had two consequences. It had given umbrage. It had aroused suspicion: had thrown doubt upon the sincerity of his professions as to French intentions towards Morocco. The ambiguous character of Article 2 of the Anglo-French (public) Declaration, even taken by itself (*i.e.* without the context of the secret Articles together with the secret Franco-Spanish Convention), has already been commented upon,² opening as it did with a formal declaration on the part of France that she did not intend to alter the political *status* of Morocco and closing with a recognition on the part of Britain that it appertained to France "more particularly . . . to preserve

¹ Yellow Book.

² *Vide* Chapter X.

order" in Morocco. Germany was on the alert, watchful and suspicious. If there was anything more behind the Declaration, then, clearly, the economic Article¹ left the field wide open to serious future injury to German commercial interests.

In October, 1904, Germany was confronted with the further spectacle of France signing a joint Declaration with Spain, variously described as "a Spanish endorsement of the Anglo-French Agreement of last April," and as "an annex to the Anglo-French Convention." Here again came from France neither formal notification, nor any proposal for a similar friendly agreement with Germany, notwithstanding that her actual and potential interests in Morocco were far greater than any of which Spain could boast. It now became patent that Germany was being studiously left on one side: that France, backed by Britain, and in conjunction with Spain, was bent upon pursuing a certain policy in Morocco without either consultation or discussion of any kind with Germany. The intention was so deliberate on the face of it that it could no longer be ignored. From this time onwards the German Government and German opinion passed from suspicion to angry certainty. To considerations of positive interest were now added considerations of national prestige, which Reuter's note did not certainly tend to assuage:—

"Every detail of the negotiations"—declared this obviously authorised pronouncement—"has been made known to the British Government, and the terms of the new Treaty are regarded with satisfaction by the Governments of London, Paris, and Madrid. *The Treaty contains a number of secret clauses which will not be made public.*"

So the cat had been let out of the bag! There was a

¹ Chapter X.

secret Treaty as well as a public one! France, Britain, and Spain were calmly disposing of Morocco between them, and treating Germany "as of no account in the Cabinet of nations."

Thenceforth dated the situation which for more than seven years has poisoned the whole European atmosphere; embroiled British, French, German, and Spanish relations, and placed an enormous and constantly growing burden of added expenditure upon the peoples of those countries. Thenceforth dated the situation which Sir Edward Grey instead of seeking to improve by orienting his policy after Algeciras in a more friendly spirit towards Germany—retaining what was good but rejecting what was bad in the policy of his predecessor—has aggravated and worsened to such a degree that only yesterday we escaped a general conflagration. Veritably the process of being a party to the stealing of another man's land brings with it its own Nemesis. Unfortunately it is the people in whose name, but without whose sanction, these things are done who have to pay.

When did German diplomacy ascertain the substance of the secret Franco-Spanish Convention, and of the secret Articles of the Anglo-French Declaration? No one outside the charmed circle can pronounce upon that definitely. But all the circumstances point to the German Government having become aware of the former very shortly after its conclusion, and after Reuter's public announcement quoted above that secret clauses existed. Its contents were communicated to the head of the French Colonial Party, M. Etienne, at the time. So much is clear from the interview with that politician which was published in *Le Temps* of October 8, 1904. The indiscretion of French politicians and journalists is, moreover, notorious. The way in which copies of secret documents

whose originals repose at the Quai d'Orsay are hawked about for sale to the highest bidder is equally notorious to any student of French diplomatic history. Quite recent events have yielded an astonishing crop of this kind of revelation, disclosing depths of corruption which cast doubts upon the stability of French Republican institutions. (The Convention was finally published last November by *Le Matin*! The secret Articles of the Anglo-French Declaration last November by *Le Temps*!) The undisguised indignation¹ which pierce through the German official despatches of the period, subsequent to the German Emperor's visit to Tangier, argue the possession not only of a case sound in itself but of a case so fortified by unavowed proof as to be irresistible. That the Kaiser's visit to Tangier was the outcome of a thorough knowledge of the entire intrigue for the political dismemberment of Morocco, and the future monopolisation of its resources by France, cannot, I think, be for one moment in question.

Can any man who is not hopelessly prejudiced contest the justification of Germany's action when he reviews this story and recalls the character of the Franco-Spanish secret Convention?² Acquiescence in the accomplished fact would have meant for Germany the meek acceptance on the one hand of an unparalleled rebuff; on the other the gradual strangulation of German economic develop-

¹ Was it surprising when, with the knowledge she possessed, Germany was still treated to this sort of thing from M. Delcassé? The extract is from one of the French Foreign Minister's speeches in April, 1905: "Morocco knew that France was not seeking a pretext to enlarge the scope of her programme of policy in that country. . . . She could secure her future in the Western basis of the Mediterranean *sans froisser aucun droit, sans léser aucun intérêt.*" And that was the statesman who had just secretly arranged with Britain and Spain to put Morocco in his pocket!

² *Vide* Chapter XI.

ment—the work of twenty years—in one of the great potential markets of the world.¹ Should we, in Germany's place, have turned the other cheek? No Britisher will be prepared to answer in the affirmative.

If any further proof had been lacking as to the character of French designs, and British concurrence in those designs, it would have been provided by events in Morocco itself. These events explain the concluding portion of the Emperor's remarks to the representatives of the Sultan at Tangier.² The publication of the Anglo-French Declaration had struck the Moors, already, as we have seen, disappointed at the absence of any categorical assurances from M. Loubet,³ and profoundly disquieted by the increasing anti-Moorish character of French policy on the Algerian-Morocco frontier region, with consternation. The Sultan appealed privately, and as the months went on again and again, to the German representative at Tangier for support. The French representatives at Fez strove without effect to calm the Moorish Government's apprehensions. Then came the publication of the Franco-Spanish Declaration with its avowed but unspecified secret clauses. This arrangement does not appear to have been even communicated to the Sultan. On the top of everything M. Delcassé pitched a whole series of proposed reforms at the head of the now thoroughly alarmed Sultan.⁴ It was the final drop in the cup: the last link

¹ The way in which France treats foreign trade in her overseas possessions is of public notoriety, and has been a matter of serious loss to British interests, whenever the flag of France flies outside of Europe. On the other hand, there is no differential treatment of trade in the German oversea dependencies.

² *Vide* Chapter XIII.

³ *Vide* Chapter VIII.

⁴ An anti-German, but also an anti-Delcassé French authority, makes the following comment: "At one blow everything must be carried out: army, justice, administration, routes, frontiers, State-

connecting up the interests of Germany and the interests of the Moorish Government in a common resistance to a policy planned in secret and openly provocative both to Morocco and to Germany.

Even in France some far-seeing men had become disturbed. Speaking in the Chamber on November 3, M. Deschanel, the Chairman of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, remarked :—

“Everything has been sacrificed to Morocco, but there was one great danger, viz. that the policy of France in Morocco would so tie her hands as to embarrass her policy in Europe.”

And so the Kaiser went to Tangier, and Baron von Tattenbach a little later to Fez,¹ where he was received as a liberator and Morocco's only friend, as the Kaiser had been received at Tangier. And so, after a prolonged and desperate struggle by M. Delcassé, by the British Foreign Office, by the British Embassy in Paris, and by the *Times*, the Sultan's suggestion for a Conference, advised by the Germans, was accepted, first by Italy, then by Austria, then by the other Powers in succession, and, finally, by France and Britain. And so was framed that Public Law of Europe embodied in the Act of Algeciras concerning Morocco's future, “based upon the independence of the Sultan, and the integrity of his dominions,” and providing that if any precedent arrangement between the Powers and Morocco conflicted with the stipulations of the Act,

bank, custom-houses, education, sanitary measures, police. Then everything fell to pieces (*Alors tout craque*).”

(See Appendix VIII. for the text of the Sultan's reply to the French “demands.”)

¹ To Reuter's agent at Tangier, who interviewed him before he left, Baron von Tattenbach said: “Germany's course is clear. She claims equal rights with other nations, and insists upon the integrity of the Moorish Empire.”

the stipulations of the Act should prevail. Germany had acted in accordance with her rights, her dignity, and her interests. She was not the provoking party, but the provoked. She had been treated with contumely and contempt. She had been humbugged and flouted. For twelve months she and her Emperor had been abused and insulted almost daily in the columns of powerful British newspapers, believed to be inspired by the British diplomatic machine; accused of every imaginable perfidy and conspiracy against the peace of the world. But she had consistently stuck to her guns, had declined to be led into retaliatory measures by the clamour of her own jingoes, and basing herself solely upon the incontestable legitimacy of her position as a signatory to the Madrid Convention, as possessor of a commercial Treaty with Morocco, as the upholder of an independent Morocco, and as the holder of a considerable economic interest in that country, she had gained her aim, not because of her strength placed at the service of an unjust case, but because of the essential and intrinsic justice of her case. And her aim was an International Conference.

In numerous documents other than those already quoted, the German Government has explained and defined its fundamental position. I select the following:—

(Extract from Prince Bülow's despatch to the German Embassies abroad):—

“*April 12, 1905.*—The German Government took no action (*i.e.* upon the publication of the Anglo-French (public) Declaration of April 8, 1904), seeing that the Anglo-French arrangement postulates the *status quo* and that, consequently, we thought ourselves entitled to suppose that the Powers interested in the Morocco Convention (*i.e.* the Madrid Convention) would be consulted by France in case France had in view in Morocco innovations tending to circumscribe the rights and liberties of

the other signatory Powers of the Convention, in their extent or their duration. We perceived, however, that this opinion was erroneous, and that the time had come to think of the protection of German interests, when the Morocco Government inquired if it were true that the Minister of France at Fez was, as he professed, the mandatory of the European Powers,¹ and it became known that different features in the French alleged programme of reforms were in contradiction with the maintenance of the *status quo*. . . . Seeing that we must now reckon with the possibility of a French Protectorate over Morocco, that is to say, with the complete expulsion of non-French economic enterprises, such as has taken place in Tunis, the interests of foreigners are threatened in their totality and a Conference would be more than ever advisable. That is an issue which should not infringe the legitimate sensibilities of any one, seeing that it only means recourse to an expedient already often employed."

(Extract from Prince Bülow's despatch to the German Ambassador at London):—

"April 15, 1905.—We are acting in regard to our interests, of which there is apparently the desire to dispose without our assent. The importance of these interests is in this connection (*ici*) a secondary matter. Any man from whose pocket it is proposed to take money will defend himself to the extent of his capacities, whether five marks or five thousand marks are concerned. We possess economic interests in Morocco. That does not require proof. If, by our silence, we renounce them, we shall thus encourage the world, which is watching us, to adopt a similar lack of consideration to our detriment in other questions, perhaps more important."

(Extract from Prince Bülow's despatch to the German Ambassador at Paris):—

¹ I.e. in December, 1904, when M. Delcassé presented his programme of reforms to the Sultan through the French representative.

"April 28, 1905.—Express in my name' all my thanks to the Minister-President (*i.e.* the French Premier, M. Rouvier) for his conciliatory declaration. I think I may conclude therefrom that he realises the situation in which Germany would find herself if third parties disposed of German interests without consulting us. If a great Power were to admit this fashion of ignoring its existence, the said Power would be incurring inconvenience in the future, not to say dangers. The material value of the threatened interests only comes in here as a secondary factor. I think I may conclude from the overtures which the Minister-President has made to your Highness, that the idea of a unilateral (*i.e.* one-sided) and brutal solution of the question of interest is as far from his spirit as it is from the Government of his Majesty the Emperor. The Imperial Government is conscious that its interests in this question are identical with those of a certain number of other States. It is to be hoped that the existing tension will cease, and will be settled in a satisfactory manner, thanks to the participation of all the interested parties. We are fully disposed to assist therein."

(Extract from the Speech of the German Emperor upon the opening of the Reichstag on November 28, 1905, *i.e.* after France had agreed to a Conference):—

"The difficulties which have arisen between us and France on the Morocco question have had no other origin than an inclination to settle without our co-operation affairs in which the German Empire had also interests to maintain. To my satisfaction an understanding has been arranged on the Moroccan question by diplomatic means and with consideration for the interests and honour of both parties regarding the convocation and the programme of a fresh Morocco Conference."

The distinguished French publicist, M. de Pressensé, strongly pro-British in his sympathies, and for many years the Foreign Editor of *Le Temps*—when *Le Temps* enjoyed a very different reputation from what it does at

present—has summarised in a few scathing sentences the Delcassé policy towards Germany:—

“We know by what a series of faults an excellent situation was compromised. M. Delcassé inebriated by the *entente* with England, of which he had been but an eleventh-hour artisan, hypnotised by the favour of the Tsar, thought the hour had struck for heroic enterprises. He dreamed, if he did not conscientiously project, a sort of *revanche* by the humiliation of Germany.”

Prior to last November—*i.e.* prior to the publication of the secret Articles of the Anglo-French Declaration of 1904, and the secret Franco-Spanish Convention—those who took the view that despite her legitimate grievance arising from the obvious attempt at ostracisation pursued by M. Delcassé, Germany's action in 1905 was needlessly emphatic, could have made out a reasoned argument in support of their contention. But with the disclosure of all this secret diplomacy, now public property, but as yet insufficiently appreciated, Germany's action at the time is seen to have been cumulatively justified.

What an opportunity lay before Sir Edward Grey after Algeciras to repair the errors of the past, and to satisfy Germany that, while remaining faithful to the spirit of our happy settlement of differences with France, we had no desire to persist in a policy of antagonism towards the German Government! How egregiously he has failed to take it; how, on the contrary, he has allowed the Morocco sore, for which the Algeciras Act provided the needed balm, to fester and putrify, the following chapters will, I think, give abundant proof to all who have preserved the faculty of weighing evidence and of passing a reasoned judgment upon facts.¹

¹ It is worth while just noting here that there are numerous indications about the middle and end of 1905, suggesting that Count Bülow

A review of this period would, however, be incomplete without a brief reference to an incident which must have revealed only too clearly to German statesmen the peculiar interpretation, even then, placed in certain quarters upon the settlement of Anglo-French differences. Soon after his fall, M. Delcassé had allowed himself to be interviewed by a Paris newspaper,¹ in the course of which he delivered himself of the following opinions:—

“Of what importance would the young navy of Germany be in the event of war in which England, I tell you, would assuredly be with us against Germany? What would become of Germany’s ports, or her trade, or her mercantile marine? They would be annihilated. That is what would be the significance of the visit, prepared and calculated, of the British squadron to Brest, while the return visit of the French squadron to Portsmouth will complete the demonstration. The *entente* between the two countries, and the coalition of their navies, constitutes such a formidable machine of naval war that neither Germany, nor any other Power, would dare to face such an overwhelming force at sea.”

But worse was to follow. In October, M. Stephane Lauzanne, the well-known publicist, came out in the columns of *Le Matin* with what purported to be an account of the final and fiercely controversial meeting of the French Cabinet, already referred to, in the course of which M. Delcassé had found himself in a minority of one, and M. Rouvier were anxious, as *Le Temps* put it on July 4, that, “When the Moroccan question is settled, arrangements may be concluded on other points which will strengthen the friendly relations between France and Germany.” It was about this time that compensation in the French Congo was first mooted—as the German Chancellor and M. Caillaux have both recently admitted—in the event of further development of French designs in Morocco. The subject does not appear to have been revived until early in 1909, when the long and obscure negotiations began under the Briand Ministry. I shall deal with these later on.

¹ *Le Gaulois*, July 12, 1905.

and had been forced to resign in consequence. The crux of the narrative was that M. Delcassé had informed his colleagues of England's willingness, if a rupture occurred between France and Germany, to mobilise her fleet, seize the Kiel Canal, and land 100,000 men in Schleswig-Holstein. A curiously worded denial was issued in England. M. Delcassé declined to be drawn. M. Jaurès, whose honesty is unquestioned, declared that he had been told exactly the same by a member of the Cabinet soon after the meeting.

There was a great outcry in Germany, naturally. The "Faber" revelations of 1911 are the pendant of the obviously inspired Lauzanne disclosures of 1905. It needs a certain hardihood, in view of these occurrences, to describe Germany as the aggressor in the Morocco affair.

CHAPTER XV

HOW FRANCE (WITH BRITISH CONCURRENCE) TORE UP THE
ACT OF ALGECIRAS, AND HOW SPAIN FOLLOWED SUIT

WITH the close of the Algeciras Conference, two opposing currents became plainly visible in the French outlook upon Moroccan affairs and persisted with varying fortunes almost up to the middle of 1909, when one of the two became engulfed in the swollen dimensions of the other. We have seen ¹ that the Parliamentary Committee reporting to the Chamber on the Algeciras Act had recognised that the Madrid Convention of 1880 had "made of Morocco an international question," that the Algeciras Act had confirmed this international character, had imposed the priority of its stipulations over antecedent arrangements between Morocco and various of the signatory Powers, and had, in effect, drawn up an international Charter for Morocco of which the essential bases were the independence and integrity of that State. To that programme one school of thought in France was sincerely desirous of loyally adhering, and as I shall have occasion to point out further on, an enlightened view of British national interests would have directed the considerable influence wielded by the British Government in the whole affair, in support of that school.² Its adherents were not

¹ Footnote, Chapter VI.

² *Vide* Chapter XVII.

confined to one Party. They naturally included the Socialists, and their eloquent leader M. Jean Jaurès; but they also included the general opponents (of varying political views) both in Parliament and in the editorial offices, of the Delcassé tradition of ostracising and offending Germany. And in the Chamber they possessed, with the help of the Socialists, a large majority. Indeed, men of weight and substance even in the Colonial Party itself were to be found on that side, although very much in the minority. What may, for lack of a better description, be termed the moderate *Imperial* view in this regard as distinct from the political or the purely Socialist view, was tersely expressed by M. Augustin Bernard at the North African Congress held at Paris as recently as October, 1908 :—

“We desire”—said M. Bernard—“a Morocco free and independent as the Emperor William remarked at Tangier; we are more interested than any one that it should be so. We are concerned that no Power should establish itself in Morocco.¹ But it does not follow that we wish to establish ourselves in Morocco. There is for France a paramount interest that no one should infringe the independence of Morocco, but we are entitled to exercise in that country, Algeria’s neighbour, a preponderating influence.”

On the other hand, the necessity of coming to some understanding with Germany if a free hand was to be secured in Morocco was also recognised even in the Councils of the Colonial Party (though here again it was rather a case of *vox clamantis in deserto*). Nevertheless it is notable that at this same Congress no less an authority than M. René Millet declared that—

¹ The secret Franco-Spanish Convention of 1904, whereby Lord Lansdowne had secured that Mediterranean and North Atlantic Morocco should not come into French hands, was, of course, still unpublished.

"If we wish Germany to leave us in peace in Morocco, we must offer her satisfaction elsewhere."

The opposing school consisted of the great bulk of the Colonial Party, dealing specially with Morocco under the name of the *Comité du Maroc*, composed of, or in touch with, genuinely convinced upholders of a *Tunisification* of Morocco, financiers who were engaged in the process of strangling Morocco, and the value of whose securities stood to rise with a French occupation, concession hunters, land grabbers and speculators, and their journalistic partners; the "forwards" of the Algerian political and military staffs, and the anti-Germans. This school was "out for" absorption and conquest at the earliest possible moment, for elbowing to one side German "pretensions" and the Act of Algeciras together. It was destined to carry the day.

It should be pointed out once more that the French Parliamentary and general Public (apart from a few politicians and journalists in the swim, so to speak) were totally ignorant of the secret Articles of the Anglo-French Declaration and of the secret Franco-Spanish Convention. They had not the remotest idea that the Morocco dangled before their eyes was not the Morocco of the maps, but a Morocco in which Spain had been placed by Britain's insistence in prospective possession of the Mediterranean and North Atlantic littorals, "a Morocco decapitated and mutilated," as M. Dubois bitterly exclaimed in the Chamber on December 18 last; "a Morocco bereft of all its Mediterranean ports, but with a magnificent view of . . . the Sahara," as his opposition colleague, M. Delahaye, lamented on the same occasion. Had these secret arrangements been known, it is safe to say that the opponents of the policy of conquest and violation of international treaty

obligations would have been so immensely strengthened, that the world would have been spared the events of the past year, and their actual and future consequences. In order to appreciate how utterly British public opinion has been misled in the matter, not only as regards German policy and its motives, but as regards the real state of French opinion, it is necessary for Englishmen to understand that the policy of aggression pursued in Morocco after Algeciras through the weakness and vacillation of successive French Governments exercising their precarious tenure beneath the pressure of the *Comité du Maroc* on the one hand, and the unsanctioned activities of the military, inspired from Algiers, on the other, was not (as Englishmen have been persistently taught to believe) a national policy; but, on the contrary, was a policy pursued against the repeatedly declared wishes of the French people expressed through their Parliamentary representatives. It is surely one of the most astounding features in this astounding story of two great peoples involved by their respective diplomats, in an international quarrel which brought them to the verge of war in ignorance of the true inwardness of the quarrel, that from the close of 1906 down to the very eve of the Fez expedition the French Chamber passed resolution after resolution by large majorities expressive of its determination to observe the Algeciras Act and disclaiming intervention in the internal affairs of Morocco.¹ And yet, swiftly and surely, step by step, France was all the time being imperceptibly

¹ *Inter alia*. [I may have missed some]. December 6, 1906; November 12, 1907; January 24 and 28, 1908; June 19, 1908; December 23, 1908; January 10, 1909; November 23, 1909; March 24, 1911. The Chambers said, "No," preserve the rights of France, but uphold Algeciras; the wire-pullers said to the Government, "If you don't move we'll throw you out." The politicians in power preferred to remain in possession of it!

dragged into the adventure which was to bring her into collision once more with Germany. Now, clever as were the wire-pullers behind the scenes they could not have succeeded if the French people had known what lay beneath it all—viz. the arrangement to *divide* Morocco with Spain when the Sultan's authority no longer prevailed (which authority the *militaires* and the *coloniaux* were putting forth all their energies to destroy). The conditions would then have been clearly realised, and French public opinion, which did not desire further trouble with Germany, would have immediately perceived that what its colonials and jingoes were preparing, was another edition of the incidents of 1905. Morocco, at least the non-Spanish part of it, would have ultimately passed under French sway, but later, and the event would have been *preceded* by a friendly understanding with Germany.

No case quite analogous to this one is, I think, anywhere recorded. There could be no more poignant illustration of the utter helplessness of modern democracies in the face of secret-treaty-making diplomats—the paid servants, forsooth, of the State whose citizens are as clay in the hands of the potter!

It is difficult fittingly to comment on the lavishly distributed and perfervid declarations of the French Government during this period, such as M. Pichon's (the new Foreign Minister) statement to an assembly of Parisian journalists on October 28, 1906, in the *Journal* on December 4, and to the *Neues Wiener Tagblatt* on December 25 of the same year, etc. Or take, as a sample of more official language, his despatch to the French *chargé d'affaires* at Madrid on March 30, 1907, after the Udja affair—the first open violation of Morocco territory:—

"Our action on Udja is *not a step towards Fez*. We are resolved to maintain our intervention within the limit which we fixed at the outset."

And so after Casablanca, and so before and after Fez. It is all very nauseous, and if one had any illusions left after plunging through these labyrinthine intrigues, it would be very disillusioning.

Suffice it to say that while in Paris they were *jurant leurs grands Dieux* ("swearing their great gods") that nothing was more remote from their minds than an invasion of Morocco, Morocco itself was all the while being steadily absorbed, a mouthful here, a mouthful there preparatory to the final meal.

Two little incidents marking this period of boa-constrictor assimilation, trivial in their way, perhaps, are nevertheless of interest as throwing light upon two aspects of the Morocco problem. The first shows what the Moors might have accomplished if Europe had shown a modicum of honesty in dealing with them, if Europe had helped them to clear out the devil on their hearths instead of introducing seven other devils worse than the first. The small town of Arzila, twenty-five miles from Tangier, had been captured by brigands. The affair was enormously magnified as indicating the powerlessness of the unhappy Moorish Government; as a matter of fact, the "brigands" numbered . . . twenty-five! The disloyal Moorish Governor of the district—Raisuli—had recaptured the place and used the additional prestige conferred upon him thereby to defy the Sultan more or less openly. He was said to have a numerous following, and his conduct provided another theme for numerous homilies on the anarchy of Morocco. The chauvinists eagerly seized upon the opportunity, right deftly were the strings pulled, and a small landing party from a French cruiser at Tangier, having

had a few stones flung at them by Moorish wastrels about the same time, the French and Spanish Government made solemn preparations for the despatch of a strong naval force "capable of dealing with any emergency," and, if necessary, of "landing detachments." After portentous discussion, a Franco-Spanish note was drawn up and despatched to the Powers.¹ A little more and the Sultan's authority in the Tangier district would have been replaced by that of his kind Latin friends. Inspired, so it was announced at the time, by the wicked Teuton, the Sultan perceived the danger and despatched an army of 2000 men to Tangier. Arzila was reoccupied, Raisuli's forces which were going to annihilate the Sultan's troops melted away without firing a shot, Raisuli himself was publicly dismissed and promptly made himself scarce. The Sultan was just too quick for the "liberating" Armada, which was about to set out from Cadiz and Toulon! The second incident illustrates the esteem which Germany had acquired in the eyes of the Moors by the stand her legitimate interests had caused her to make for their independence. The Moorish Governor, Ulai Hafid, of Marakesh, publicly thanked the German residents for attending the celebrations connected with the Bariam festival, saying:—

"The presence of your countrymen at to-day's celebrations is a double pleasure to me, inasmuch as it is a proof of the friendship existing between your Emperor and my illustrious master and brother, the Sultan, and also because just now conditions, particularly in the south of the Empire where I am Khalif, are wilfully represented as affording no security of the person, while complaints are made concerning events which are partly pure inventions and partly artificially produced."

It seems useless to recount in detail the peripatetics of

¹ Appendix XIII.

the Morocco question throughout the four years, 1907-1910—of which, indeed, something has been told in Chapter VII., especially on the financial side. It suffices to say that, with resources mortgaged to international finance;¹ rent by internal disturbances and civil war; its territory violated; its coffers empty; its subjects ground with taxation; compelled to perpetrate abuses in order to sustain itself and feed its troops; intrigued against by the French on every hand; harassed with incessant demands for apologies and reforms and compensations; its prestige irrevocably impaired; with French expeditionary columns foraging in every direction from their base in the Shawiya; the Moorish Government fell to pieces, while the country itself sunk into bloody chaos. And, concurrently, Franco-German rivalry in Morocco and in Europe became intensified. In Morocco the official representatives of Germany fought to preserve the international machinery set up by the Algeciras Act, while German firms sought to push their commerce and their enterprises. The official representatives of France, both civil and military, fought with equal energy, and in the case of the latter fought literally, to break that international machinery and to promote French interests, political, commercial, and, above all, speculative, in a whole series of localities, by operations often of a most disgraceful character.² In Europe the French and German newspapers abused one another with copious invective, and the anti-German British newspapers joined in the fray—always, of course, on the side of the French.

¹ Let the reader bear in mind that the *whole* of the customs were mortgaged to guarantee the interest to European bondholders on the two loans—to the extent of 60 per cent. on the 1904 loan, and 40 per cent. on the 1910 loan.

² The "Udja" scandals have been filling the French Press for months, and the *Times* Tangier correspondent has courageously exposed others.

To the clamour of the French fife and the German bassoon was now added, in the closing months of 1910, the rattle of the Spanish castanets. Spain had been getting increasingly uneasy at the prolongation of the French military occupation and at the ever-growing perimeter of the French military operations. Her politicians began to wonder whether the contemptuous disregard of the Algeciras Act by the French would not be followed by equally high-handed proceedings towards Spanish claims as defined in the secret Franco-Spanish Convention which, failing the application of the Algeciras Act, Spain was resolved to maintain. Questions and complaints multiplied themselves in the Cortes and Senate, and the newspapers harangued. To Spanish grumbling official France continued to oppose the entire "correctness" of its intentions as proclaimed in the resolutions of the Chamber and the pledges of its public men, which, to be sure, were numerous enough. In these assurances the Spaniards appeared to find but cold comfort, in view of what had actually taken place on the spot. So they sent large reinforcements to their existing garrisons in the Riff, and began the occupation of the outlying districts of the zone which, under the Convention, fell to Spain. The tone of the French Press thereupon became openly threatening.

And now the curtain goes up upon the final scene which is to witness the triumph of the *Comité du Maroc*. In April, 1911, Fez is reported blocked by insurgents and the Europeans in danger; General Moinier sets out for its relief at the head of 30,000 men, and the French Government, continuing its everlasting assurances of respect for the integrity and independence of Morocco, announces that General Moinier will withdraw to the coast after succouring the menaced Europeans. Sir Edward Grey

declares in the House of Commons that the march on Fez has his approval. The German Government at once issues through the *North German Gazette* the warning which, as we now know and as will be subsequently explained,¹ it then addressed to France. If the French Government, declares in effect the official organ of the German Government, considers its subjects to be in danger, Germany while not in receipt of similar information so far as German subjects are concerned, sees no cause to oppose that view, but, taking note of the French Government's public pledges not to occupy the capital, expresses the hope that it will succeed in carrying out its programme. Were it to fail to do so the Act of Algeciras would finally have ceased to exist, and full freedom of independent action would be automatically restored to the signatory Powers. So Britain approves, Germany warns, and the storm approaches.

Spain, however, is not content with a warning. She takes immediate action, pouring more troops into the Riff; and, prosecuting further her intention not to be jockeyed out of any of her rights under the secret Convention, sends a strong force to occupy *manu militari* Larash and El-Kasr in the North Atlantic section of the zone. Thus, Spain's answer to the occupation of Fez.

Furious clamour arises in Paris.² The *Comité du Maroc* moves heaven and earth to prevent the Government from giving the order for the evacuation of Fez, and the chauvinist organs use language of unveiled menace to Spain. May closes with General Moinier still at Fez, and the sentiments precedently prevailing both in Germany

¹ Chapter XVIII.

² Very different, as we shall see presently, to the calm which generally prevailed, when the *Panther* anchored off Agadir. We clamoured then!

and in Spain as to the validity of the urgency pleaded by France for her march upon the capital, are strengthened by the inconvenient revelations which begin to appear, even in the French Press, as to the non-existence at any time of any panic among the Europeans in the capital and, *per contra*, the existence therein of plentiful supplies.

One of the best informed and most distinguished of French publicists, M. Francis de Pressensé, has with accuracy and scorn painted the true picture of the Fez comedy, and as it is a piece of excellent writing, I give it in lieu of any description of my own—

“Nevertheless matters were still not sufficiently to the liking of the *impressarii*. To justify the financial operation which was to crown the sordid tragic-comedy, something else was still needed. And at this point the *Comité du Maroc* and its organs surpassed themselves. They organised a campaign of systematic untruth. Masters of almost the entire press, they swamped the public with false news. Fez was represented as threatened by siege or sack. A whole European French colony was suddenly discovered there, living in anguish. The ultimate fate of the women and children was described in the most moving terms. Even in the absence of independent information one could not fail to be struck by the singular contradictions of these alarmist despatches. Now, Fez was lost because the *Mehallah* commanded by a French instructor was away. Anon the return of the said *Mehallah* was calculated to lose Fez. One day, the alarmed public learned that the town had undergone a formidable assault. The next day the public was gravely told that the rebels had not yet assembled, but in a few days would surround Fez with a circle of iron and flame. The most lamentable details were given of the state of the expeditionary *Mehallah* which only possessed an insignificant quantity of cartridges and shells, but this did not prevent the subsequent announcement that, thanks to the heroism of its leader, it had achieved a

great victory and scattered the enemy with a hailstorm of shot and shell. Finally it was affirmed that in case of siege the city was only provisioned for two or three weeks. Thus carefully cooked, public opinion soon took fire. What was the Government thinking of? At all cost the Europeans, the Sultan, Fez itself must be saved. . . . As ever, from the beginning of this enterprise, the Government knew nothing, willed nothing of itself. With a salutary dread of complications it would have preferred not to move, perhaps, even, had it dared, to withdraw from the hornet's nest. But the greater fears it experienced from another quarter prevailed; those inculcated by the so-called patriotic shoutings, the concerted clamours of the orchestra of which the *Comité du Maroc* holds the *bâton*, and whose chief performers are to be found in *Le Temps* and *Le Matin*. The order to advance was given. . . . Already while the expedition was on its way, light began to pierce. Those redoubtable rebels who were threatening Fez had disappeared like the dew in the morning. Barely did a few ragged horsemen fire off a shot or two before turning round and riding away at a furious gallop. A too disingenuous, or too truthful, correspondent gave the show away. The expeditionary force complains, he gravely records, of the absence of the enemy; the approaching harvest season is keeping all the healthy males in the fields! Thus did the phantom so dextrously conjured by the *Comité du Maroc* for the benefit of its aims disappear in a night. . . . Avowals and disclosures then began in right earnest. One of the correspondents who had contributed his share to the concert of lying news, wrote with an admirable *sang-froid* that, in truth, there had been some exaggeration, that, in point of fact, at no moment had the safety of Fez and its inhabitants been seriously menaced; that the idea of a regular siege and of a sudden capture had been alike chimerical and that, moreover, so far as the provisioning of the place was concerned, he could reassure the most timorous that there was sufficient corn in the city to feed the whole population, plus the expeditionary column, for more than a year! The farce was played. After

Casablanca, Fez. France without realising it, without wishing it, almost without knowing it, had taken a decisive step. An indefinite occupation of the capital was the natural prelude to a Protectorate. For the clever men who had invented and executed the scenario there only now remained the task of reaping the fruit of their efforts. The era of concessions, profits, dividends was about to open. Premature joyfulness! It was the era of difficulties which was at hand."

Such was the operation with which the British Foreign Office hastened diplomatically to identify itself. Not only so—but to take upon itself, and to impose upon an ill-informed British public, the defence of all the international consequences following from that operation, and, under cover of vague talk about "British interests" (where none were involved), to compromise British interests to the extent of risking a European conflagration.

The close of June saw the French Government still protesting its "correctness"; General Moinier still in occupation of Fez; the entire country between the coast and the capital overrun by French troops; with Spain strengthening her position at Larash, El-Kasr, and in the Gharb generally, fighting in the Riff and descending upon Ifni; Morocco in the death-throes—and the *Panther en route* for Agadir.

PART V

Germany's Second Intervention (1911) and the ensuing
Anglo-German Crisis.

CHAPTER XVI

WAS GERMANY JUSTIFIED IN SENDING THE "PANTHER" TO AGADIR ?

As in 1905, so in 1911, events had compelled the German Government to assume a decided position in the Morocco affair. And as the German Emperor's visit to Tangier in 1905 had been described as "dramatic" and "tempestuous," so the despatch of the *Panther* to Agadir has been denounced as diplomacy of an "aggressive" and "brutal" kind. It was certainly less subtle than the diplomacy which Germany had to contend against. The latter had started by ignoring altogether Germany's right to be consulted in the future of Morocco, proceeding in secret to dispose of that State while loudly professing the intention of maintaining its independence. That was period number one. Then, in the face of the Algeciras Act, brought about by Germany's intervention, it had gradually, inch by inch, still professing entire attachment to the principle of Moroccan integrity, plotted and schemed to confront Germany with an accomplished fact—to wit, the substitution of a French Protectorate over Morocco upon the ashes of the Algeciras Act. And throughout both periods it had manœuvred successfully to convince public opinion of its eminent straightforwardness. The contrast between the complacency with which the exploits of France and Spain had been accepted in the quarters that greeted the advent of the little German gunboat off

Agadir¹ with horrified cries of outraged propriety, is certainly comic.

Germany's action in this regard has, however, been widely condemned even by those who have admitted the shabby treatment which Germany has received all through this miserable business. Let us look at the matter a little closer and put one or two pertinent questions.

Short of acquiescing in the, by then, undisguised destruction of the Act of Algeciras, and thus throwing up her whole case, what could Germany have done? She should have insisted, urge some critics, upon a return to the *status quo*, i.e. the *status quo* established by the Act of Algeciras. But how? How was that possible with nearly 100,000 French and Spanish troops in Morocco, with a French army of occupation established in the capital, with the Sultan's authority gone never to return? Morocco as an independent political entity had, in point of fact, ceased to exist. That Germany would have been within her legal rights in demanding a return to the *status quo* is obvious. It was that self-evident fact which made her position impregnable internationally whatever she chose to do, and despite all the screaming on the other side. But at the stage matters had reached France could no more have evacuated Morocco without national humiliation than Germany could have accepted defeat and retired beaten from the diplomatic field without humiliation. That was the impasse to which the Colonial Party in France and the forward School in Algeria, with the concurrence of the British Foreign Office, had brought matters.

If Germany had desired war she would either have demanded a return to the *status quo* with its indispensable

¹ It has been repeatedly stated that the *Panther* "occupied" Agadir. There was, of course, never any occupation.

accompaniment, the withdrawal of the French and Spanish military forces from the soil of Morocco, whose integrity, formally proclaimed by the Public Law of Europe, their presence upon it violated. Or she would have sent not a two-penny-half-penny gunboat to Agadir: but half a dozen men-o'-war, landed troops and done at Agadir and in the Sus what France had done at Casablanca and in the Shawiya, what Spain had done at Larash and in the Gharb—and with justification at least equal to theirs. For did the Algeciras Act authorise France and Spain any more than it authorised Germany to occupy Moroccan territory? Will it be seriously contended that because of an affray between European workmen and the Moorish populace at Casablanca, France was morally or legally entitled to bombard that town and spread her soldiers over the Shawiya district¹; or that Spain was morally or legally entitled to make a descent upon Larash and El-Kasr, without, so far as the Moors were concerned, the very ghost of a pretext?

Had Germany wanted war her course was clearly indicated, and it has been one of the most shameful features of the persistent misleading of the British public in favour of a diplomacy immoral from its inception, that Germany, the provoked party, has been represented both in the crisis of 1905 and in the crisis of 1911—crises entirely brought about by that diplomacy—as working for war.

I submit that, intrinsically, Germany must be held to have been entitled to raise the question of the legality of the new situation created by France, in such manner as would compel a final settlement of the problem. To

¹ In that case—seeing that the Act of Algeciras had proclaimed the integrity of Morocco—England would have been equally justified in occupying, shall we say Mequinez, because Mr. Madden was murdered at Mazagan (January 10, 1908).

assert, as Sir Edward Grey and the newspapers who support his policy have asserted, that the new situation was created by Germany in despatching the *Panther* to Agadir, is to fly in the face of the most patent and irrefutable facts. It is easy to make such an assertion before an ill-informed Parliament, and to a worse informed public. But it is impossible for a solitary human being to sustain it in argument. Whether the German Government could have selected any other form of effective protest against the attempt to elbow Germany out of her lawful position, appears doubtful. At any rate, no alternative between the acceptance of defeat and a summons which must have resulted in war has been suggested by Germany's critics.

But if, intrinsically, and taking her stand upon the Public Law of Europe, Germany was justified in calling a halt to the actual process of a Franco-Spanish partition and occupation of Morocco, she also possessed further elements of vindication. Those elements, those contributing causes lay in the series of negotiations which she had carried on with France subsequent to the Franco-German arrangement of February, 1909.¹ It will be observed from the terms of that Agreement that far from pursuing a policy of bitter ill-will towards France in Morocco which has been laid to her charge by those who in this country are, if the truth were known, much less concerned with that idea than they are by the fear of seeing France and Germany draw closer to one another; the German Government had taken an important step towards dissipating the Moroccan shadow which clouded Franco-German relations² and removing certain points of friction

¹ *Vide* Chapter V., and Appendix.

² In January, 1909, Mulai Hafid applied to Germany for the loan of military instructors. Germany informed France of the request, and declined it.

between the two countries in Equatorial Africa. While extracting from the French Government a renewed declaration of firm attachment to the independence and integrity of Morocco, the German Government had confirmed in more precise terms than those used in the Exchange of Notes of July, 1905,¹ its recognition of special French interests in Morocco; had proclaimed that Germany's interests in Morocco were purely economic, and had paved the way to co-operation in economic questions. Both Governments had interpreted the reference to economic co-operation as applying not only to Morocco but to other parts of Africa where their mutual interests touched, and the Agreement was soon followed by the initiation of comprehensive negotiations covering a wide field of business enterprise. These had relation, in Morocco, to the famous *Union des Mines*, an international Association constituted in 1907, whose founders and adherents comprised powerful French, German, British, Spanish, Italian, Austrian, Belgian, and Portuguese manufacturers, bankers, and even political personages²; to the *Société Marocaine des Travaux publiques*, another international concern like the Morocco Tobacco Monopoly,³ with French, German, British, and Spanish capital; finally

¹ *Vide* Appendix X.

² The French "group" included the Cie. des Forges de Chatillon-Commentry et Neuves Maisons, Schneider et Cie., Banque française pour le commerce et l'Industrie, Count Armande, etc.; the German "group" included Krupps, the Metallurgische Gesellschaft of Frankfurt, the Nationalbank fur Deutschland of Berlin, etc.; the British "group" included A. E. Harris of Harris Dixon, Ltd., London, Mr. Bonar Law, M.P., Mr. W. B. Harris, correspondent of the *Times* at Tangier, etc.; the Spanish "group" included the Marquis de Villamejor, and so on. *Vide L'Humanité*, of March, 1911, which published a list of them. *Vide also Manchester Guardian*, of May 8, 1911.

³ *Société internationale de régie co-intéressée des tabacs du Maroc*, in which the Paris and Netherlands Bank, Mendelsohn & Co., Sir Ernest Cassel, and others, were interested.

to the participation of Franco-German capital in the construction of railways in various parts of Morocco.

Outside Morocco, in the French Congo and German Cameroons, the negotiations affected conflicting economic interests which had long given rise to friction, and in one case—the affair of Missum-Missum—to armed collision between a German military detachment and the Agent of a French Concessionnaire Company. The genesis of these incidents lay on the one part in the rivalries of German merchants and French concessionnaire companies, on the other to ill-defined frontiers and absence of means of communication. To put an end to these irritating affairs by a combination of the clashing interests at stake and to elaborate a scheme for Franco-German railway construction, was the desire of the German Government, and, to all seeming, that of the French politicians with whom that Government successively negotiated. Discussion continued all through 1909, 1910, and down to June, 1911, with a uniform ill-success which appeared in German eyes, systematic, and which has since been publicly admitted in numerous quarters in France, to have been deplorable and well-calculated to annoy the German Government.¹

It is no part of my task to disentangle the innumerable financial, personal and political intrigues with which these “conversations” were honeycombed on the French side, still less to apportion responsibility with the magnificent assurance displayed in certain editorial offices in London.

¹ *Vide* the Debates in the French Chamber (December, 1911) and Senate (February, 1912); the published summaries of the examinations of Ministers and others by the French Senatorial Committee (January, 1912); numerous articles in *Le Temps*, *La Liberté*, and, notably, the articles in *La République française* by the well-known Deputy, M. Jules Roche (January 9, 1912, *et sequitur*); the revelation attending the resignation of M. de Selves and the Caillaux Cabinet (January, 1912), etc., etc.

Broadly speaking two tendencies were at work—pro-German and anti-German—in French official and political life, throughout this period, as they were in the period immediately following Agadir; and these tendencies were reflected in the actions of respective members of the Cabinets which succeeded one another with such bewildering rapidity last year.¹ Behind them, and mixed up with them, all kinds of strings were being pulled by individuals with axes of their own to grind.

Confining one's self merely to what is now established, there is no denying that the German Government was confronted with a state of affairs which, as it developed, became inextricably chaotic. Side by side with official overtures, proposals were put forward now by one Minister, now by several Ministers, only to be subsequently explained away or withdrawn. There were official "conversations" and private "conversations": emissaries said to be authorised passed to and fro: inopportune disclosures in the Paris Press added to the confusion, which was made worse confounded by constant Cabinet changes. The negotiations made no progress. One combination after another fell through. The growing irritation in German official circles reached its climax with the collapse of the so-called *consortium*, an arrangement whereby the N'Goko Sangha Company (whose concession extended to the German border and in whose undelimited territory frequent disputes had occurred with German merchants) was to have become a Franco-German Chartered Company with police rights over an extensive area of the French Congo. An agreement had actually been signed

¹ The Briand Cabinet fell at the end of February, 1911. It was succeeded by the Monis Cabinet which fell at the end of June; to be in turn succeeded by the Caillaux Cabinet. (The Caillaux Cabinet resigned in January, 1912, to be succeeded by the Poincaré Cabinet.)

in regard to this matter in December, 1910, between M. Pichon, Foreign Minister in the Briand Ministry, and the head of the German "group," subject to the approval of the Chamber. The Briand Ministry having ascertained that the feeling of the Chamber was hostile for the reason explained in the footnote further on, dropped the matter and reopened it on a somewhat different basis with the German Embassy in Paris. A final agreement was signed on February 15, 1911, subject to the approval of the Chamber. But Parliamentary and public hostility to the *consortium* had steadily grown, and M. Briand's fall from power, attributed at the time to internal questions, was due to the certainty he had acquired that if he faced the Chamber with this *consortium*, his defeat, under circumstances prejudicial to his future political career, was inevitable. The Monis Ministry came in, and, a fortnight later, M. Messimy, Colonial Minister in that Ministry,¹ announced to the Chamber the Government's intention of abandoning the *consortium*. The rebuff to Germany was direct and all the more exasperating since the Monis Ministry was, at the very time it was inflicted, making no secret of its intention to send French troops to Fez.²

¹ Afterwards War Minister in the Caillaux Cabinet.

² The *consortium*, excellent in principle, was vitiated by the "indemnity" which the French side of the arrangement stipulated should be handed over to the N'Goko Sangha Company as a charge upon the budget of the French Congo, already in a parlous state. Many causes contributed to make of this payment a "job" of the worst description, and both it and its principal advocate, M. Tardieu, Foreign Editor of *Le Temps*, an extremely able, but most dangerous factor in French political life, were furiously assailed by Felicien Challaye, Pierre Mille, Peaix-Seailles, and other high-minded and honourable Frenchmen connected with the French League for the Defence of the Congo natives, as much in the interests of the natives as of public morality. Their opposition led to a Parliamentary investigation which concluded in rejecting the whole transaction. See in this connection more particularly the French Parliamentary Paper No. 376 of 1911;

Before the Monis Ministry fell (end of June), General Moinier's army was in occupation of the capital of Morocco.

When it became quite clear that the French were at Fez to stay, the German Government made up its mind that the time had come to move, although desultory negotiations on several points (notably the French-Congo Cameroons railway scheme) were still going on. The fall of the Monis Cabinet at the end of June, placed M. Caillaux in power with M. de Selves as Foreign Minister [June 28]. Three days later the German ambassador at Paris informed the new French Ministry that it had despatched the *Panther* to Agadir.

The German Government which, in the previous May—i.e. at the time of the expedition to Fez—had informed the French Government that it reserved henceforth complete liberty of action in connection with the Morocco question,¹ made known the step it had taken to the signatory Powers of the Act of Algeciras in the following despatch communicated to those Powers by Germany's accredited representatives:—

“Some German firms established in the south of Morocco, notably at Agadir and in the vicinity, have been alarmed by a certain ferment among the local tribes, due, it seems, to the recent occurrences in other parts of the country. These firms have applied to the Imperial Government for protection for their lives and property.

numerous articles in the *Courrier européen*, *Journal de Genève*, *Dépêche de Toulouse*, etc., and my own letter to the *Daily News* on October 3, 1911, based upon Felicien Challaye's “*Politique internationale et journalisme d'affaires*” (Paris, Felix Alcan), particularly interesting to English readers, as it reveals the very suggestive and highly unpleasant fact of the existence of relations between M. Tardieu and the British Foreign Office.

¹ *Vide* Chapter XVIII.

At their request the Imperial Government have decided to send a warship to the port of Agadir to lend help and assistance in case of need to their subjects and *protégés* as well as to the considerable German interests in the territory in question. As soon as the state of affairs in Morocco has resumed its former quiet aspect the ship charged with this protective mission shall leave the port of Agadir.

"Please convey this information verbally to the Government to which you are accredited, if possible, on Saturday at noon, leaving the text as an *aide-mémoire*.

"KIDERLEN."

That the German Government would have strengthened its position in the eyes of the world by laying less stress upon the alarm of German firms and by stating the further reasons dictating its resolve, is certain. When one reviews carefully the whole position, however, one is led to the conclusion that such a procedure would have been unwise unless the German Government desired a rupture, probably resulting in war, which it is quite obvious the German Government did not. And for this reason. However diplomatically worded, a statement of the German case at that juncture, and in an official communication to foreign Powers, would have conveyed a censure upon French action, and, consequently, upon British approval of French action,¹ which would have immediately resulted in a very strained situation. Such a course would, moreover, have rendered virtually impossible the prosecution or rather the continuation of direct negotiations with France which it was the aim of German policy to promote. At first sight, too, one might be disposed to blame the German Government for not having incorporated in its communication a more explicit disavowal of

¹ Sir Edward Grey had, in the House of Commons, publicly approved of the French march to Fez.

any intention to occupy Agadir. On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that the German Government had, in its Agreement with France in February, 1909, categorically proclaimed its interests in Morocco to be purely economic, which was not, indeed, the enunciation of a new attitude but the confirmation of the attitude to which it had consistently adhered. Nevertheless one cannot help feeling that the German Government would have been well advised to have disclaimed once more, at that moment, and, categorically, all political and territorial designs. No doubt it did so to the various Governments concerned, as we shall see later. But not to the world, officially at least—which gave a handle to its enemies.

The opening portion of the German Chancellor's speech to the Reichstag on November 9, may, perhaps, be usefully reproduced here :—

“The Algeciras Act was intended to maintain the independence of Morocco with a view to the economic development of the country for the benefit of the trade of all the Powers parties to it. It was soon evident that one of the essential conditions was lacking, namely, a Sultan who was actual ruler of the country, and was in a position to carry out the reforms contemplated. Even Sultan Mulai Hafid could not do so in spite of his personal qualities. He became more and more dependent upon foreign influence, and came into constantly increasing conflict with the tribes of his own country in consequence. This led to ever-growing influence on the part of France, for, of the four Powers which since the seventies possessed treaty rights to maintain military missions at the Sultan's Court, only the French Mission had succeeded in establishing its position. In the same way France had for long supplied Morocco with money. The position of the Sultan, surrounded by hostile tribes and shut up in Fez, became eventually so precarious that France informed the Powers that grave apprehensions must be felt for the lives and

property of her officers at the Sultan's Court, and of the European colony.

"France accordingly declared that she proposed to send troops to Fez, and to conduct the Europeans back to the coast. We had received no such threatening reports from Fez, and, therefore, declared that our colony did not require foreign assistance. Since, however, we could naturally assume no responsibility for the lives of the French citizens who were apparently threatened, we raised no objection to the advance to Fez to bring back the threatened French citizens to the coast. We added the explicit reservation, however, which we also announced publicly, that we retained our liberty of action, should the French expedition go beyond its alleged object, even should such action be merely the result of circumstances arising out of the expedition. This occurred, as was to be expected. France exerted practically unlimited sway over the relieved Sultan in virtue of her influence, which had gradually become absolute. The independence of the Sultan assumed by the Algeciras Act thus ceased to exist. It has, indeed, been urged that the Sultan himself summoned the French to his assistance, but a ruler who summons foreign troops to his assistance, and who relies solely upon the support of foreign bayonets, is no longer the independent ruler on whose existence the Algeciras Act was based. We let this be known, and suggested to France an understanding, leaving, of course, the initiative to her. We indicated the general outlines only of our programme to the effect that we should be ready to take into account the altered position of France resulting from the changed conditions, but that in return we must demand more precise guarantees for the equality assured to us in the domain of commerce and industry, especially in regard to public works, besides compensations for the rights assumed by France without previous understanding with us and going beyond the letter and spirit of the Algeciras Act. At first we received no positive proposals from Paris, whilst the French military power continued to spread in Morocco, and the fiction began gradually to become established, not only in France,

but also with the other Powers, that France was acting in pursuance of a European mandate. When, therefore, German interests appeared to be threatened in consequence of the events in Morocco, we sent a warship to Agadir. The despatch of this ship was primarily intended for the protection of the lives and property of our subjects. It represented at the same time a clear intimation of our right and our intention to defend our subjects in Morocco just as independently as France protected hers, so long as she came to no understanding with us. This object of the despatch of our warship and its limitation to this object were announced, immediately before the arrival of the ship, to the Powers through our Ambassadors and Ministers accredited to them. It is, accordingly, an untrue assertion if the despatch of a ship to Agadir was represented in the press—in the foreign press—as a provocation and a threat. We provoke and threaten no one; but we protect our rights and we shall not allow ourselves to be deterred or hindered by any one.

“The discussion with France then began.”

We have now to examine the respective manner in which the French and British Governments greeted the German official despatch.

CHAPTER XVII

HOW THE DESPATCH OF THE "PANTHER" TO AGADIR WAS GREETED IN PARIS AND LONDON RESPECTIVELY

IF one desired to select from an abundance of accessible material an ideally symptomatic introduction to the amazing narrative of the policy pursued by the British diplomatic machine towards Germany in the month of July, 1911, one's choice would fall upon the incident which by natural sequence and by no artificial device takes its appointed place at the stage we have now reached in recounting the exploits of "Morocco in Diplomacy." I allude to the profound divergence between the reception of the German notification by the French and British Governments respectively.

M. de Selves, Foreign Minister of the Power directly concerned and supposedly threatened, by Germany's "brutal" act, went off to Holland with President Fallières, and did not return to Paris until July 7.

Sir Edward Grey, Foreign Secretary of a Power indirectly concerned, apprised, as was M. de Selves on July 1, sent for the German ambassador on July 3, summoned a Cabinet meeting, held it, sent for the German ambassador on July 4, told him that "a new situation had been created," and that the British Government "could not recognise any new arrangement that might be come to

without" it. On July 6 Mr. Asquith¹ stated in the House that he wished it "clearly to be understood that his Majesty's Government consider that a new situation has arisen in Morocco, in which it is possible that future developments may affect British interests more directly than has been the case." After expressing confidence that "diplomatic discussion" would find a solution, the Prime Minister went on to say that "in the part we shall take in it we shall have due regard to the protection of those interests and to the fulfilment of our treaty obligations to France, which are well known to the House."

Thus from the very outset the attitude of the Foreign Office may fairly be described as (1) an unreserved declaration in favour of the French case by accentuating the creation of a "new situation" through Germany's action, whereas the French occupation of Fez, precedently endorsed and applauded by Sir Edward Grey² (plus the long-drawn-out and abortive negotiations described in the last chapter) as the factor in bringing about the "new situation" was ignored. (2) An intimation that the British Government would insist upon taking part in the ensuing negotiations—an intimation which was *mort-né*,³ because in point of fact, as explained in the last chapter, negotiations had been going on for a considerable time, and the despatch of the *Panther* to Agadir had resulted at once from the impossible position in which the German

¹ Replying to Mr. Balfour.

² On November 27, 1911, Sir Edward Grey was asked if he would give the House the information upon the strength of which he had approved the Fez expedition. He declined to do so.

³ The British Government never participated in the ensuing negotiations, but the French Government kept the Foreign Office fully informed throughout, as stated by Sir Edward Grey in the House later on, an admission damaging to British foreign policy, as will appear in due course.

Government found itself of bringing them to a head, and from the march on Fez while they were actually in progress and within a year of France's categorical pledge of firm attachment to the independence and integrity of Morocco.

In short, at the very outset, the British Foreign Office went out of its way to make this Franco-German dispute its own, adopted a distinctly though not then pronounced anti-German tone, tinged with suspicion, and was, at least, the reverse of dispassionate. There was no suggestion of a wish to keep the scales balancing even for a time, while the French Foreign Minister was paying his official visit to the Dutch Court; but, on the contrary, the indication of a somewhat precipitate desire to weigh them down in a certain direction.

To inquire whether this was wise would be superfluous. It was merely illustrative and symptomatic of British foreign policy on the Morocco question since the Conference at Algeciras. Let us digress for a moment and glance backwards, though at the risk of repetition. Three things must be obvious, I venture to think, to those who have followed the narrative thus far. First, that official France was determined—quite rightly, from the point of view of those of her rulers who believed that her interests demanded it—to convert Morocco into a French Protectorate. Secondly, that France relied upon British support to achieve her ambition. Thirdly, that in French official circles opinion was divided as to the advisability of executing the design (*a*) by relying solely upon British support with Russia in the background, and thus again risking a rupture with Germany, (*b*) by securing German acquiescence for a consideration, as British, Spanish, and Italian acquiescence had been secured by the diplomatic arrangements concluded prior to the Conference of Algeciras.

Such being the case, a really far-sighted British policy, really pursuing its oft-advertised concern for good relations between France and Germany, and its frequent repudiation of the slightest wish to cause friction between its friends and their neighbours, had surely, a line of action clearly mapped out before it. Upon its support of the French aim, *unaccomplishable* without that support, *it could have put a price*. That price would have been an arrangement between France and Germany. That price would have been an insistence—justified to the hilt by Britain's signature at the foot of the Act of Algeciras—that the British Government could not, in honour, treat as non-existent Article 123 of that Act;¹ that the Act, assented to and signed by France, had materially modified precedent engagements and that British diplomatic support of French unavowed—indeed repeatedly disclaimed—but nevertheless, existing ambition, must be subject to a treatment of Germany commensurable with Germany's legal position, and with Germany's unquestionable rights. Such a policy was, I repeat, plainly designated from the point of view of British interests, British good faith, and that widest of all interests—solicitude for the peace of the world. Such a policy would also have been in the manifest interest of France herself. The men who bullied and harassed successive French Governments into comminatory measures in Morocco, who transformed “pacific penetration” into financial strangulation, violent reprisals, incessant intrigues and sometimes cruel outrages, were the men who for the past twenty-five years had brought France to the verge of war, twice with England and twice

¹ Postulating (*Vide* Chapters V. and VI.) that the stipulations of the Act should prevail over any provisions in antecedent arrangements between the signatory Powers and Morocco, conflicting with these stipulations.

with Germany; and who, between them, had cost the French tax-payer millions.

Whether such a policy ever entered Sir Edward Grey's mind I do not know. Suffice it to say that it was not followed: that the party in France, and a strong party it was, not confined to one section of public opinion, which favoured a complete break with the Delcassé tradition, received no support from the British diplomatic machine. The party of the strong hand, the party of violence, the party which wrecked the negotiations of 1909-1911, the party which drove the Algerian frontier far into the Sultan's dominions, hypocritically declaring its attachment to Moroccan integrity, while it filched town after town, district after district, and having by the proceedings of its agents produced a state of chaos and disruption from one end of the country to the other, marched to Fez over the scattered remnants of the Public Law of Europe thereby rendering a collision with Germany unavoidable—that party it was which, from first to last, received the support of the British diplomatic machine, and the plaudits of its mouthpieces in the British Press.¹

¹ One might add, the Party which has filled North Africa from Udja to Sfax, with the pestilence of administrative and financial scandals; which has determined the policy that has driven thousands of Algerian families to migrate to Syria, and which, if its activities be not curtailed, will bring about before many years are over, an uprising against French rule, extending from the North Atlantic to the borders of Tripoli; the party whose machinations led to the enforcement of the Leopoldian system in the French Congo, and strewed bloodshed and devastation in its tracks—a hideous story studiously suppressed from the British public, but upon which several well-known Frenchmen have shed a sombre light. For a summarised version of one of the blackest pages of African history, *vide Contemporary Review*, December, 1911.

I commend Felicien Challaye's article in *La Revue du Mois*, for January, 1912. Here is a striking extract, and it is the bare, unvarnished, incontestable truth: "Honesty would in Morocco and the Congo have been the best of policies. France committed lamentable errors

Public opinion in France was not more excited than M. de Selves. On July 5, M. Poincaré—now Prime Minister—delivered a speech before the Democratic Republican Alliance, collected and moderate in tone:—

“It may be,” he said, “that we are paying the penalty of indecision and, in some respects, of our past mistakes. Let us leave all this on one side. It is futile to recriminate. We must not look behind us, we must look ahead with firmness and tranquillity. Let our policy be frank, straightforward, and resolute. Let us found it firmly upon our treaties with other nations; let us, if necessary, lend ourselves to courteous negotiations, and we shall soon see the clouds disperse that have just rolled upon the horizon.”

What of the French Press? A section of it certainly expressed itself strongly, in terms, however, rather of indignant surprise than denunciation.¹ Even if the comments of this section of the Press had been stronger than they were it would not have been surprising—the *French were the directly interested parties*: moreover, three or four of the numerous Parisian newspapers are always strongly anti-German, such as the *Echo de Paris* and the *Eclair*. But another section, the more important and better-informed section, took the “Crisis” in a very matter-of-fact way—notably *Le Temps*, which had been cognisant of and (for private reasons of its own) had endorsed, the

when, for the satisfaction of private interests, she violated in Morocco the Act of Algeciras, and in the Congo the Act of Berlin. . . . Under what influences have been committed these violations of the Act of Algeciras? Incontestably through the influence of private interests.” The whole article is an admirable piece of cool, honest, and informed writing by an expert on Colonial questions.

¹ Let it be again repeated that the Franco-Spanish secret Convention, and the secret Articles of the Anglo-French Declaration, were not publicly known, nor was the full story of the abortive 1909-1911 negotiations.

attempt on the French side to bring the negotiations of 1909-1911 to a satisfactory termination. The speech of that very able deputy, M. Marcel Sembat, in the Chamber last December, reveals so accurately the general feeling which prevailed in France at the time that one is dispensed from further illustration. After declaring—what has since become well known, but was not so widely understood in December—that Germany's claims for compensation in the French Congo in exchange for her recognition of a French Protectorate over Morocco had arisen "in part from French suggestions,"¹ he went on to say—

"One is compelled to observe (*il faut bien convenir*) that the despatch of the German boat to Agadir was regarded by a large part of the French Press, not as the manifestation of a desire or a feeling of hostility, but simply—the expression itself was used—as the manifestation of a wish to discuss (*causer*). It was also described as the 'Ringing of a bell.' . . . On the day after Agadir it seemed—and if you indulge in the same experience you will undergo the same curious feeling as I, who have followed this matter from day to day, and the comments of the newspapers, underwent—when I read the latter again yesterday in the library, I underwent the same curious feeling that at that time it was sought not only to calm the French people, which was quite right, but to calm them by saying: 'Don't you understand? This is in order that discussions on the *consortium* should be renewed. Don't seek any further. Do not get alarmed. It is simply a business matter.'"²

In other words, public opinion in France—the country directly affected by Germany's action—was by no means

¹ I.e. the Franco-German combination in the French Congo and Cameroons, signed by the Briand Cabinet, and upset by the Monis Cabinet—*vide* preceding chapter. No doubt M. Sembat also referred to the negotiations of the then French Premier, M. Caillaux, with the German Government.

² *Journal Officiel*, December 16, 1911.

convulsed. Quite the contrary. A great many persons in political, journalistic, and financial circles, in the Parisian *Salons* (which make public opinion in France) were perfectly well aware that Germany, through a whole series of inter-related circumstances covering a protracted period, had a case, and a very strong case indeed. The repeated warnings conveyed to the French ambassador at Berlin by the German Government that if France stayed in Fez Germany would resume her complete freedom of action in Morocco,¹ Germany's unconcealed displeasure at the action of the Monis Ministry in rejecting the French-Congo Agreement signed by the Briand Ministry²—these things had been known and openly discussed in the *Salons* for some time. That Germany would take some sort of action was, it is now quite clear, fully anticipated in well-informed quarters in Paris. And when she did, Paris, that most sensitive of cities, did not go into hysterics.

In England, the *Times* echoed from the first the note of hostility observable in the attitude of the Foreign Office. If I quote the *Times*, it is for three reasons, and for no other. First, because its admirable service of foreign telegrams makes of it, deservedly, the inspirer of a considerable section of British newspapers, consequently of a considerable section of the British public; while it

¹ *Vide* the cross-examination of M. Cruppi (Foreign Minister in the Monis Cabinet) by the Senatorial Commission on December 26. I refer to this later.

² When the Monis Cabinet came in (March, 1911) the French Foreign Office staff handed M. Cruppi, then Foreign Minister, a detailed report on the subject, pointing out that the German legation in Paris had "manifested on several occasions the importance attached by the Imperial Government to the settlement of the negotiations," and warning the new occupant of the Department that a "regrettable demonstration" was to be feared if they broke down, etc. *Vide* M. Jules Roche (Deputy) in *La Republique française*, "Le Secret d'Agadir," January 12, 1912.

exercises a quite special influence over one of the two great political parties in the State. Secondly, because it is widely believed to have close relations with the Foreign Office and the British diplomatic machine generally, especially noticeable during the past eight years, and in Continental eyes is almost universally held to be the exponent of the views of those who direct British foreign policy. Thirdly, because the *Times* has played, ever since 1905, a part in influencing British opinion over this Morocco affair which, whether it be regarded as sound and wise, or as unsound and mischievous, has been so conspicuous that to ignore that part would be impossible. The rôle of the *Times* must appear, indeed, to any student of the subject an integral factor in the diplomatic history of Morocco since 1905. It should also be stated that a careful study of the despatches of the *Times* correspondent at Tangier shows, on the whole, a remarkable desire to be impartial, and that the *Times*, especially of late, has displayed its usual impartiality as a *news-recorder* by printing several despatches from its correspondent commenting severely upon French action in the matter of land-grabbing.

The hostile note was sounded very early in the day, and continued up to Mr. Asquith's speech in the House on July 27, when the editorial tone, at least, underwent considerable modification, maintained for a time, but, afterwards, again departed from. Thus on July 5 the Paris despatch of that date shows knowledge that the British Government had—

“explicitly intimated its desire to take part in the discussion of a matter which very directly concerns important British interests of various kinds. Certain French journals are therefore mistaken when they lay stress upon the

probability of a *tête-à-tête* between France and Germany on the subject of the Agadir incident."

That, of course, was what the British embassy in Paris was aiming for—that there should be no Franco-German *tête-à-tête*—which both the German and the French Governments, on the contrary, desired; the German for the obvious reasons that it considered itself quite as much entitled to negotiate direct with France over a question in which "important *German* interests" were at stake, as the British Government had considered itself so entitled in 1904; that it had already negotiated a Treaty direct with France in 1909, and that it had been engaged for the past eighteen months in direct negotiations with France; the French Government because—to put the matter bluntly—many of its members were desirous of wiping the slate clean with Germany, and were doubtful whether they would succeed in doing so if the British Government stepped in.¹

From Berlin the same day the identical string was pulled—

"One thing"—says the Berlin despatch—"however, is certain—that in any conversations that take place England will have to take part."

And this from the editorial of the 6th—the same issue, *i.e.* in which the above despatches appeared—

"It is not our habit to draw back from our pledged word, or to suffer other Powers to settle important interests of ours in 'conversations' held behind our backs. . . . No 'claims' can be admitted and no 'compensations' allowed in an international matter which concerns us nearly and deeply, without our participation and assent."

¹ This explains in part the violent onslaught upon M. Caillaux in certain British newspapers. See concluding chapter.

Pretty good that—in view of the circumstance that the British diplomatic machine had settled the “Morocco question (as it thought) behind the back” of Germany by secret treaties concealed from the world, in 1904! And note the arrogance of the second quoted sentence. If Englishmen would put themselves in the shoes of Germans sometimes, I wonder how *they* would appreciate this sort of thing. As a revelation of the working of the diplomatic machine these three extracts are quite interesting.

M. de Selves returned to Paris on the 7th; saw M. Cambon, French ambassador at Berlin (then in Paris conferring with M. Caillaux, the Prime Minister), the same day. M. Cambon left Paris for Berlin that night.

CHAPTER XVIII

FURTHER LIGHT UPON THE BRITISH OFFICIAL ATTITUDE FROM JULY 1 TO JULY 12

THUS closed the first week of July. M. Cambon and the German Foreign Minister began their protracted bargaining bout on the 9th. On that interview and the succeeding ones the basis of negotiations which lasted some four months and went through many vicissitudes was determined by mutual consent.¹

The basis was that Germany and France would negotiate direct without the intervention of third parties as they had done in February, 1909, and as France had negotiated in 1904 direct with Britain and then with Spain: that Germany would recognise an unqualified French Protectorate over Morocco subject to (*a*) binding guarantees as to the permanence of the open door for

¹ There are, indeed, very strong presumptions for assuming that the ground had been prepared before the official negotiations began, perhaps as far back as June, when it was known in French Government and diplomatic circles, that Germany contemplated action of some sort, and M. Cambon had been sent (on June 20) to Kissingen to see the German Foreign Minister: and during the three days' absence of M. de Selves in Holland, when the Premier, M. Caillaux, took the conduct of foreign affairs under his charge. See in this connection also M. de Selves' speech in the Chamber (*vide* Chapter XX.). But the fact is not yet absolutely established from amid the clamours of personal affirmations and denials let loose by the investigations of the French Senatorial Committee. In any case it is a matter which chiefly concerns the French—not the national interests of Great Britain.

trade¹ coupled with securities for open tenders in the construction of public works,² (b) territorial compensation in the French Congo with reciprocal exchange of German West African territory.

By July 15, the general lines the discussion was taking became publicly known, and the information was, on the whole, calmly received in the Paris Press.

Let us pass at once to the further and disastrous development in the anti-German attitude of our Foreign Office. Sir Edward Grey's opportunities at this moment were immense. It depended upon him to make Great Britain's rôle in the matter an influence for harmony or discord. The *Journal des Débats* expressed the situation in a nutshell when it said³: "The turn which the conversations will take between Paris and Berlin must inevitably depend upon the attitude of England." Spanish opinion was similarly reflected in the *Imparcial*, and from Madrid the *Times* correspondent reported: "It is generally agreed that the main interest . . . centres in the attitude of England." What could a mind, free from prejudice, sweeping in broad survey over the position with its long chain of antecedent links, not have accomplished at this juncture!

But Sir Edward Grey had started badly, had already committed himself to a position he was unable from the first to sustain, that of insistence upon becoming an official party to the Franco-German discussions. He was full of suspicion, and, obviously, ill-informed.⁴

¹ Stipulated for thirty years only by the British Government in the Anglo-French Declaration of 1904 (*vide* Chapter XXII.).

² Not stipulated at all in the Anglo-French Declaration.

³ July 5.

⁴ At no time, for example, did he give the slightest indication that he possessed any knowledge of the protracted 1909-1911 negotiations (*vide* Chapter XVI.).

An examination of his speech in the House on November 27 shows how vain was the hope that he could shake himself free from the anti-German atmosphere in which the Foreign Office and the British embassy in Paris were saturated. The German ambassador had accompanied the formal notification¹ of the despatch of the *Panther* to Agadir by a verbal explanation,² the substance of which was that a situation had gradually arisen "which rendered the provisions of the Algeciras Act illusory," that while the German Government "had in no event the intention of making any reproach to France on account of her action"—

"In view of the state of affairs it might appear questionable whether it would be possible for France to return to the *status quo ante*, e.g. the *status quo* of 1906. We were, therefore, prepared, if it became necessary, to seek, in conjunction with France, some means, which would be compatible with the interests of the other signatory Powers, of arriving at a definite understanding on the Morocco question. Direct negotiations could hardly meet with insuperable difficulties in view of the good relations existing between us and France."

This explanation, Sir Edward Grey has told us, seemed to him "much more important than the actual communication of the sending of the ship"—

"The explanation given to us made it clear that the Moroccan question was being opened—the whole Moroccan question—by the sending of the ship to Agadir. They made it clear that the German Government regarded a return to the *status quo* in Morocco as doubtful, if not impossible, and that what they contemplated was a definite solution of the Moroccan question between *Germany, France, and Spain*. The whole question, or at

¹ *Vide* Chapter XVI.

² Cd. 5992.

least the kernel of the question, after that communication was received, was what was the definite solution of the Moroccan question which Germany contemplated? If a return to the *status quo* was doubtful, if not impossible, then the only alternative was a definite solution of the Moroccan question. What was the nature of that? What was clearly the objective Germany contemplated? Was it to be the partition of Morocco, or what was it to be? That was what occupied our minds after receiving that communication."

With what the reader has gathered from the precedent analysis of the facts as given in this volume, the obvious comments upon that statement at once suggest themselves. What was there of surprise or menace in the German view that a return to the *status quo* of 1906 was doubtful if not impossible? Was it not a self-evident fact? How could Sir Edward Grey affect to consider a return to the *status quo* in Morocco—the *status quo* embodied in the Public Law of Europe framed at Algeciras—possible with the French in occupation of Fez, Rabat, Mequinez, Casablanca, Udja, and the whole of the Shawiya, with Spain in occupation of Larash and El-Kasr, with nigh upon 100,000 French and Spanish troops spread over Morocco? What authority had the Act of Algeciras given for this situation? Did any fraction of the *status quo* remain? And then, why did Sir Edward Grey jump to the conclusion that Germany contemplated a partition of Morocco with France, *and Spain*? No allusion whatever to Spain had been made in the German ambassador's communication. What grounds had Sir Edward Grey for supposing that Germany aimed at a partition of Morocco at all? No action of Germany's from 1880 onwards had given rise to that supposition. The official repudiation of successive German Governments that they entertained any such idea had been observed in the letter for a period of thirty years,

and this in the face of incessant attacks from quarters in Germany desirous that she should effect a political footing in Morocco, which—in point of fact—she was just as much, or as little, entitled to do as either France, Spain, or Britain. In February, 1909, the German Government had corroborated all its previous declarations—declarations supported by acts—in that respect, by its Treaty with France. *France it was, and Spain, which with the concurrence of Sir Edward Grey's predecessor had, in secret "partitioned" Morocco seven years before, and were then actively engaged in carrying out that British-approved programme, despite the Algeciras Act, signed by Great Britain, proclaiming the independence and integrity of Morocco!*

Moreover, if Sir Edward Grey really believed that Germany harboured these designs, surely there was an obvious way of satisfying himself as to the foundation of his belief? The German ambassador had told him on the 4th that in his (the German ambassador's) view "the Imperial Government had absolutely no wish to exclude England from the new arrangement of things, or to prevent any possible safeguarding of British interests in Morocco."¹ If Sir Edward Grey judged the German notification and the German ambassador's assertion insufficient, why did he not request more definite explanations? He made no such request, either to the German ambassador or through the British ambassador at Berlin.

Why? Why did he hug these suspicions and make no attempt to clarify the situation? Between the 4th, when he had summoned the German ambassador and told him that the despatch of the *Panther* had created a new situation and that Great Britain must be a party to the negotiations which ensued, and the 12th, Sir Edward Grey took no steps whatsoever in this direction.

¹ Cd. 5994.

What happened on the 12th? Sir Edward Grey has told us. The British ambassador at Berlin "had occasion to see the German Foreign Secretary on some minor matters."¹ He "took the opportunity to say that there had been at one time some mention of a conversation *à trois* between Germany, France, and Spain, the inference being that we were to be excluded from it."² What did the German Foreign Secretary reply? In Sir Edward Grey's words he "told our ambassador to inform us that *there never had been such an idea.*"³ The German version is:—

"Once only, on the 12th July, did the English ambassador here speak to the Secretary of State of the possibility of a negotiation *d trois* in regard to Morocco between Germany, France, and Spain, and added the remark that this would make an unfavourable impression in England. The ambassador *received a reply on the same day, as an official statement of the German Government* that such an intention had never existed."⁴

Thus, by July 12, Sir Edward Grey had received, in addition to the statement in the notification, the personal assurance of the German ambassador in London and the official assurance of the German Government that Germany did not contemplate, and never had contemplated, a negotiation for the partition of Morocco with France and Spain.

By that time, too, he had had similar assurances from France,⁵ unless his statement to the House on November 27 that the French Government had consulted him "at every point where it seemed at all likely that British interests might be affected—most loyally at every point,"⁶ was devoid of meaning. It is most important that that

¹ Sir E. Grey in the House of Commons, November 27, 1911.

² *Ib.*

³ *Ib.*

⁴ Cd. 5994.

⁵ *Vide* Chapter XX.

⁶ Sir E. Grey in the House of Commons, November 27, 1911.

statement should be borne in mind, confirmed as it is by similar statements made later by the French Foreign Minister.¹ For the negotiations between M. Cambon and the German Foreign Secretary had already, as we have recorded, begun, and we shall see in a moment that the position taken by the German Government at the outset was such as described at the opening of this chapter.

It would seem necessary at this point to refer to a matter which is within the personal cognisance of a number of persons, the writer included. When Mr. Lloyd George's speech—to which I am coming in a moment—was delivered, it caused the utmost surprise (except in one quarter) not only in Germany, but in England: not only to the general public in England but among the supporters of the Government and even among the members of the Cabinet itself.² Many well-known members of Parliament, publicists, and others made inquiry as to what might lie behind so direct, and at the same time so unusual a method of communicating a warning—almost a menace—to a foreign Government. These inquirers were informed, I will not say by whom, but at any rate they were informed, and they were informed under conditions permitting them to pass on the information to others, that the speech was intended as a protest against the discourtesy of the German Government *in keeping a British despatch unreplyed to for a fortnight*. And that story—that discreditable and utterly untrue story—was permitted to go the round of the clubs and editorial sanctums. When the diplomatic machine is seen to be capable of such performances, most men will agree that it is badly in need of repair.

¹ *Vide* Chapter XX.

² Only Sir Edward Grey and the Prime Minister were aware of what Mr. Lloyd George was going to say.

It is also advisable before proceeding with the general narrative to draw attention to the misleading impression left upon the public mind by Sir Edward Grey's reference (in the speech defending his policy in the House on November 27) to the German view of the French occupation of Fez. He said—

“The German Chancellor and the German Foreign Secretary have already disposed of one misapprehension with regard to the Moroccan question. It was imagined in some quarters, I think I have seen it on the paper of this House in a question put, that Germany had protested against the French action in going to Fez at all, and that France had persisted in going there in the face of the German protest. The German Government have now explained what the German view was of what the French going to Fez really was, and I have no comment or criticism to make upon what they said.”

This utterance, made at the opening of the “narrative” part of Sir Edward Grey's speech, has naturally strengthened the public view, for the most part ignorant of the data set forth in this book, at any rate in their cumulative significance, that the despatch of the *Panther* to Agadir was remote from the Fez expedition, and was merely an afterthought with sinister intent. Now, what had the German Chancellor and Foreign Secretary admitted in the public statement to which Sir Edward Grey had alluded? They had admitted that Germany had not objected to France going to Fez *with the proclaimed French object of withdrawing to the coast the Europeans alleged to be in jeopardy*. But the German Chancellor had stated—

“We added the explicit reservation, however, which we also announced publicly, that we retained our liberty of action, should the French expedition go beyond its alleged

object, even should such action be merely the result of circumstances arising out of the expedition.”¹

How faithfully the German Government dealt with France on the point the French Senatorial Committee's investigations reveal.

“During to-day's (26th of December) cross examination of M. de Selves”—runs the authorised account of these proceedings²—“it was ascertained that in preliminary conversations between the German Foreign Secretary and the French ambassador in Berlin with regard to the French occupation, first of Rabat and then of Fez, Herr von Kiderlen Waechter made repeated and definite reservations as to the eventual attitude of Germany in case the occupation were prolonged. As regards the French march to Fez, Herr von Kiderlen Waechter had from the outset insisted that this step would become inevitable after the advance to Rabat. To this suggestion M. Cambon at first demurred, but in the face of subsequent events, he was compelled to admit its accuracy. Herr von Kiderlen Waechter then urged that if the French went to Fez they would remain there. M. Cambon again demurred, but Herr von Kiderlen Waechter replied that an evacuation in the circumstances would be unprecedented. M. Cambon ultimately admitted the possibility of the occupation of Fez, whereupon Herr von Kiderlen Waechter replied that in that case Germany would resume complete liberty of action as regards Morocco.”

Therefore, if France had not gone to Fez “in the face of the German protest”—a “protest” under such circumstances involving an *ultimatum*, *i.e.* war—she had gone to Fez, *and stayed in Fez*, in the teeth of an explicit German warning that the German Government would regard her action as the culminating episode in her destruction of the Public Law of Europe embodied in the Algeciras Act, and

¹ Cd. 5970.

² In all the Paris and many British newspapers of December 27.

would, thenceforth, resume the entire liberty of action it possessed before Germany had co-operated with the other Powers in framing that Public Law. Presumably Sir Edward Grey had full cognisance of that German warning at the time—unless, indeed, those desirous of influencing him in an anti-German direction had concealed it from him, which is possible. In any case, Sir Edward Grey, as the head of the British diplomatic machine, must bear the responsibility for the policy which, taking no account of this warning, endorsed French action to the uttermost, with all the consequences which were bound to flow from it as touching the future of British relations with Germany. When the inevitable happened Sir Edward Grey professed to be greatly astonished, perturbed, and not a little indignant. The amazing thing is how British diplomacy could for a moment have imagined that it was not bound to happen.

CHAPTER XIX

THE STORY OF AN ANNOUNCEMENT, AN INTERVIEW, AND A SPEECH

FROM July 12 to July 19 the discussions in Berlin and Paris went on, in silence so far as the outward world was concerned, Sir Edward Grey, as he has himself told us, being kept informed throughout, presumably both by the French ambassador and by the British embassy in Paris. A sort of expectant calm reigned. It was destined to be rudely disturbed on the 20th.

On that day Morocco passed into the background for the time being, and the French Congo took its place—that portion of the French dependencies in tropical Africa where, by mutual consent and by protracted antecedent negotiations, Germany was to find compensation for the final forced abandonment of her stand on behalf of Moroccan integrity and for her acquiescence in the final consummation of the French designs; even as Britain had found compensation by the surrender of the French position in Egypt, Italy a free hand to make good her aims in Tripoli, Spain in Morocco itself.

On July 20 the *Times* published a despatch of over a column in length from Paris, entitled “German Policy and *British* Interests”¹ (not French, be it noted!). The despatch opened with a quotation from Mr. Asquith’s

¹ Appendix XIX.

statement on July 6,¹ in which the latter had spoken of "British interests" being possibly affected, and went on to say that "developments affecting British interests are already in progress." Mr. Asquith had, of course, meant British interests in Morocco; but here, it seemed, was a question of British interests elsewhere also. The despatch continued that Germany was pressing proposals which, "as German statesmen must be well aware, could not for one moment be entertained by any conceivable French Government." Those proposals had nothing to do with Morocco, it appeared, but with French Congo where Germany was "demanding impossible 'compensations.'" The bargain was "so monstrously unfair" that its proposers could not "seriously have believed that it would be entertained in Paris." What Germany was really after, we were told, was the acquisition of the Agadir hinterland, which, "by directly compromising British interests," would put "a, perhaps, fatal strain upon the Anglo-French *entente*." The wiles of the German Government might be deadlier still, for had not the *Frankfurter Zeitung*² been making suggestions which—

"amount to nothing less than a general reconciliation of France and Germany on the basis of the unreserved opening of the French money market for the benefit of the German national credit and German industrial enterprises at home and abroad. . . . It has now been universally recognised that the political consequences of a settlement on this scale would be too far reaching, and that, quite apart from the question of Anglo-French relations, it would mean the death-blow to the Russian Alliance."

"It would be regarded," concluded this part of the

¹ *Vide* Chapter XVII.

² One of the most independent papers in Germany, by the way, and often a ruthless critic both of the Emperor and of the Government.

contribution, "as entirely in keeping with Mr. Asquith's statement on July 6, if Great Britain should decide to see for herself what the Germans are doing at Agadir." In other words, send a warship there, as the *Times* had recommended in a leading article on the 20th.¹ This message, in which the finger of the British diplomatic machine—abroad!—is as clearly indicated as the clock on the face of St. Stephen's (note in particular the insinuation that a "reconciliation" of Franco-German relations would be a catastrophe for Britain's relations with France), was introduced by an *Editorialette* headed "The Moroccan Crisis. German demands in West Africa. Strong feeling in France," which went one better than the Paris despatch by holding that Germany had also demanded "the contingent reversion held by France over the Congo State." Where, one wonders, did the *Times* get that from? There is no hint of it in the Paris despatch.²

¹ By a coincidence—shall we say?—that suggestion had already come before the British Cabinet and was rejected, the majority of the Cabinet doubtless being of the opinion that the British Empire was, after all, not imperilled by the presence on the God-forsaken coast of South Atlantic Morocco, at a spot five hundred miles distant from Gibraltar, of a German gunboat with an equipment of one hundred and twenty-five men. The French Cabinet was divided on the opportuneness of the step. Note that the *Daily Mail* had announced the probability of the despatch of a British and French cruiser on the 4th.

² The German Government issued a denial. No French Minister has asserted that Germany ever made such a demand. Sir Edward Grey said not a word about it in defending his attitude in the House on November 27. That the future of the Congo State (Belgian Congo) was repeatedly discussed, and that various suggestions were made on both sides we know. That the French Prime Minister himself made at one time a suggestion somewhat similar in character to the "demand" attributed to Germany I happen personally to be aware. The upshot of the discussion on this particular point may be seen in Article 16 of the Franco-German Convention of November 4, 1911, of which the effect is to substitute for a right of pre-emption of questionable legality, secretly obtained by France from King Leopold, in 1884,

These "compensations—concluded the editorial introduction—would obviously touch Britain's interests in Africa in several very important directions. . . ."

Denunciation was left to the editorial proper, which was of extreme violence. Headed "The German Demands," it opened thus—

"The German demands are at last known. They are understood to be surrender by France to Germany of the whole of French Congo from the sea to the River Sanga, and also the renunciation in Germany's favour of the contingent claims of France to the acquisition of the Congo State should circumstances at any time lead to the alienation of that vast and important territory by its present possessors. This is the "compensation" which Germany demands for the aid which France has given to the Sultan of Morocco at his express request for the maintenance of his sovereignty and the restoration of order and peace within a portion of his dominions."

To the above may be added the following :—

"German statesmen, as our Paris Correspondent says, must know perfectly well that no French Government could for a moment entertain them. They must know equally well *that no British Government could consent to suffer so great a change to be made in the distribution of power in Africa, even were a French Government to be found feeble enough to sanction it.*¹

The editorial wound up by again expressing the hope that British ships might be sent to Agadir to "hasten developments."

as her price for signing the Act of Berlin of 1885, the submission of any change in the *status* of the Congo to all the Powers signatory to the Berlin Act which created that State. Thus Germany is seen, so far as these negotiations are concerned, to have founded her attitude on the Congo State question upon the Public Law of Europe as she did her attitude on the Morocco question. Less subtle, no doubt, but more honest, it seems to me! See in this connection Chapter XXII.

¹ Italics mine.

To all outward seeming, the heavy guns of Printing House Square shattered the nerves of Downing Street, for the *next day*—i.e. July 21—Sir Edward Grey sent for the German ambassador and told him that the silence of the British Government in the absence of any communication from the German Government since July 4¹ must not be interpreted as a slackening of British interest in the matter. He had been “made anxious by the news *which appeared the day before* as to the demands which the German Government had made on the French Government.” The demands involved “a cession of *the French Congo*,” which it “was obviously impossible for the French Government to concede.” If the negotiations were unsuccessful “a very embarrassing situation would arise.” According to “native rumours” the *Panther’s* people were “landing and negotiating with the tribes.” Agadir was a suitable place for “a naval basis.” It might be necessary to “take some steps to protect British interests.” In his speech in the House, Sir Edward Grey subsequently explained that—

“I was afraid, and I spoke to the German ambassador because I was afraid, that things were developing in a way that would bring up the Morocco question, force the Moroccan negotiations back not upon an arrangement between France and Germany about the Congo and Morocco respectively, but upon something in the nature of the partition of Morocco or some sort of solution which might

¹ It is a little difficult to see what the German Government could have done further in the interval. The German ambassador had given his personal assurance on the 4th that Sir Edward Grey’s suspicions were groundless; the German Government had categorically given a similar assurance to the British ambassador at Berlin on the 12th. Sir Edward Grey had not made any request for further information, and the French Government at no time intimated a desire that the British Government should become an official party to the negotiations.

make the question of British interests to be directly affected, and which would certainly bring into operation our treaty obligations with France."

The version of this conversation given by Sir Edward Grey to the House—the only British version extant—was obviously much abridged. The German official version¹ is fuller, and it appears therefrom that Sir Edward Grey suggested the advisability of an exchange of views before events developed further. As the German official version has been issued as a White Book by the British Foreign Office it may be assumed that the above statement is an accurate representation of Sir Edward Grey's words. After registering a sort of general protest against Sir Edward Grey's assumption that Germany had made impossible demands upon France, repeating that Germany had not the slightest intention of injuring British interests, pointing out that no third Power was bound by the Anglo-French Declaration of 1904, and that Germany for her part was only bound by the Algeciras Act and her treaty with France of February, 1909, both of which were based upon the independence and integrity of Morocco; that no one could pretend that the independence and integrity of Morocco had not been violated; that although Germany made no complaint against France on that score "she must offer some compensation approximately equivalent to the great goal she had in view"—even as England had secured in Egypt; and that he "could not conceal from the Minister (Sir Edward Grey) that he seemed to be applying two standards," one standard for France and another for Germany; the German ambassador immediately communicated the interview with Sir Edward Grey to his Government. The German Government replied at once:

¹ Appendix XX.

the reply was in London on July 23, and the German ambassador called at the Foreign Office on July 24.

But, meantime, an event had happened which brought to its culminating point the anti-German attitude adopted by the Foreign Office from the outset. Without even waiting for a reply to this, his first communication with the German ambassador since the formal assurance received from the German Government that any thought of a partition of Morocco with France and Spain, from which Britain was to be excluded, was remote from that Government's mind, Sir Edward Grey communicated with the Prime Minister and with the Chancellor of the Exchequer.¹ That very evening Mr. Lloyd George speaking at a banquet given in his honour at the Mansion House, after a reference to the blessings of peace said—

“But I am also bound to say this—that I believe it is essential in the highest interests, not merely of this country but of the world, that Britain should at all hazards maintain her place and her prestige amongst the Great Powers of the world. Her potent influence has many a time been in the past, and may yet be in the future, invaluable to the cause of human liberty. It has more than once in the past redeemed Continental nations, who are sometimes too apt to forget that service, from overwhelming disaster and even from international extinction. I would make great sacrifices to preserve peace. I conceive that nothing would justify a disturbance of international good will except questions of the gravest national moment. But if a situation were to be forced upon us in which peace could only be preserved by the surrender of the great and beneficent position Britain has won by centuries of heroism and achievement, by allowing Britain to be treated where her interests were vitally affected as if she were of no account in the Cabinet of nations, then I say emphatically that peace at that price would be a

¹ Though not with the other members of the Cabinet.

humiliation intolerable for a great country like ours to endure. National honour is no party question. The security of our great international trade is no party question; the peace of the world is much more likely to be secured if all nations realise fairly what the conditions of peace must be. And it is because I have the conviction that nations are beginning to understand each other better, to appreciate one another's points of view more thoroughly, to be more ready to discuss calmly and dispassionately their differences, that I feel assured that nothing will happen between now and next year which will render it difficult for the Chancellor of the Exchequer in this place to respond to the toast proposed to you, my Lord Mayor, of the continued prosperity of the public peace."

All momentary doubt as to the precise significance of the speech was set at rest the next morning by the *Times*, which printed it in two places in its issue (July 22) with suitable accentuating notes and head-lines and accompanied by an editorial entitled "The European Crisis," which I think should be reproduced here in full—

"Mr. Lloyd George's clear, decisive, and statesmanlike reference, at the Bankers' dinner last night, to the European situation created by the German demands in West Africa will be endorsed without distinction of party by all his countrymen. In making public the amazing character of those demands on Thursday last we called attention to the extreme gravity of the claim which they imply. It is not merely that Germany, in advancing them, demands concessions out of all proportion to the interests which she is able and prepared to cede, though that aspect in itself is serious enough. Far more serious, because the present *démarche* is only the last of several attempts of a kindred nature, is the light which it throws upon the whole method and purpose of German statesmanship. Some indignation is expressed in the German Press at the fact that Herr von Kiderlen Waechter's suggestions have been brought into the light and at the criticism

which they have evoked. We cannot pretend to regret either the publicity or the criticism. Europe has nothing to lose by revelations which show the true pretensions of its greatest military Power, even though the diplomacy of that Power itself may prefer to move, as Dick Turpin preferred to move, in the dark. The purport of such demands as were outlined in Berlin last week is nothing less than a claim for absolute European predominance. Neither France nor Great Britain could have entertained them for a moment without confessing themselves overborne by German power. That is not the intention of our French neighbours, nor is it our own. Mr. Lloyd George made that perfectly clear last night. 'If a situation were to be forced on us,' he said, 'in which peace could only be preserved by the surrender of the great and beneficent position Britain has won by centuries of heroism and achievement, by allowing Great Britain to be treated, where her interests were vitally affected, as if she were of no account in the Cabinet of Nations, then I say emphatically that peace at that price would be a humiliation intolerable for a great country like ours to endure.' We have insisted on the gravity of the position, because humiliation of that kind for the interested Powers was implicit in the German demands, but we have every confidence that, with the better understanding of British temper which Mr. Lloyd George's speech is calculated to produce, those demands will assume a more reasonable form. Mr. Lloyd George is under no suspicion of jingoism, and it may be taken that in what he said last night he spoke not only for himself, but for the British Government. He spoke, indeed, for his countrymen as a whole. Even at such a moment of internal crisis as the present, party divisions can in no way affect the unity of English sentiment upon a question involving the honour as well as the interests of the country in the outside world. We ourselves know that that is so; it is time it were realised abroad."

For two or three days preceding the announcement in the *Times* one or two Paris newspapers had changed their

previous tone for one of greater aggressiveness, and the chauvinist organs had become openly violent. Mr. Lloyd George's speech and the *Times* comment the next day, punctuating its significance, and comparing the German Government to Dick Turpin, added fuel to the flames. A furious Press campaign followed, not in France only but in England as well, taken up in the weeklies and magazines. In France it subsided as soon as it arose—French diplomacy having secured its end. But it raged in England for three months, German resentment and bitterness growing as it progressed—not against France, but against Britain, and concentrating upon the obvious torch which set light to the edifice, viz. the attitude of the British Foreign Office as crystallized in the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who, of course, was merely used by Sir Edward Grey as the latter's mouth-piece.

On the top of everything came the disclosures of Captain Faber, M.P., which could not be denied, because in their substance, though not in every detail, they were true, as every one with relatives or friends in both Services knew. Confirmed by Mr. Arthur Ponsonby and Mr. Noel Buxton, later on by Lord Charles Beresford, Mr. Sidney Low, Admiral Fremantle, and others, the German public learned that last summer the British Government was prepared under certain contingencies to support the French case in Morocco—which legally was unsound, morally was doubtful, and was in its relation with Germany's, at the very least, no better—with the whole naval and military power of Britain.¹

¹ The *Times* announcement, editorial, etc., are given in full in Appendix XIX.

CHAPTER XX

AN ANALYSIS OF THE EVENTS OF JULY 20 AND 21 IN THE LIGHT OF FACTS NOW ESTABLISHED

WAS the *Times* announcement of July 20 designed to force Sir Edward Grey's hand by whatsoever influences suggested; or was it inspired directly or indirectly by the Foreign Office in order to have its hand forced?¹ Or was it solely and simply an expedient by French diplomacy, in order to create a diversion in England in France's favour, so that the compensation bill the French Government would have to pay should be as small as possible? Probably it may have been a mixture of the first and last hypotheses. Anyway the announcement

¹ In this connection the following despatch from Berlin in the *Times* of November 10 is interesting. It is part of a criticism of the German Chancellor's remarks on the 9th:—

“In view especially of what followed it must be observed that Herr von Bethmann Hollweg's version of events is remarkable for its omissions. The acuteness of the recent “crisis” was beyond all question due in large measure to two things which are not here mentioned—the manner in which Germany chose to conduct the conversations with France, and the original presentation by Germany of demands enormously in excess of the gains which ultimately satisfied her. The demands were presented in the middle of July and they were withdrawn at the beginning of August. *Mr. Lloyd George's speech was delivered on the morrow of the publication of the demands. The speech would presumably not have been delivered if the demands had not been presented and pressed. There would presumably have been war if the demands had not been withdrawn.*”¹

¹ Italics mine.

succeeded in enormously embittering Anglo-German relations.

Of Sir Edward Grey's action on July 21—and the Chancellor of the Exchequer's speech must, of course, be regarded as part and parcel of it—it is difficult to judge otherwise than severely. Whether he was in receipt of news similar to that published in the *Times*, either from the French Government direct through its ambassador in London or through the British embassy in Paris—in which case the information given to him was inaccurate in its most essential aspects and incomplete in others; or, as his conversation with the German ambassador and his speech in the House indicate, although it appears hardly credible, his information was taken solely from the *Times*—is immaterial. The fact remains that he adopted the *Times*' statement,¹ the *Times*' views, and the *Times*' tone. He spoke of German "demands"—in the sense in which the ordinary man interpreted them in reading the *Times*, *i.e.* as a species of *ultimatum*, Germany's last word, "I demand this or I shall go to war" attitude. He spoke of these demands as "obviously impossible for the French Government to concede," not, it is true, going quite so far as the *Times*, which had added, as we have seen, that no British Government ought to permit them to be conceded even if a French Government were found weak enough to do so. On another point he had gone even further than the *Times*, speaking of a cession of the "French Congo," although even according to the *Times* map, the "demands" only embraced about one-third of the French Congo.² He could not surely have been more emphatic in defence of a purely French interest had he been the servant of the French

¹ Except the statement regarding the Congo State.

² See Map.

Republic instead of a servant of the British Empire? He reverted again to the partition scheme he had previously attributed to Germany, thus plainly intimating that he did not believe the formal repudiation of the German Government conveyed to him on the 12th. He had wound up¹ by suggesting a formal exchange of views. Then, presumably as an encouragement thereto, without giving the German ambassador time to communicate with his Government,² he had promptly put up the Chancellor of the Exchequer to make a speech which, delivered under the circumstances of the moment, no proud nation in the world would have regarded otherwise than as a gratuitous interference, and as a menace—the more exasperating as the German Government knew itself to be grossly misrepresented, but could have proved it only by breaking off negotiations with France.

Now what were the facts? First, as to the "demands." There do not appear to have been any "demands" in the sense used by the *Times*, endorsed by Sir Edward Grey, and thus, of course, understood by public opinion. There were *discussions* on the basis of a negotiation agreed upon by both parties certainly not later than the second week in July (perhaps in the middle of June) whereby Germany had undertaken to recognize a French Protectorate over Morocco subject to economic guarantees, and in exchange for a territorial compensation in the French Congo, which Germany on her part was disposed to make easier for the French Government to grant by ceding German territory to France. The speech of M. de Selves, the French

¹ According to the uncontradicted German version. *Vide* Chapter XIX.

² Bear in mind that this was the first conversation Sir Edward Grey had held with the German ambassador since the meeting of July 4.

Foreign Minister in the French Chamber, of December 14 has made this clear beyond the possibility of doubt in the following words :—

“ *Very well !* ” M. de Selves describes the German Foreign Secretary as having stated. “ *We can arrange some exchanges. We will abandon you Togoland, we will make you territorial concessions in the Upper Cameroons. But this is what we ask.* ” ¹

“ *Voici ce que nous demandons* ” does not mean this is what we *demand*, but this is what we *ask*. Not much of the Dick Turpin stand-and-deliver kind of thing about this !

It will be seen that M. de Selves’ account tallies with the German Chancellor’s—

“ At no stage in the negotiations was any language used, any idea mooted, in any quarter which would have been incompatible with the honour of one of either party. There was never any occasion for the ‘banging on the table with the fist’ which was recommended to us.” ²

So much for the mischievous legend which has been incessantly dinned into the ears of the British public. And, observe another feature of it. Neither the *Times* in its original pronouncement of July 20, nor Sir Edward Grey in defence of his policy in the House, said one word about the offers with which Germany accompanied her so-called “demands.” Yet Sir Edward Grey, at least, must have known of them if, as he says, and as the French Foreign Minister says, the French Government kept him constantly informed of the course of the negotiations. In suggesting the surrender of Togoland

¹ *Journal Officiel*, December 14, 1911.

² Cd. 5970. It may be well to state that the German Chancellor’s personal character is regarded in Germany as highly as Sir Edward Grey’s personal character is regarded among us.

the German Government was offering a small but flourishing little dependency, the only self-supporting German dependency overseas, and one which enjoys the reputation—as students of West Africa have long been aware—of being splendidly administered; a dependency where more genuine work has been accomplished than in the whole of the mismanaged and maladministered French Congo up to date.¹ She also offered German Bornu—*i.e.* the Upper Cameroons.

Now, as to the exact area in the French Congo—the area indicated in the *Times*' announcement map—round which the discussions had centred at one time, probably about the third week of July. In this particular direction some obscurity still remains. M. de Selves' version is that when Germany's desires for this area were manifested—we may assume in the absence of any positive indication that it was on or about July 18—he declined to entertain them, and that the discussions were temporarily suspended. The German version differs. Without affording us any additional means of ascertaining whether the *Times* announcement coincided with the stage when the discussions were concerned with this particular part of the French Congo, the German version is to the effect that the temporary suspension of the discussions was taken on the initiative of Germany as a protest against the direct or indirect action of the French Government in violating a secrecy mutually agreed upon. Here is the passage from the German Foreign Secretary's speech bearing on the incident—

“The negotiations had begun; both parties had mutually agreed to observe the strictest secrecy. We took this obligation seriously, and did not even inform

¹ Mrs. Mary Gaunt's recent testimony as to Togoland may be read with advantage.

our allies. France adopted a different course, and unfortunately communicated not only to the Press, but, it appears, also in part to her friends, information which, inaccurate and incomplete as it was, was calculated to arouse suspicion as to our intentions. We therefore did not negotiate further for a time so long as the secrecy of the negotiations was not guaranteed."

The reader must form his own conclusions on these conflicting statements. In any case the suspension of discussion was brief, because M. Cambon and the German Foreign Secretary met again on the 24th.

There is, however, a certain amount of external evidence to suggest that M. de Selves' story of a prompt rejection of the German proposal to cede the maritime region of the French Congo, from the point of view of *French* interests, of course, must be taken *cum grano salis*. Apart from the *size* of the territory indicated by the German Foreign Secretary, when he and M. Cambon were wagging their respective heads in amiable converse¹ over a map of Africa, there was no special reason why the French Government should have been less willing to cede this part of the French Congo than any other part, for instance, than the part France did eventually cede. (The *size* no doubt represented the opening feature of most bargains where a man who wants, asks the *maximum*, and the man who has to give, sets out the *minimum* he is prepared to concede; moreover, there were the German proposals of a cession of German territory to be set against it.) Indeed, in several well-known quarters in France, notably in *Le Temps* of November 4, and in the able articles of Commandant

¹ Instead of the picture mentally conjured up by the ordinary Englishman upon reading the *Times* of July 20, viz. that of the unfortunate French ambassador shrinking before the brutal *ultimatum* of the German Foreign Secretary.

Thomasson in the *Questions diplomatiques et Coloniales*, to select two opinions out of a number, the belief finds expression that France's interests would have been much better served by the surrender of a portion at least of the maritime zone than of the central zone actually ceded. The arguments supporting this view are technical but powerful. But if *French* interests would not have suffered, the British diplomatic machine which affects to regard an increase of Germany's sea-board possessions in any part of the world as a menace to the security of the Empire, was, there is good reason to think, strongly averse to a Franco-German settlement which would have prolonged the German Cameroons coast-line and added to it a good natural port,¹ over and above the one it already possesses. In this connection the following passage in the *Times* editorial of July 26 is significant—

“There are districts in the interior which might suit Germany as well as the coast-line, and the acquisition of which by her might not arouse other susceptibilities in the same degree.”

For my part, although I admit that inferential evidence is all that can be advanced, I am fully convinced that the British diplomatic machine put great pressure upon the French Government not to cede any part of the French Congo *coast-line*, and so drove the compensation settlement in a direction which surely will prove far more disadvantageous to the French, if only because it offers innumerable causes for further local friction between the two Powers. The settlement actually arrived at is, indeed, what M. Millerand termed it in the French Chamber “*une solution biscornue*,” and a glance at the Map must be sufficient to convince any one of the trouble

¹ Libreville.

which may lie ahead with such a frontier and such a settlement, interposing, as it does, two German *antennæ* between the French possessions in the north and in the south.

But the chief fact to remember so far as the French Congo is concerned, is that Sir Edward Grey was willing to take the line against Germany he did over the exact locality and area of African jungle which Germany should acquire as compensation for recognising a French Protectorate over Morocco!

And what can one say of Sir Edward Grey's renewed raising of the "partition" bogey in the light of facts? His defence of his policy in the House was delivered, unfortunately, before the debate in the French Chamber, so that members did not possess at that moment the French version of the events of July.¹ Had they possessed it they would have known not only that the French Government was entirely opposed to bringing Spain into the negotiations with Germany in any way, and never entertained the idea, but that, as stated at the head of Chapter XVIII., the German Government *from the very beginning of the negotiations* was fully prepared to recognise the principle of a *French Protectorate over Morocco*!

M. de Selves' statement is categorical. After explaining that when he became Foreign Minister (June 28) discussions between France and Germany had been proceeding for *some time*—first at Berlin, then again at Kissingen—arising out of Germany's view that the Act of Algeciras had been "profoundly modified" by the French military occupation of Fez and of many districts in Morocco; M. de Selves went on to say that the French Government had laid down from the first that France

¹ The debate in the House took place on November 27. The French debates began on December 14.

must be the predominating Power in Morocco and could not allow any Power (other than Spain) to take a footing there. The German Government had at once agreed—

“Right (*soit!*) *We accept. Take Morocco, establish therein your Protectorate.* But, since you have made a treaty with England in this matter, that you have made a treaty with Italy, that you have made a treaty with Spain, on what basis will you treat with us? Our public opinion will not permit that we should not obtain compensation elsewhere for our abandonment in your favour and the undertaking we shall give you that our diplomacy will assist in getting the Powers to ratify the arrangement we arrive at.”¹

And later on in his speech M. de Selves showed with equal clearness the spontaneity of the German attitude—that it was not on the part of the German Government a yielding to the inevitable, but of a position mutually assumed from the outset—

“People have asked why territorial concessions were thus spoken of. Why had these questions been examined? I have already told you, it is because THE FIRST WORD WHICH THE GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAD PRONOUNCED had consisted in saying: ‘Morocco you shall have it.’ He had even added, ‘Establish therein your Protectorate, draw up yourselves the arrangement which shall specify the details.’”²

¹ “L’Allemagne nous a dit: Soit! nous acceptons. Prenez le Maroc, installez y votre protectorat. Mais, alors que vous avez traité avec l’Angleterre à cette occasion, que vous avez traité avec l’Italie, que vous avez traité avec l’Espagne, sur quelles bases traiterez-vous avec nous? Notre opinion publique ne permet pas que nous n’obtenions pas par ailleurs quelque compensation à l’abandon que nous allons vous consentir et à la promesse que nous allons vous donner que notre diplomatie s’emploiera à faire ratifier par les puissances l’accord que nous aurons conclu.” (*Journal Officiel*, 14 December, 1911.)

² “On s’est demandé pourquoi il avait été ainsi parlé de ces cessions territoriales. Pourquoi ces questions là avaient été examinées? Je vous l’ai déjà dit, c’est parceque la première parole qu’avait prononcée

Thus the French Government itself testifies to the absolute straightforwardness of the German Government's attitude from the first, corroborating the official German declaration to the British ambassador at Berlin on July 12.

If Sir Edward Grey was kept continually posted by the French Government of what was going on, as he says he was, and as the French Foreign Minister says he was, Sir Edward Grey knew before the second week in July had expired that the German Government not only meditated no partition of Morocco with France and Spain, but had, on the contrary, spontaneously admitted the principle of a French Protectorate over that State subject to economic pledges and compensation elsewhere—which were to form the subject of negotiations.

He knew that from the French.

On July 12 the German Government gave him an official assurance to the same effect.

Yet, on July 21, he adopted a course of action which in the ultimate resort very nearly brought about a rupture with Germany—which would have meant a European war—and which did, in fact, produce the state of tension still unhappily prevailing, and which the British Government is now endeavouring, under the spur of public opinion, to remove.

le ministre des affaires étrangères en Allemagne avait consisté à dire : 'Le Maroc, vous l'aurez'—il avait même ajouté ; 'installez-y-votre protectorat, libellez vous-même l'accord qui doit en déterminer les précisions.' " (*Journal Officiel*, 14 December, 1911.)

CHAPTER XXI

THE AFTERMATH OF THE EVENTS OF JULY 20 AND 21

MR. LLOYD GEORGE'S speech, and especially the interpretation (uncorrected on our side) placed upon it by the French and British Press, immediately led to very strained relations between the two Governments, while the Press of the three countries lashed itself into a state of fury. When diplomatists talk about "Public Opinion" being incensed, they turn a blind eye upon their own performances in bringing that condition about; posing as peacemakers, whereas, more often than not, the responsibility is wholly theirs. In his speech in the House on November 27 Sir Edward Grey expressed the opinion that the diplomatists ought to be congratulated upon having prevented war in view of the "political alcoholism" which had prevailed—a sample of diplomatic irony which would, indeed, be hard to beat. For who mixed the alcoholic brew which the public partook of? Mr. Lloyd George's speech was comparable to the action of a man who, observing a smouldering fire, pours upon it a can full of kerosene and then seeks to place the blame upon the onlookers because the flames leap up to Heaven. That speech set the whole world by the ears, and, then, forsooth, the world is at fault! If Sir Edward Grey did not intend the speech as a menace why did he not, when he saw the interpretation placed upon it by the *Times* next

morning (the 22nd), at once correct the impression it had produced, in order to prevent the flames from spreading?

Sir Edward Grey's conversation with the German ambassador on the 21st, had, as we have seen, been immediately transmitted to Berlin. It was the first conversation in the course of which Sir Edward Grey had definitely asked for information and formulated more than vague suspicions. It was the first time Sir Edward Grey had raised the question of the "compensation" negotiations then proceeding between France and Germany. The German Government's answer was in London two days after the conversation. Why in the world could not Sir Edward Grey have waited for that answer? Was it fair to Germany, was it statesmanlike, was it even reasonable that as soon as the German ambassador had left the Foreign Office Sir Edward Grey should arrange for Mr. Lloyd George to make a speech that very evening—a speech suggesting that Germany was treating us as of no account in the Cabinet of nations, and that we should go to war with her if she did not mend her manners? What terrible performances could the wretched little *Panther* with its complement of one hundred and twenty-five officers and men have carried out in the interval? Why this precipitation to credit "native rumours" that the *Panther's* formidable naval contingent was landing and negotiating with the tribes? Since when have we based a hectoring attitude towards a great Power on the strength of "native rumours" which, apparently, were not believed in Paris¹ and which turned out to have no foundation in fact?

¹ "Mais il nous est apparu, d'après nos renseignements, que si l'Allemagne envoyait un bateau à Agadir, elle n'avait pas l'intention d'y opérer un débarquement." (M. de Selves in the French Chamber, December 14, 1911.)

But for the Lloyd-George speech it may be assumed that the atmosphere of ill-will and suspicion against Germany, the mingled *parti-pris* and reluctance frankly to ask for the further explanations seemingly required which had reigned at the Foreign Office since July 1, would have been dissipated by the German Government's reply.

As it was, an "exceedingly stiff" interview took place between Sir Edward Grey and the German ambassador on the 24th. Both Governments hereafter stood on their "dignity," and millions of men and women who knew nothing of the whole miserable business, the vast majority of whom could certainly not have pointed out Morocco on the map, were on the verge of being precipitated into all the horrors, all the miseries and privations and losses of a great war as the result thereof.

Could there be a more scathing satire upon "civilisation"? Could there be a greater travesty of human government? Do not all the proposals for preventing such a state of affairs, such as greater publicity on foreign questions, greater public control of the diplomats, the break-up of the caste system in diplomacy, and so forth, immature, and incomplete, and unthought-out as they may be, appear the very embodiment of common sense as compared with that state of affairs itself?

Both Governments stood on their "dignity"—the word is Sir Edward Grey's, not mine. In view of the Lloyd-George speech, which the German Government looked upon as a threat, that Government declared it could not authorise Sir Edward Grey to make public use of the pledge given on the 12th to the effect that Germany had no territorial designs on Morocco. German public

opinion, the German Government argued, would look upon such a declaration at that moment as a retreat before a British menace. Sir Edward Grey, for his part, could not, in view of the very stiff tone adopted by the German ambassador, condescend to give any public explanation as to Mr. Lloyd George's speech. Such an explanation would not have been compatible with the dignity of Great Britain.

On the 27th, a further conversation took place between Sir Edward Grey and the German ambassador, and the high-and-mighty attitude on both sides was to some extent departed from.¹ The Prime Minister's speech in the House that evening showed a very different tone. There is some reason for believing that several Members of the Cabinet had expressed themselves pretty vigorously on the subject of Mr. Lloyd George's speech. Be that as it may, Mr. Asquith declared that he thought an issue of the Franco-German negotiations without prejudice to British interests quite possible, and earnestly desired such a solution. The British Government did not dream of interfering with territorial arrangements between the two Powers outside Morocco. Any statements that the British Government had so interfered were "mischievous inventions without the faintest foundation in fact." An utterance which in the light of facts can only be described as amazing.

Still the effect intended was produced. The relations between the two Governments became less strained. But henceforth the bickering of the Governments became drowned in the popular anger. The mischief had gone too far. The wound was too deep and recent for the plaster to adhere. The whole of Germany, without distinction of

¹ The British and German versions of these conversations are given in the Appendix.

party or class, was rocking and seething with indignation, at what it regarded as an insulting and unwarrantable interference on the part of Great Britain in the negotiations with France, as an arrogant British embargo upon Germany acquiring territory in Equatorial Africa, as proof that Britain was determined to block and hamper Germany's expansion; that, in short, Germany had been deliberately and wantonly provoked. Far from dying down, this feeling gathered intensity with the weeks, and there is not, unhappily, the slightest doubt that the German Foreign Secretary interpreted with absolute accuracy the popular sentiment held by the entire German nation when he said—

“If the English Government had intended to complicate and embroil the political situation, and to bring about a violent explosion, they would certainly have chosen no better means than the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, which took so little into account for us the dignity and position of a Great Power which was claimed by him for England.”¹

Finally, can we wonder that this view should be held, and should have crystallized into conviction since the Faber revelations and their *sequelae*?

To-day we are confronted with this situation.

The German *nation* firmly believes not only that it is threatened by Great Britain, but that Great Britain intends to take the first favourable opportunity to force a war.

The British nation knows itself to be absolutely innocent of any such desire or intention.

Is there a way out of the *impasse*? Only, it seems to me, if British public opinion will think out the problem

¹ Cd. 5992.

for itself, face the issues squarely and resolutely and decline any longer to tolerate being in the position of finding itself involved in war without any real knowledge of the why and the wherefore.

Meanwhile let us note the substantial advantages which British interests have reaped from Germany's double intervention in Morocco.

CHAPTER XXII

THE FRANCO-GERMAN SETTLEMENT AND ITS EFFECTS UPON BRITISH INTERESTS

So far as Morocco is concerned, the conclusion finally reached in the Franco-German negotiations and embodied in the Convention of November 4, 1911, constitutes a reversal of the Public Law of Europe formulated in the Algeciras Act. Subject, of course, to the agreement of the signatory Powers—which may be taken for granted—the independence and integrity of Morocco disappear.

For that independence and integrity, a French Protectorate is substituted on certain conditions.

France thus gets her way, and adds, on paper, 219,000 square miles and some eight million inhabitants to her Colonial Empire.¹

¹ The present French Cabinet estimates the cost of the "occupation" of Morocco last year at £2,460,000, and this year at £3,500,000; double the latter figure will probably work out nearer the mark. It is also reckoned that 38,000 men will suffice to maintain the Protectorate; that again is obviously an under-estimate. Irregular fighting is even now going on in several places, and the impotence of the Sultan is complete. With the disappearance of the Sultan's authority lawlessness in aggravated form has become the rule all over the country, and to bring order out of chaos will require a much larger force than 38,000 men. But the real trouble will begin when the Moors fully realise what they do not yet appear to have done, namely, that they have passed for good and all under the domination of the Frank. It is interesting to recall that the conquest of Algeria lasted nearly fifty years, and cost one hundred and fifty million sterling, and that a

Germany abandons her long fight for Moroccan independence in exchange for guarantees as to equality of treatment in economic matters, upon which I shall touch in a moment, receiving as compensation 107,270 square miles of the French Congo, sparsely populated and of moderate intrinsic value, and ceding to France 6450 square miles of German territory in the Upper Cameroons by way of *quid pro quo*. Even a casual glance at the Convention¹ will show that the utmost good will on both sides will be required if its provisions, as they affect both Morocco and the French Congo, are to work out harmoniously in practice, and several years must, in any case, elapse during which the French and German Governments will be engaged in constant discussions arising out of those provisions. It will also be apparent from Article 16 of the Congo section of the Convention that the way has been left open for the question of the Congo State (or Belgian Congo) to be raised on some future occasion—a question which involves the interests of Belgium and those of Great Britain, as well as those of France and Germany, and, nominally at least, the interests of all the signatory Powers of the Berlin Act of 1885.

It is obvious, therefore, that this settlement must

permanent garrison of 60,000 French troops is even now maintained there, although the population of Algeria is only about half that of Morocco. Some French military experts contend that before another twelve months have gone by France will have locked up 100,000 to 150,000 troops in Morocco. If the Moors make up their minds to resist the French Protectorate the estimate is not exaggerated—for the Berbers of Morocco especially are a magnificent fighting race. Italy, it would seem, needs 130,000 troops to *contain* probably not more than 30,000 Arabs, Tuaregs, and Turks. On the other hand, of course, the French African army is an excellent and trained fighting machine; whereas the Italians know nothing of North African warfare.

¹ Appendices XV. to XVIII.

multiply the possibilities of friction between the two Powers to a very considerable extent, since it leaves many highly controversial problems in Morocco itself unsettled, since it adds to their land frontier in Europe, a greatly extended land frontier in equatorial Africa, and since it places—on the basis of a political agreement defining a variety of specific stipulations—their economic interests in close contact in Morocco. Conversely, this settlement may conduce, if handled tactfully and with a genuine desire for a political and economic co-operation, to bring the two Powers more closely together upon a field of common endeavour, than they have ever been before.¹

In any event, the relations of France and Germany cannot be the same in the future as they have been in the past. They must be more continuous, more intimate, more complicated, affording greater opportunities for interference to a foreign diplomacy that, inspired by interested friendliness towards one of them, might be disposed to the display of unfriendliness towards the other. That is the chief conclusion of a general character which can be drawn from the understanding which has been reached; and it is eminently satisfactory, as conveying proof of the real wishes of both Governments, that they should have mutually agreed to refer differences of interpretation to the Hague Tribunal and disputes as to the delimitation of the new Congo frontier to an independent arbitrator.

Examining these documents at close quarters it will be observed that Germany has been able to secure for the

¹ Far-seeing Frenchmen—as far removed from one another in political thought as M. Jaurès and Senator de Lamarzelle—realise this perfectly, and both in the Chamber and in the Senate have publicly given expression to the obvious truth, viz. that the Convention of November, 1911, is workable only if the general attitude of Germany and France becomes inspired by genuine good-will.

trade of all nations in Morocco, conditions, unlimited by time, infinitely more advantageous than the situation in which the British Government was content to leave international commercial interests by the Anglo-French Declaration of 1904. British trading interests in particular may take full measure of the debt which they owe to the double German intervention in Morocco, by recollecting how those interests, at present ranking foremost in importance, were neglected by their own Government in 1904. Under the 1904 Treaties the open door for ordinary trade *was limited to thirty years only*. Apart from ordinary trading transactions, not only was no provision made for a British share in the enormous number of public works—railways and harbour-works, electric light installations, mining plant, telegraphs, post offices, and so on—which the opening up of Morocco will entail, besides the endless purchases of material, stores, etc., which a Moroccan Government equipped on modern lines will require, but as a study of the Franco-Spanish secret Conventions of 1904 and 1905 (especially the former, which was submitted to and approved by the British Government) will show, this unlimited field of enterprise was virtually handed over, lock, stock, and barrel, to a Franco-Spanish monopoly.

After binding down the French Government to equality in trade matters in every direction whereby a loop-hole might be found for favoured treatment despite the non-existence of a differential tariff, Germany has secured the expansion—certain to be very large—of the iron-ore industry from being restricted by export duties, and has imposed a common treatment for all mining undertakings, particularly stipulating that no taxes, uniformly levied, shall be privately remitted in favour of a given company. Germany has insisted upon open

tenders for all contracts for public works and supply of material, under conditions of time and circumstance which shall not place the subjects of any one Power in a position of inferiority. She has postulated that all nations shall be equally privileged to participate in the actual working of great public undertakings, and that industrial and mining concerns shall not be hampered in laying down light railways to connect their enterprises with a port of shipment. She has thought problems out ahead with remarkable thoroughness. In every respect minute precautions have been taken by Germany that international enterprises of every kind are as assured as public pledges can make them, of an absolutely fair field and no favour. That in so doing Germany has sought to benefit her own nationals goes without saying, but in benefiting them she has benefited the nationals of every great commercial Power, and notably Great Britain. Morocco is not to become another Tunis or Madagascar, and British trade and enterprise, shabbily treated in both owing to the well-known fixed rule of French policy overseas and the incapacity of the British Foreign Office, has to thank, not its own Government, but the German Government for the fact. The anger and dismay which fills a certain school in France at contemplating these restrictions upon time-honoured French Colonial methods, may be surmised by perusing some of the speeches made in the course of the Moroccan debate in the French Chamber last December. M. Caillaux, the then Premier, met these complaints in a broad and statesmanlike manner, but which did not tend to increase his popularity. It may be hoped that the French Government will not yield to the importunities it is bound to be plagued with by the initiators of "affaires," who haunt the *Quai d'Orsay*,¹

¹ French Foreign Office.

the *Pavillon de Flore*¹ and the editorial sanctuaries of Parisian newspapers not a few; but that it will carry out the economic conditions attaching to its acquisition of political control over Morocco, both in the letter and in the spirit.

As the economic aspect of the Moroccan section of the Convention is all in favour of British commercial interests, so is the arrangement under which some 100,000 square miles of equatorial African territory pass from French to German control. The increased area of German Cameroon and the decreased area of the French Congo, it cannot be too emphatically asserted, is a distinct and unquestionable gain for British commerce. In the Cameroon, Germany has always treated British trade and British merchants on a level of absolute equality with her own. Nay, more, as the directors of one of the largest British firms and the oldest therein established have recently testified,² the German local authorities have repeatedly gone out of their way to show courtesy to our merchants and to assist them in their business, so far as a local West African Government can do so. Messrs. John Holt speak in the highest terms of their treatment at the hands of the Germans. I have reason to know that their experience is by no means

¹ French Colonial Office.

² Messrs. John Holt & Co., of Liverpool. A curious and significant story attaches to this firm's testimony affecting a *purely British interest*. During the crisis last autumn, when British newspapers were repeating *ad nauseam* the unfounded statement that Germany differentiated against British goods in her oversea possessions, Messrs. John Holt & Co. wrote a letter to a certain very prominent British newspaper, inspired by no love for Germany, describing their own experiences in the Cameroon. The letter was acknowledged. As three weeks later it had still not appeared, Messrs. John Holt & Co. sent a copy to the *Manchester Guardian*, which published it. It was afterwards widely reproduced in England and Germany.

singular. Contrast that story with the notoriously abominable manner in which British trade has been persecuted in the French Congo, where France has violated the Act of Berlin in the most flagrant way.¹

In this connection it is difficult not to apprehend future complications arising from the contradictory character of Articles 5 and 12 of the Convention. By the former the German Government undertakes to respect the concessions granted by the French Government to certain financiers in the part of French Congo which has now become German. By the latter both Governments bind themselves to observe the commercial clauses of the Berlin Act which those concessions grossly violate. In point of fact the whole area which Germany has acquired, with the exception of an infinitesimal corner of it, has been long subjected to that iniquitous system of pillage of the natural riches of the country accompanied by forced labour which the French Colonial Party forced upon the French Colonial Minister of the day in emulation of King Leopold, and largely through his personal intrigue. And eighteen months ago this particular rubber syndicate obtained a ten years further lease of life from the French Government. If respect for this arrangement is to be taken in a literal sense, it means that the Act of Berlin will continue to be violated in the ceded territory for ten years longer, to the detriment of the natives and of international trade alike, and that Cameroon merchants, whatever nationality they may belong to, will be unable to extend their business to the new German territory. Such a state of things would be so clearly alien to Germany's policy and to German

¹ *Vide, inter alia*, "The British Case in French Congo" (Heinemann, 1902), and the paper in the *Contemporary Review* for December, 1911, by the author.

interests that it may be hoped some way may be found out of the difficulty and that Germany may be able to set an example in relation to this matter, of faithful adherence to international Treaties which besides, in this particular instance, redounding to the benefit of black humanity and legitimate trade,¹ will free her hands when presently (as I devoutly hope she may, and, if the Foreign Office by that time is cured of its Teutophobia, in concert with Britain) she sets herself to insist upon the Belgians fulfilling *their* Treaty obligations in the Congo State.²

Politically speaking, the form the French Congo territorial compensation has eventually taken is extremely awkward and inconvenient for the French and irritating for the Germans. A study of the map and of the Appendix will suffice to make this plain to any one. Geographically it is an impossible arrangement, and a well-informed French friend compares it to the accumulation of barrels of international gunpowder along the banks of the Congo. Either of the plans first discussed would have been better than this solution, *i.e.* if the territory ceded had been further south, Gaboon-wards; or if the German river frontage in the ceded territory had spread over the intervening space between the two existing *antennæ* or horns (see map). The former need not have been so extensive as the Germans originally asked—in exchange for a considerably larger German territory than they have

¹ The *Concessionnaire* system in equatorial Africa involves and necessitates the most horrible abuses, of which the world has had an unforgettable object-lesson in King Leopold's management of the Congo State.

² Representations in regard to this problem have already been made to the German Government by the German Congo League and the German Colonial Society, and to the British Government by the Newcastle and, I think, other Chambers of Commerce.

actually conceded—but it might well have embraced the basins of the Ogowe and Kwilou, following a straight line, parallel with the 12th Parallel, to the Congo State frontier. There would then have been no “cutting in two” of the French dependency, and communication between the Middle and Upper French Congo and the Coast would not have been modified, since it is and has always been, entirely dependent upon the Belgian railway from Stanley Pool to Matadi. But, as indicated in Chapter XX., the British diplomatic machine was opposed to the extension of the German coast-line and to Germany acquiring Libreville, which, in all probability, was the immediate cause of the uproar of July 20 and 21. The second solution, which was actually proposed by M. Caillaux, was defeated, or rather modified, by the opposition worked up in Paris to the “cutting in two” idea. As a matter of fact, the solution actually adopted has consecrated this disadvantage, without any of the compensating advantages in the shape of absence of future friction, which the present arrangement inevitably entails.

An interesting feature of the Convention is the cession of France's right of pre-emption over Spanish Guinea, the Corisco Islands, and the Elobey Islands, should Spain be willing to sell these places to Germany. Equally interesting, and far more important, is Article 16, whereby France's right of pre-emption over the Congo State is modified to such an extent as to have become, practically speaking, non-existent. Germany has secured that if the Congo State ever comes into the market through the unwillingness or inability of the Belgians to control it, the signatory Powers of the Berlin Act must adjudicate as to its future. German insistence upon this provision was, doubtless, inspired by the knowledge—which the Congo Reform Association, I may say, also obtained early

in 1909—that France had made tentative proposals to Germany and Great Britain, at the time that King Leopold and his Parliament were wrangling over the terms under which the Congo State was to be annexed, for a Franco-British-German partition of the Congo State. Article 16 places the Congo State question in its international aspects on the *terrain* from which M. Jules Ferry succeeded in 1884, secretly and behind the back of the Powers, in removing it—*i.e.* upon its true basis as an *international* problem.

A brief reference may be made in conclusion to France's dispute with Spain which presumably will be settled before this book is in print.¹ As British strategic policy requires that Spain shall remain in possession of Mediterranean and North Atlantic Morocco, it may be presumed—unless Sir Edward Grey gives way—that she will retain Larash and El-Kasr (despite the annoyance of the French Colonials, who have been indulging in sundry threats about sundering the *entente*, if the British Government does not force Spain to clear out of those places); abandoning Ifni and perhaps the Rio del Oro region on

¹ The origin of the Franco-Spanish dispute is, briefly, this: France declares that Spain, in occupying Larash and El-Kasr, has violated the secret Convention of 1904, because that Convention only recognised Spain's right to occupy these places with French consent, and so long as the *status quo* of Morocco was not altered. Spain replies that France had herself altered the *status quo* by occupying Fez and the surrounding country, and that as regards French consent, that Spain twice asked for French consent between April and June of last year, and only decided to act when France withheld that consent—unjustly, in view of her own performances. In other words, as Felicien Challaye puts it most excellently in "La Vie Internationale": "Thus this initial dispute has for its primary cause the duplicity which both France and Spain have displayed in regard to Morocco, both having undertaken to respect its independence and integrity, both having worked in secret to partition and conquer Morocco." The truth could not be more tersely stated.

the South Atlantic to France. It may be hoped that the forthcoming Franco-Spanish settlement will regularise the doubtful and peculiar position in which Tangier is left by this hotch-potch of treaties superseded, treaties set aside, old treaties, new treaties, secret treaties, and public treaties—the strategic importance of Tangier being, of course, for Britain a matter of considerable moment.¹

¹ Sundry French Colonial papers have insisted that France must be politically preponderant at Tangier, and that the future Tangier-Fez railway must be wholly in French hands, even when it passes through Spanish territory. These statements must not, however, be taken too seriously. More significant is the fact that Germany has not taken Spain into account at all in dealing with France, but has recognised a French Protectorate (subject, of course, to the conditions specified) to the *whole* of Morocco, the Spanish zone included. This makes France technically responsible for the fulfilment in the Spanish zone of all the stipulations formulated by Germany in the Convention of November, 1911. This responsibility France has accepted, and now seeks to make Spain swallow the additional pill—at which the Spanish gorge rises, partly because it will upset the calculations and enterprises of certain influential Spanish *concessionnaires*.

CHAPTER XXIII

AN APPEAL FROM PREJUDICE TO REASON

"The nation does not desire peace at any price. People talk about peace at any price, but there is something far worse—and that is alliance at any price, and especially alliances the price of which is not disclosed." (The Dean of Worcester [Canon Moore Ede], speaking at the first Annual Meeting of the Church of England Peace Congress, January 26, 1912.)

THERE are three keys with which to unlock the door to a permanent improvement in Anglo-German relations if the British people desire it, as I firmly believe they do.

The first is the honest admission that in the one case where a quarrel has occurred over a specific issue—Morocco—we have not treated Germany fairly, and that Germany has a legitimate grievance against us on that score. This I have tried to show from an analysis of the facts, not because it was a pleasant thing to do, assuredly not because it was a popular thing to do, but because to any one who believes an understanding¹ with Germany to be a supreme British national concern, the national interest demanded that it should be attempted. If the thinking public after reading this book share that view, a public force will have been created to prevent the recurrence of a similar episode, whether in connection with further developments which the Morocco question with its now inevitable *annexes* the French Congo and Belgian Congo questions may have in store for us, or as regards

¹ Not an alliance, but an *understanding*.

any other specific problem which may arise, either in Asia-Minor, in China, or in the Portuguese African dependencies. There is no need to clothe ourselves in a white sheet for the world's sneers. But we shall be no weaker; we shall be stronger if we allow to ourselves that we have been misled, quietly make up our minds to take the fact into account in our future dealings with Germany, and imitate our French friends to the extent of insisting upon a final close to the era of secret treaty making, whether such secret treaties be between us and another Power, or between other Powers but involving our national responsibility, as in the case of the secret Franco-Spanish Convention of 1904.

The second key is the indispensable duty that devolves upon the House of Commons to ascertain the real nature of our relations with France, and if, as the public are assured, there are no positive commitments, to insist that neither in regard to Morocco nor in regard to any other dispute which events may occasion between France and Germany, shall this nation's foreign policy be directed as though such positive commitments existed.

It is well to be absolutely plain-spoken in this matter. In 1904 Lord Lansdowne was successful in removing various specific and long-standing causes of friction between ourselves and France by a series of arrangements. Only in one of these arrangements was an avenue left open for future national liabilities if, as an outcome of it, France found herself at loggerheads with another Power. Those liabilities were limited, but even in their limitation they went beyond what the nation was aware of, or had sanctioned, because their nature was kept from the nation. Such liabilities as existed were still further reduced by the Act of Algeciras. Such as they were before the close of the Algeciras Conference, and *a fortiori* from the date

of its conclusion, they did not make it incumbent upon this nation, either in honour or in law, to support France in violating the Act of Algeciras if her Government chose to take the risk of doing so without having previously come to an understanding with any Power signatory of the Act that might consider its interests and rights jeopardised and set on one side by such violation; much less to support France to the extent of being prepared to involve this nation in a great war as the outcome of the French Government's proceedings.¹ *There was an unwarrantable, unsanctioned transmutation of a strictly limited agreement with France into an instrument of aggression against the Power which challenged France's infringement both of that Power's interests and rights under its own Treaty with Morocco, and under the Algeciras Act. Parliament should place beyond doubt or question that this nationally unauthorised transmutation must cease. Parliament should place beyond doubt or question that France having, thanks to the British Government, succeeded in her long-matured design of acquiring a Protectorate over the greater part of Morocco, cannot expect us to fight her battles for her in any subsequent squabble which may arise between her and other Powers over the exercise of her Protectorate, any more than she can expect us to play the part of wet nurse to her in any other portion of the globe. This nation, through its elected representatives, should absolutely decline to allow itself to be tied to the cartwheels of the French Colonial Party or of any other Party or Parties in France.*

¹ Even those who argue that our commitments to France under the Anglo-French Declaration of 1904 were not modified by the Algeciras Act, cannot assert that the giving of "diplomatic support" to France entailed the granting of naval and military support, in face of the Foreign Office's assertions to the contrary. *Vide* footnote, Chapter X.

Not to make a firm and unambiguous stand now would mean for the British people an unending vista of prospective and unknown liabilities, which they would be absolutely insane to permit themselves to be saddled with. If the House of Commons does not pronounce unmistakably on the matter it will be betraying its trust to the nation. A means must be found for curtailing the virtually unlimited discretion of the executive in foreign affairs. I believe that some twenty-five years ago a resolution providing that all Treaties should be laid before Parliament for approval before being finally ratified only failed to be carried by four votes. A similar resolution should be brought forward and pressed again and again until it passes.

Moreover, if the British position for the future is not made clear, it can only be a matter of time before the friendly feeling happily existing between France and ourselves will be changed into one of open tension, for the simple reason that the nation will not put up with being made the cat's-paw of French colonial adventures; neither will it put up with a situation whereby it might become to-morrow the agent of some one or other ephemeral French Government bent upon a war with Germany for the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine. The time *may* come when, if the Republican régime cannot purge itself of the financial corruption, the incessant personal intrigues and the dangerous irresponsibility which undermine and honeycomb the body politic, it will be so shaken as to find in a successful war its only chance of survival. That event, if it should occur, must find the British people unfettered and at liberty to pursue the course best suited to the national interest. The disorganised condition of our own Foreign Office, the personal rivalries which obtain within it, its extraordinarily faulty intelligence system, the

way in which the embassies abroad have got out of hand through the absence of a strong directing head at home with clear ideas and personal knowledge of European languages, countries and peoples—these things, which, unhappily, do not appertain to the region of gossip, but to the realm of fact, are in all conscience bad enough. But that the British national interest should be in any sense at all tied up with the vagaries prevailing in the Public Departments, Parliamentary lobbies and editorial offices of the French Republic is altogether intolerable, and would not be tolerated for twenty-four hours by the British people if they realised the true position. The revelations of the last few months should surely open the eyes of our statesmen to the appalling state of chaos and intrigue which has been, in part only, dragged to light by the French Senatorial investigations into the inner history of the Moroccan affair.

It is in the interest neither of the British nor of the French *peoples* that they should be fettered in their intercourse with other peoples; or committed by their Governments to a definite course of action in advance. Such commitments play into the hands of certain sections in Britain, France and Germany, who, whether they be actuated by motives of honest conviction, or inspired by class or personal interests, or merely governed by fixed and narrow ideas, are the enemies of peace, which is and must be the paramount interest both of the creative elements and of the working masses in each country.¹ There is such a section in Germany which, seeing, or affecting to see, in Great Britain the implacable foe of Germany's national and inevitable expansion in commerce, industry and power, urges war. There is a section in Great Britain which, seeing, or affecting to see, in the

¹ Except the manufacturers of war material.

growth of Germany a rival animated by aggressive and sinister designs, works for war and would use the *entente* with France to that end. There is a section in France which, adhering to the cult of "*La revanche*" and dismayed at a stationary if not falling birth-rate which twenty years hence will place the French in a position of conspicuous and incontestable military inferiority *par rapport* with their eastern neighbours, dreams of replenishing the dwindling fighting strength of the nation by regiments of brown and black Africans, and, agitated and restless, loses no opportunity of envenoming Anglo-German relations with the intent of using the *entente* as a lever to precipitate a struggle before France has fallen altogether behind Germany in point of military numbers.

The task of the peoples concerned is to find statesmen who will shake themselves free from these influences. Or, to state the proposition inversely, statesmen worthy of the name must shake themselves free of them by taking the people more and more into their confidence and appealing more and more to the national interest of the vast mass of the population to counteract these influences.¹ In other words, foreign policy must be democratised, which does not mean in the least, as certain pompous persons rooted in fossilised ideas which no longer respond to the world's imperative requirements, urge in panic horror, that diplomatists should carry on their conversations in the public squares, any more than the shipowner informs the neighbourhood of his negotiations over a charter-party, or the novelist invites his readers to

¹ The surest proof that both the German and the French Governments were animated with peaceful intentions in the crisis of last summer and autumn, is to be sought in the fact that the great labour demonstrations for peace, held in Berlin and Paris respectively, were inspired by the respective Governments concerned, acting independently of one another. This has been denied; but it is true.

follow the unravelling of his plot while he is engaged upon it.

Especially is it necessary for the common-sense elements in the British nation to set their faces like flint against the sections in Britain and France desirous of distorting the existence of friendly relations with France into an instrument of aggression against Germany. If Englishmen will stop and think for a moment they will realise that the idea sedulously thrust into their brains by certain newspapers—the idea that the French are living in daily terror of a descent upon them by Germany which, but for a British fleet, would indubitably take place—is on the face of it extremely unlikely; that, as a matter of fact, the persistent encouraging of this idea among us may conceivably be doing France the greatest disservice by increasing the power of certain persons, and, perhaps, certain forces, in Britain and France anxious to prevent a Franco-German *rapprochement*, not at all, in the former case, as an act of love for France, but from a muddle-headed conception of the national interests of Britain. Let them, for example, turn over the following points in their minds. Until a few months ago it was a cardinal article of faith among us that the German army was the most efficient fighting machine in the world. Well, for *forty years* the Imperial controller of that most efficient fighting machine in the world has not once used it for carrying out one or other of the numerous schemes with which he has from time to time been credited by certain wiseacres in Fleet Street, by the compilers of blood-curdling articles in the popular magazines, or by excited and badly informed politicians. Then, again, if the rulers of Germany meditate far-seeing designs of conquest, they would be, surely, playing a fool's game to give effect to them now, as regards France at any rate.

The German population is increasing by nearly a million a year. It is now somewhere in the neighbourhood of sixty-seven millions; that of France somewhere in the neighbourhood of thirty-nine millions, and the population of France is slowly declining. In another quarter of a century France, for all her incomparable intellectual genius, will, in the ordinary course of events, short of some far-reaching internal thought-revolution, which is extremely unlikely in view of the steady decay of religious faith and the corresponding increase in every influence making for the spread of sexual licence (or short of an alteration of the map of Europe in her favour), have fallen, so far as fighting strength is concerned, immeasurably below the level of Germanic capacity. What is a quarter of a century in the life of a nation? Germany can afford to wait. Time is on her side, and all the evolutions of all the diplomatists in the world cannot affect the great national forces at work. Pondering over this, Englishmen might well consider whether causes, which, in the case of Germany, they are told, operate as a *primâ facie* warrant for crediting the existence of German designs upon her neighbours, do not apply with equal if not greater logic in the case of France. That *France must, within the next half century, increase the population owning allegiance to the French flag, or crumble to ruin*, approximates at least nearer to the truth than that the growth in the German population is a "world menace." An attempt to expand beyond the line of the Vosges might be too hazardous to entertain, even now, say within the next year or two. Postponed for two decades, or even one decade, it would be suicidal. But the risks of expansion northwards into the Low Countries, or southwards beyond the line of the Pyrennees, would not be so considerable. Then, again, the Englishman

who prefers to think for himself, instead of letting half a dozen gentlemen invested with the power (how often abused, alas!) of transmitting their thoughts daily to an aggregate of millions do their thinking for them, might ask themselves whether there is not a suspicion of crocodillian tactics in this perpetual lament over poor, plucky little France, brow-beaten by brutal, sabre-rattling Germany, combined with the appearance of learned articles—such, for example, as Colonel Repington's¹ in the *Times*—in which we are told, in effect, that the German army is very over-rated and inefficient in many respects, while the French army is greatly under-rated and conspicuously efficient.

Finally, Englishmen might pause and think for a moment whether they are *quite sure* they are being accurately informed as to the real sentiments of the peace-loving, laborious, thrifty masses of the French nation in regard to Germany and the relations of France with Germany. Are they *quite sure* that the same people who invited them to believe that the German Government had offended the Russian bureaucracy (misnamed "Russia" with pleasing complacency) for at least a generation because the Kaiser had stood in shining armour beside his ally Austria over the Bosnian business are altogether

¹ I am told by military friends that Colonel Repington's reputation as a military expert is internationally recognised. M. Philippe Millet, reviewing these articles in *Le Temps* of November 21 last, remarks: "Although Germany still continues to loom large in the imagination of her neighbours by reason of the number of her battalions, and because of her admirable mobilisation system, it is beginning to be whispered in Europe that the French army excels its rival in essential military qualities. Our weight in the diplomatic scale cannot fail to increase if, while conscious of our strength, we are wise enough not to relax our efforts." So we cannot have it both ways, and on this showing, Germany's increased estimates for 1912 respond to necessities pointed out by the *Times* and hailed by *Le Temps*.

safe guides to follow? Have they forgotten that this Russian bureaucracy was so little offended that before two years had passed it had concluded a general understanding with the German Government known as the Potsdam Agreement—an agreement which caused these prophets the acutest discomposure? Englishmen might be reminded of a saying attributed to one of the shrewdest politicians who in recent years has wielded the French Premiership—

“An Anglo-French alliance destined, whether desired or not, to arouse keen anxiety in Germany, would be a source of great strength for England. It would not, however, be a source of strength for France.”

They might reflect that those who would stand to suffer most in an Anglo-French-German war would—the chances are ninety-nine to one—not be ourselves, nor the Germans, but the French. The chances that English soil would be violated and that we should be driven to defending our homes and hearths are appreciably less than in the case of either Frenchmen or Germans.¹ And, reflecting upon these things, they would be led to inquire whether, in point of accuracy, it is not a fact that many of the clearest-headed men at the head of affairs in, or prominent in the councils of, France are strongly in favour of a permanent understanding with Germany, that the sore of Alsace-Lorraine is gradually healing with the up-growth of the new generation, and that the process has been assisted by the Kaiser's recent statesmanlike

¹ If those who in this country speak so light-heartedly of war had experienced in their persons the anguish of belonging to an invaded nation, they would call a very different tune. It is so easy to stir up strife from the depths of an editorial chair—so easy, and yet of all forms of cowardice there is none, surely, so contemptible.

action in granting self-government to those annexed provinces—one of which, at least, has always been more German than French. In this connection an article by M. Hanotaux—the ex-Minister for Foreign Affairs and distinguished historical student—in *La Revue Hebdomadaire* is worthy of note. After repudiating the charge that he is opposed to friendly relations with England, he declares himself—

“a convinced partisan of the policy of ‘equilibrium’; I demand that France shall make it her business as far as possible to hold the ‘balance even’ between the great Powers.”

Was it France’s interest, he asks, in regard to recent events—

“to throw our sword violently into the balance of European quarrels when there was still need for us to proceed with the greatest circumspection in order to complete in Africa what had been undertaken—that is the question. After having pursued without success the chimera of the ring-fence (*encerclement*),¹ we have had to abandon it, and we find ourselves confronted with the painful reality

¹ *I.e.* the policy of making a ring-fence around Germany which Germans have alleged to be Britain’s object since Sir Edward Grey’s accession to office, but which Sir Edward Grey has denied. That M. Hanotaux does not stand alone, however, is notorious. Another very distinguished Frenchman of international reputation, but belonging to a totally different political school, Baron d’Estournelles de Constant, gave expression to the same belief in the Senate on February 6th last. After pointing out that the idea that Germany could adopt a line of action in international affairs which would place her morally in the rear of other nations, and pointing to her willingness to submit any cause of dispute arising out of the Convention of November 4, 1911, to the Hague tribunal as the best answer to the allegation, Baron d’Estournelles de Constant added—

“And here appears the puerile character of our policy of the isolation of Germany substituted for the irreproachable policy of equilibrium and of truth which ought to be the policy of France.”

which compels us to cede the Congo¹ in exchange for a diminished Morocco."

M. Hanotaux echoes, for France, as a Frenchman, the sentiment I venture to suggest here that Englishmen should give expression to when perpetually reminded that we must think of France and French interests: "Friends with England"—he says—"very well. But France first," and he recommends the adoption, for France, of the policy here urged in these pages for Britain—

"If it be question of Germany, I should ask that France shall keep her hands free, that she shall act always in accordance with her duty and her actual and permanent interests, fearing nothing, forgetting nothing; but that French diplomacy shall always and everywhere work, according to circumstances, for the greatest profit of the present and for the best preparation for the future."

Precisely. Let Britain do the same, rejecting Sir Edward Grey's formula that such a policy would leave us "without a friend in Europe." "Friendships" which fetter a nation's freedom are unnatural compacts and the most dangerous of illusions.

Englishmen will not fail to perceive in the narrative of the events of last year a steady tendency in French official circles to draw nearer to Germany, and to bring a long-festering squabble (a sentiment which took into account the existence of a strong and legally unassailable German case) to a satisfactory solution. And they will, perchance, not dissociate the attacks indulged in in certain quarters here against the men who in France were working for

¹ That, of course, is an exaggeration. The French have not ceded "the Congo" or anything approximating to its total area.

that end,¹ and the proportionate sympathy expressed for those who were pulling in another direction, from the existence of sentiments among a section of thought at home which contemplates such a *rapprochement* with ill-disguised irritation. If they are at all affected by these observations, Englishmen will conclude that Britain's true rôle, the one responding alike to her real interests and to the professions of her public men, is to use her influence not to impede, but, should she be required to use it at all one way or another, to facilitate a thorough reconciliation between France and Germany.

The third key is to be sought in a serious effort at comprehension of both the difficulties and the necessities which confront German statesmen and the German people. Such an effort is surely not incompatible with a fixed and unvarying determination that, come what may,

¹ As a specimen of these attacks the article entitled "The New French Ministry" in the *Spectator* of January 20 last may be cited. In perusing it the reader will do well to bear in mind that, with one exception—that of M. de Selves, who had precedently quarrelled with his chief and resigned—the whole of M. Caillaux's colleagues (including M. Delcassé) spontaneously signed a public declaration immediately upon the fall of the Caillaux Cabinet, in which they asserted that M. Caillaux had not acted without consulting them, and that they were in full agreement with everything he had done. And yet the *Spectator* holds up M. Caillaux to execration, and goes far towards insinuating that he was a traitor to his country, unconscious, apparently, that in so doing it labels an entire French Government with the same stigma, and not only one French Government but three, because M. Caillaux, whatever may have been his mistakes, was merely carrying out, with more courage and consistency, the policy of his two predecessors (MM. Briand and Monis; *vide* Chapter XVI.). When will Englishmen realise the grotesqueness of this kind of history-making which they are asked to swallow? The article touches the sublime in its concluding paragraph when French public opinion is adjured to show "no mercy" to wicked Ministers who conceal their designs, well knowing that M. Delcassé has been in this respect the greatest offender the third Republic has known—M. Delcassé, for whom the *Spectator* has nothing but rhetorical flowers.

no decrease of the British fleet below the level of safety, can for one moment be entertained? ¹ The analogy the anti-German party at home seeks to draw between the France of Napoleon 1st and industrial modern Germany, in order to make our flesh creep, must strike any one who tries to think it out, as even more comical than it is foolish. The France of a hundred years ago, drunk with military glory, at the feet of a military genius whose god was War and whose personal ambition was at once limitless, and uncontrollable by any force within France, bears as much resemblance in its motives, its needs, and its possibilities to the Germany of to-day as . . . well as the two most dissimilar objects which the reader's mind can conjure.

Germany's supreme need to-day is not war but peace, is not military conquest but trade, is not the acquisition of colonies peopled by a German-speaking race, but *markets*. The extension of trade, the extension of markets

¹ Which, however, does not imply that the nation should fail to guard itself against a recurrence of the unworthy panics which convulsed it in 1908 and 1909—panics as Captain Burgoyne, the editor of the *Navy League Annual*, who describes himself as “a hardened Tory, an enthusiastic Navy Leaguer, and an ardent (if imperfect) advocate of an all-powerful and ultra-efficient fleet,” and who may be assumed to know what he is talking about, describes as being built “upon the flimsiest foundation.” The agitation at the time this enthusiastic advocate of an all-powerful British navy declares to have been “one of the most portentous pieces of parliamentary humbug ever practised upon the electorate.” It may be that Captain Burgoyne's political views are inclined to tinge his indictment of the Prime Minister and Sir Edward Grey and Mr. McKenna, but the tables and statements with which he supports it are impressive, and I am not aware that their accuracy has been challenged. (See “The Dreadnought Controversy” in the *Oxford and Cambridge Review*.) Unless Captain Burgoyne can be proved wrong in his facts the ordinary citizen will be forced to the double conclusion that, as in the Morocco controversy, he has been badly misled, and that the German Government has been much misrepresented.

to feed an enormously expanding home industry, outcome of a yearly increase in population equal to the combined yearly increase of the United Kingdom, Austria-Hungary, and Italy—these are matters of life and death to Germany. A fair and open commercial field in every undeveloped area of the world's surface is a vital national necessity for Germany. The closing of potential markets to her trade in Africa, in Asia, in South America, Germany is bound to regard as a blow aimed straight at her heart. She cannot help herself. Either she must find work at home to do for her rapidly increasing population or she must be content to see that population emigrating *en masse* to foreign lands over-seas. To find her people in work, she not only requires expanding markets in which to sell her goods, but she requires the raw material of the tropics and sub-tropics to sustain her industries and manufactures. Moreover, she must feed her people too, and she is no longer able to do that from her own soil's output. Owing, on the one hand to growth of population, and on the other to the current which, as in our case, is sweeping the people from the land into the towns, aggravated in the case of Germany by the political and social disadvantages under which the rural population, or at least a considerable section of it, suffers by comparison with the urban population; Germany is becoming increasingly less able to support her own people with the products of her own agriculture. These national necessities automatically entail both a constant and growing addition to German shipping, and the necessity of adequate protection for that shipping on the high seas.

The guiding motive of German foreign policy to-day is to secure for the German people unfettered access to markets over-seas, as large a share as possible in the

development of those markets, and a voice in the acquisition of over-sea territories which may fall, through the course of events, into the international melting-pot. It is not land hunger, but trade hunger which inspires her, and trade hunger responds to the fundamental demand of her national existence. That is the bed-rock reason why Germany opposed the secret partition of Morocco between France and Spain, when she got to know of it. That is why Germany stood out pertinaciously for her acquired and her legal rights, and insisted that if France was to get Morocco it should only be at a price (in which she did but follow the lead of Italy, Britain, and Spain), and on the understanding that Morocco should not be turned into a preserve for the French financier and *concessionnaire*. That is why she exacted a price from Russia in exchange for standing aside while Russia—with Britain looking helplessly on—proceeded to absorb the largest and commercially most valuable section of Persia preparatory, so the *Novoe Vremya* is good enough to inform us, to the absorption of the whole. That is why Germany will fight against any attempt to close the Chinese markets in favour of any particular Power, or group of Powers. That is why Germany insisted last autumn that if Belgian rule in the Congo should ultimately become impossible, France must so far modify her reversionary claim to the Congo State as to consent to the problem being carried before the Signatory Powers which created the Congo State. That is why Germany will find it impossible to allow that her newly-secured territory in the French Congo, or that the French Congo outside that territory and subject to the freedom of trade clauses of the Berlin Act, shall remain a vast rubber monopoly for the benefit of a handful of French and Belgian *concessionnaires*. That is why, if the

Portuguese West and East African dependencies come into the market she will demand her share.

But to carry out this necessity of her national life, Germany must be secure of such a position in the councils of the nations as to make her ever and always a factor to be reckoned with. This she can only attain by the possession of a fleet which will make the strongest Power hesitate either to attack her or to ignore her. People who persist in representing the German fleet as built for purely aggressive purposes, pointing to Germany's great army as sufficient to secure her safety, altogether overlook the fact that if Germany is still, as ever, compelled to protect her land frontiers and maintain her position in Europe, the old Germany of continental-limited interests has passed away and has been replaced by a Germany whose national existence is equally bound up with her over-seas commerce and industry, which have largely become the life-blood of the nation.¹

Germany's naval armaments will expand and contract in the measure in which her national needs are, or are not, regarded by Britain as a cause for blocking action. The matter is largely in our own hands. It is a matter of general policy. For example, it is perfectly obvious that Germany must have coaling and repair stations at some point or points over-seas. She is so situated to-day that, even under easy steam, she would be unable to reach her possessions in the Pacific in case of war. That is an intolerable position for any great Power to submit to in perpetuity. Is it reasonable, is it just, that we should for ever oppose Germany's acquisition

¹ This chapter was written before Mr. Winston Churchill described the German navy as a "luxury." It seems a pity that some of our governing statesmen do not take the trouble to make themselves acquainted with the elementary national problems of the countries they refer to.

of coaling stations on the high seas? Yet it is well known that we have been so opposing her. A few years ago the Foreign Office was convulsed at the idea of a German purchase of one of the Canary Islands. If to-morrow there were a question of Germany's buying the Azores, we should have half the Press of Great Britain asserting that the purchase would sound the death-knell of the British Empire.¹ Sir Edward Grey was appalled at the phantom of a German naval base at Agadir, a mud-hole which would involve an expenditure of millions even to turn into a decent port, let alone a naval base. The Foreign Office was prepared to take immense risks in order to prevent Libreville falling into German hands. How much longer is this insane dog-in-the-manger policy to be pursued?

The growth of modern Germany may be very inconvenient for us, but we have to make up our minds that it is inevitable, just as the increasing vigour of German industrial competition is inevitable. We have become so long accustomed to supremacy in the world of business, circumstances favoured us with such a tremendously long start, that the awakening is necessarily unwelcomed. But to credit the Germans with all sorts of Machiavellian designs is childish and undignified. We should be better employed in turning our Foreign and Colonial and Board of Trade Offices inside out; strengthening our Consular Service; publishing the reports of our Consuls broadcast, instead of suppressing them; effecting some much-needed changes in the representation of our diplomatic interests in certain foreign capitals; making it part of the functions of our Embassies and Legations abroad to report upon all the diplomatic and political aspects affecting trade problems; infusing some new life into our Chambers of

¹ We should have had a month ago.

Commerce; correcting many of our antiquated methods of conducting trade abroad, and recognising that, in these days, commerce must be treated as a science, and not merely as an occupation.

Nationally speaking, is there, for us, anything in the German national requirements, such as here defined, and, I believe, accurately defined, which threatens vital British interests other than in the sense of keen commercial competition? If so, what? Does Germany close her over-sea dependencies to our trade? No. Does she impose differential tariffs therein in favour of her own, as the French and the Portuguese do? No. The British merchant and British trade are treated in German West and East Africa and in the Pacific on exactly the same equal footing as we treat German merchants and trade in our oversea possessions. In her home market Germany's fiscal policy and ours differ. Whether Germany's home fiscal policy is the best for Germany is a matter upon which opinion in Germany is divided, and judging from the recent elections is tending more and more towards free trade. But it is worthy of note that, in the main, the bitterest critics of Germany in Britain are precisely to be found among the supporters of a fiscal policy similar to that which they denounce Germany for practising, although France (be it said *en passant*) practises it also. But over-seas, Germany's commercial policy is like ours, the "open-door" which she pursues and is bound to pursue in her own interests, it seems to me, wherever she acquires a political footing, for the simple reason that, unlike France, Belgium and Portugal, she needs to find employment for the *nation* primarily, not profits for the favoured individual; *i.e.* she seeks *an abundance* of raw material from the tropics rather than large profits upon a smaller output—and *that* she can only get by

a system of free commerce. *That* she can only get by making every brown and black man who acknowledges her flag a richer man than he was before, inasmuch as the richer he is the more he will buy of her goods with the raw products of his soil. I contend that if Germany adheres to the policy of the open-door for trade over-seas, the national interest of Great Britain lies in the direction of not hampering her over-sea expansion in the undeveloped tropical and sub-tropical regions of the world in favour of a Power which closes the door; but rather in that of facilitating this expansion, assuming, of course, that our rulers mean what they say when they tell us that, save here and there,¹ we have got enough exotic territory on our hands already.

But if these conclusions are contested, what is the alternative? Does any thinking Briton really believe that we can suppress Germany, that we can stop the works of that mighty human engine, arrest the flow of that rising population, contain its development to strictly circumscribed limits, *smash or crush nearly seventy million people* by a successful war? A successful war would not be the end but the beginning of a legacy of hatred—of which no man could estimate the final reckoning. If the German fleet were hopelessly shattered, what would the patriotic German say? Why, that it was his own fault. He did not build enough, he would argue, and he would promptly, tirelessly set to work to build another navy in its place—if he had to go without beer and sausages. If it comes to France or Germany as an ally of Great Britain, look at the potentialities of each as a world-force, and let us

¹ Which means, of course, that they want Delagoa Bay and the Katanga, and are now more or less driven—alas! for both honour and strategy—to absorb Southern Persia.

beware of backing the wrong horse.¹ But it should be neither. Let us, on the contrary, keep our hands free, unfettered by alliances or understandings of a compromising character from which our partners may profit but from which, as John Bright said long ago, we stand in the long run to lose; and let us come back to the only sound ideal of policy for Great Britain at the opening of the twentieth century, *i.e.* to play our own part in the Concert of Europe when necessity arises; to uphold, if necessary by our whole strength, international treaties when violated *to the detriment either of our honour or of our interests*, but not to assert our intention of upholding them when neither our honour nor our interests are directly affected, especially if we do not mean to carry out our proclaimed intention; to use our moral influence, which is enormous (so long as it is not compromised by such inconsistencies as querulously objecting to a breach of international etiquette one moment and participating in a similar breach the next), in favour of a just policy towards weaker peoples and coloured races which, in the ultimate resort, is wise as well as right; to draw nearer by some well-thought-out scheme of Imperial partnership in matters of defence and foreign policy to our great self-governing Dependencies.

¹ Contrast these two extracts—there is in them a profound psychological lesson we could do worse as a nation than lay to heart: “To-day is ‘Busstag,’ the day set apart by the Government annually for prayer and penitence, and in order that the thoughts of the people may not be distracted, every theatre is closed, none but sacred music may be played publicly or privately, no dancing or other frivolity may be indulged in, and all work must cease.” (*Morning Post* Berlin Correspondent, November 22, 1911.)

Quotations from the school-books in the French Government schools (as given in a recent article by R. W. Grinton Berry): “No belief concerning God, the origin of the world, the origin and destiny of man, can be accepted by thinking people; all that we can do in this matter is to make suppositions. The Gospels contain moral conceptions which shock the modern conscience. Religion is founded upon fear and upon unverifiable hypotheses.”

Let us not allow ourselves to be mentally confused by such arguments as Sir Edward Grey used the other day in order to turn criticism away from the policy with which he has become identified, and which consisted in an attempt to represent the critics of that policy as being desirous of interfering here, there and everywhere, whereas the gravamen of complaint is precisely the contrary, viz.: that *he* interfered, unnecessarily and unhappily, in the Franco-German dispute over Morocco, and that, having himself concluded a Treaty with Russia over Persia, he has shown himself unable to make Russia conform to that Treaty.

Let us on the contrary, made wiser, perchance, by this Morocco affair, persist in demanding until we obtain it, some measure of effective national control over our own foreign policy. Let us hold out the hand of friendship to Germany, not ostentatiously, not by sacrificing in the remotest degree our self-respect, not by offering her absurd "concessions," but in a spirit of frank recognition that between our two nations there is neither sense, nor dignity, nor justice, in petty jealousy and unworthy recrimination. In a spirit of frank recognition that Germany's industrial progress does but demonstrate the need for renewed activities of our own in a field of honourable economic rivalry—that as she has learned from us, so may we have to learn from her. In a spirit of frank recognition that she is as fully entitled as we may be to make such naval provision as her statesmen consider advisable, adequately to protect her extensive over-sea connections.¹ In a spirit of determination that

¹ According to the recently published edition of the *Navy League's Annual*, the relative British and German position is as follows:—*Dreadnoughts in commission March, 1911*: British 12, German 5. *Pre-Dreadnoughts*: British 40, German 20. *Armoured cruisers*: British 34,

we shall allow no influences on our side, no personal prejudices or incitements to suspicion and mistrust, to prevent a gradual but sure advance towards the re-establishment of those harmonious relations which are alone worthy of two great peoples who have fought side by side on many a stricken field, who have never fought against each other, who come of the same stock, between whom association and history have forged innumerable links, whose respective prosperity and progress are indispensable to each other's welfare, and whose reconciliation would remove the mists of apprehension and uncertainty which weigh like a nightmare upon the world.

German 9. *Smaller cruisers*: British 96, German 41. *First-class destroyers*: British 61, German 18. *Submarines (built and building)*: British 83, German 36.

APPENDICES.

- I. The Madrid Convention of 1880.
- II. The German Commercial Treaty with Morocco, 1890.
- III. The Anglo-French Public Declaration of 1904.
- IV. The Secret Articles attached thereto.
- V. The Franco-Spanish Public Declaration of 1904.
- VI. The Franco-Spanish Secret Convention of 1904.
- VII. Exchange of Notes between the British and French Governments concerning the Franco-Spanish Secret Convention of 1904.
- VIII. Text of the Moorish Government's rejection of M. Delcassé's proposals of Reforms, May 27, 1905.
- IX. Text of the Sultan of Morocco's invitation to the Powers to meet in Conference, May 30, 1905.
- X. Exchange of Notes between the German and French Governments respecting Conference, July 8, 1905.
- XI. Secret Franco-Spanish Treaty, September 1, 1905.
- XII. The Act of Algeciras, and documents attached thereto, April 7, 1906.
- XIII. Text of the Franco-Spanish Note to the signatory Powers of the Act of Algeciras, December 5, 1906.
- XIV. Franco-German Declaration, February 8, 1909.
- XV. Franco-German Convention respecting Morocco, November 4, 1911.
- XVI. Exchange of Notes between the German and French Governments concerning the Franco-German Convention of November 4, 1911.
- XVII. Franco-German Convention respecting the French Congo of November 4, 1911.
- XVIII. Exchange of Notes between the German and French Governments concerning the above.

- XIX. The *Times* Paris despatch of July 19 (*Times*, July 20) introductory editorial note thereto, and Editorial of July 20, and the *Times*' Editorial of July 22, upon Mr. Lloyd George's speech.
- XX. The British and German versions of the Grey-Wolf Metternich conversation of July 21, 1911.
- XXI. The British and German versions and interpretations of the Grey-Wolf Metternich conversations of July 24 and 27; Mr. Asquith's statement in the House on July 27, and the German Chancellor's comments in the Reichstag on December 5 (1911).

APPENDIX I.

TEXT OF THE MADRID CONVENTION, JULY 3, 1880.

(The first International Conference relating to Morocco.)

ARTICLE I.

The conditions under which protection may be granted are those laid down in the British and Spanish Treaties with the Government of Morocco, and in the Convention concluded between that Government, France, and other Powers in 1863, subject to the modifications made therein by the present Convention.

ARTICLE II.

Foreign Representatives, Heads of Missions, may choose their Interpreters and employés from among subjects of Morocco or persons of other nationalities.

The persons thus protected shall not be liable to any dues, imposts, or taxes whatsoever, excepting as stipulated by Articles XII. and XIII.

ARTICLE III.

Consuls, Vice-Consuls, or Consular Agents, Heads of their respective posts, who reside in the dominions of the Sultan of Morocco, can only select one Interpreter, one soldier, and two servants from among the subjects of the Sultan, unless they should stand in need of a native Secretary.

The persons thus protected shall not be liable to any dues, imposts, or taxes whatsoever, excepting as stipulated by Articles XII. and XIII.

ARTICLE IV.

If a Representative should name a subject of the Sultan to the post of Consular Agent in a town on the coast, such Agent shall be respected and honoured, as well as his family residing under the same roof, the members of whom, as well as the Agent himself, shall not be liable to any dues, imposts, or taxes whatsoever, excepting as stipulated in Articles XII. and XIII.; but he shall not be able to protect other subjects of the Sultan beyond his own family.

He may, however, in order to the exercise of his functions, maintain a soldier under protection.

Subjects of the Sultan, who may be left in charge of Vice-Consulates shall enjoy, during the exercise of their functions, the same rights as Consular Agents who are subjects of the Sultan.

ARTICLE V.

The Government of Morocco recognizes the right (which is accorded by the Treaties) of Ministers, *Chargés d'Affaires*, and other Representatives to select the persons whom they employ, whether in their personal service or in that of their Governments, provided always that these are not Sheikhs or others in the employ of the Government of Morocco, such as soldiers of the line or cavalry, excepting *Maghaznias* employed as guards. Moreover, they may not employ any subject of Morocco under pursuit of the law.

It is understood that civil suits commenced before the protection takes place shall be terminated by the same Tribunals before which the proceedings were commenced. The execution of the sentence shall not be let or hindered. Nevertheless, the local Moroquine authority shall be careful to make instant communication of sentence delivered to the Legation Consulate, or Consular Agency to whom the protected person belongs.

In the case of ex-protected persons who shall have commenced a suit before their protection ceased, their

suit shall be tried by the Tribunal before which it was brought.

The right of protection cannot be exercised in respect of persons under prosecution for a misdemeanour or crime until they shall have been tried by the authorities of the country, and shall, if found guilty, have undergone their punishment.

ARTICLE VI.

Protection extends to the family of the person protected. His dwelling is respected.

It is understood that the family consists only of wife, the children, and such relations, being minors, who live under the same roof.

Protection is not hereditary. A single exception, already established by the Convention of 1863, and which must not be held as creating a precedent, is maintained in favour of the Benchimol family.

If, however, the Sultan of Morocco should grant another exception, each of the contracting parties shall have the right to claim a similar concession.

ARTICLE VII.

The foreign Representatives shall notify in writing to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sultan the choice they may make of an employé.

They shall furnish the said Minister every year with a list giving the names of the persons under their own protection, or under the protection of the Agents, in the dominions of the Sultan of Morocco.

This list shall be transmitted to the local authorities, who shall consider those alone who are inscribed in it to be protected persons.

ARTICLE VIII.

Consular Agents shall furnish the authority of the district in which they reside with a yearly list, certified with their seal, of the persons whom they protect. The

authority in question shall transmit this list to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in order that, if it is not conformable to the regulations, the Representatives at Tangier may be so informed.

It shall be the duty of the Consular officer to give immediate notice of any changes which may occur in the list of persons under the protection of his Consulate.

ARTICLE IX.

Servants, farmers ("fermiers"), and other native employés of native Secretaries and Interpreters do not enjoy protection. It is the same for Moroquine employés or servants of foreign subjects.

Nevertheless, the local authorities may not arrest an employé or servant of a native functionary in the employ of a Legation or Consulate, or in the employ of a foreign subject or protected person, without having given previous notice to the protecting authority.

If a Moroquine subject in the service of a foreign subject should kill any person, wound him, or violate his domicile, he shall be immediately arrested, but notice thereof shall be given without delay to the Diplomatic or Consular authority under whom he is placed.

ARTICLE X.

No change is made in the position of brokers, such as it was established by the Treaties, and the Convention of 1863, except in so far as is stipulated in the following Articles relative to taxes.

ARTICLE XI.

The right to hold property in Morocco is recognised for all foreigners. The purchase of real property ("propriétés") must be made with the previous consent of the Government, and the titles to such property shall be subject to the regulations prescribed by the laws of the country.

Any question which may arise respecting such right shall be decided according to the same law, with the appeal to the Minister for Foreign Affairs which is stipulated in the Treaties.

ARTICLE XII.

Foreigners and protected persons who are proprietors or renters of cultivated land, as well as brokers in agricultural matters, shall pay the agrarian tax. They shall furnish their Consul with an exact yearly statement of their possessions, and shall at the same time pay into his hands the amount of the tax.

Any person making a false declaration shall pay, by way of fine, double the tax which he should have properly paid for the property not declared. In case of a repetition of the offence, this fine shall be doubled.

The nature, the mode, the date, and the amount of this tax shall be fixed in a special regulation to be arranged between the Representatives of the Powers and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of His Shereefian Majesty.

ARTICLE XIII.

Foreigners, protected persons, and brokers who own beasts of burden shall pay the so-called gate tax. The amount and the method of levying this tax, which is common to foreigners and natives, shall be likewise settled by a special regulation to be arranged between the Representatives of the Powers and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of His Shereefian Majesty.

The said tax may not be augmented without a fresh agreement with the Representatives of the Powers.

ARTICLE XIV.

The mediation of Interpreters, native Secretaries, or soldiers of various Legations and Consulates, in the case of persons not placed under protection of the Legation or

Consulate, shall only be admitted when they are the bearers of a document signed by the Head of the Mission or by the Consular authorities.

ARTICLE XV.

Every Moroquine subject naturalised abroad, who shall return to Morocco, must, after a residence there equal in time to that which was legally necessary to obtain naturalisation, choose between entire submission to the laws of the Empire and the obligation of quitting Morocco, unless it is proved that the naturalisation abroad was obtained with the consent of the Government of Morocco.

Naturalisation abroad, obtained up to the present date, by Moroquine subjects, in accordance with the regulations established by the laws of each country, is secured to them with every right, without any restriction whatever.

ARTICLE XVI.

No irregular or officious protection shall be granted in future. The authorities of Morocco shall not recognise any rights of protection, whatever may be their nature, other than those which are expressly laid down in this Convention.

Nevertheless, the exercise of the customary right of protection shall be reserved to those cases alone where it is a question of rewarding signal services rendered by a subject of Morocco to a foreign Power, or for other entirely exceptional reasons. The nature of the services and the intention of rewarding them by protection shall be previously notified to the Minister for Foreign Affairs at Tangier, in order that he may, if necessary, offer any observations; the final decision shall be reserved, however, to the Government to whom the service shall have been rendered. The number of these protected persons shall not exceed twelve for each Power, which number is fixed as the maximum, unless the consent of the Sultan is obtained.

The position of the protected persons who have obtained protection in virtue of the custom henceforward to be regulated by the present stipulation shall be, without limitation of the number of the protected persons actually in this category, the same for them and for their families as that which is established for other protected persons.

ARTICLE XVII.

The right of most-favoured-nation treatment is recognised by Morocco for all the Powers represented at the Conference of Madrid.¹

ARTICLE XVIII.

The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratification shall be exchanged at Tangier with the least possible delay.

By the special consent of the High Contracting Parties the stipulations of the present Convention shall come into operation from the day of the signature at Madrid.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Convention, and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms.

Done at Madrid, in thirteen copies, the third day of July, one thousand eight hundred and eighty.

(L.S.) L.S. Sackville West.
(L.S.) G.E. Solms.
(L.S.) E. Ludolf.
(L.S.) Anspach.
(L.S.) A. Cánovas Del Castillo.
(L.S.) Lucius Fairchild.
(L.S.) Jaurès.
(L.S.) J. Greppi.
(L.S.) Sid Mohammed Vargas.
(L.S.) Heldewier.
(L.S.) Casal Ribeiro.
(L.S.) H. Akerman.

¹ This is, of course, the most important provision in the Act.

APPENDIX II.

THE GERMAN COMMERCIAL TREATY WITH MOROCCO.
JUNE 1, 1890.

ARTICLE I.

FRIENDSHIP will always prevail, without anything being able to alter it, between His Majesty the German Emperor and His Majesty the Sultan of Morocco, as between their Empires and their subjects. In consequence, commerce will be carried on without privileges and will be free for the two contracting parties. It is, moreover, agreed that the subjects of the two parties will have the same rights and advantages as those which exist or may come to exist as regards subjects of the most favoured nation. The same stipulations relating to rights and advantages will regulate the position of the subjects of His Shereefian Majesty with foreign Powers.

ARTICLE II.

Germany has a right to import into Morocco all goods and objects, to whatever nationality may belong the importing ships; exception is made of tobacco and other herbs which are smoked, such as opium and analogous products. These articles, together with other prohibited objects, like powder, saltpetre, sulphur, lead, all instruments of war and weapons of whatever kind, remain prohibited. His Majesty the Emperor of Morocco accepts by this Treaty that the customs dues levied upon the products or merchandise imported by German subjects into ports of his Empire shall not exceed ten per cent. *ad valorem*. The value will be estimated in silver, and in accord with the gross current price of sale at the port of discharge. The Germans have the right to import all sorts of merchandise and provisions with the exception of the articles specified above in this same Article. The custom

dues they will have to pay will not exceed those imposed on Moroccan subjects and upon those of the most favoured nation. If after having landed goods in a Moroccan port and having paid duty thereon, a German wishes to re-ship them for another Moroccan port, the duty he has already paid will remain to his credit and he will not be called upon to pay any other duty either on shipment or discharge. But these goods must be *viséd* by the Custom-house officials in the port whence they have been re-shipped, showing that the dues they were liable to pay have been imposed.

ARTICLE III.

The desire of His Shereefian Majesty to increase and encourage commerce in his fortunate States has induced him to fix the customs duties to be imposed on the merchandise detailed below at the regular tariff arranged for each article.

(Here follows tariff of dues applied to various merchandise.)

ARTICLE IV.

German subjects are entitled to load in all the ports and places in Morocco on ships of whatever nationality all the products of the land of Morocco and Moroccan merchandise enumerated in the above-mentioned table, provided the custom dues levied thereon are paid. German subjects will have the right to buy themselves or through their brokers in all the States of His Shereefian Majesty the articles mentioned in the table free from any embarrassment or hindrance; no subject or official of His Majesty the Sultan must create difficulties for the Germans in their trade. If a German merchant loads grain in a Moroccan port consigned to another port in the same country, he will have to pay on the shipment the same duties that he would have to pay if he were exporting abroad, according to the tariff in the table.

ARTICLE V.

The Madrid Convention remains in vigour in all its clauses.

ARTICLE VI.

If in the future the two contracting parties should wish to introduce improvements to the advantage of their subjects and their Empires, in order to facilitate and to extend commercial relations, it is understood that at any time at the expiration of a period of five years dating from the ratification of the present Treaty either party can demand its revision. This Treaty will be applied and will remain in vigour until the moment of revision and the conclusion of the new Treaty.

ARTICLE VII.

This Treaty will be printed and signed by His Majesty the Emperor of Morocco and His Majesty the German Emperor. The revision will be made in the locality fixed by His Shereefian Majesty. After the exchange of ratifications all the stipulations of this commercial Treaty will become immediately applicable, in strength of which the delegates of the two glorious Empires have fixed their signatures to this Treaty.

Fez, June 1, 1890.

(This Treaty, as mentioned in Chapter IV., the German Government submitted to the Powers before ratifying.)

APPENDIX III.

PUBLIC DECLARATION BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM
AND FRANCE RESPECTING EGYPT AND MOROCCO,
APRIL 8, 1904.

ARTICLE I.

HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT declare that they have no intention of altering the political status of Egypt.

The Government of the French Republic, for their part, declare that they will not obstruct the action of Great Britain in that country by asking that a limit of time be fixed for the British occupation or in any other manner, and that they give their assent to the draft Khedivial Decree annexed to the present arrangement, containing the guarantee considered necessary for the protection of the interests of the Egyptian bondholders, on the condition that, after its promulgation, it cannot be modified in any way without the consent of the Powers signatory of the Convention of London, 1885.

It is agreed that the post of Director-General of Antiquities in Egypt shall continue, as in the past, to be entrusted to a French *savant*.

The French schools in Egypt shall continue to enjoy the same liberty as in the past.

ARTICLE II.

The Government of the French Republic declare that they have no intention of altering the political status of Morocco.

His Britannic Majesty's Government, for their part, recognise that it appertains to France, more particularly as a Power whose dominions are conterminous for a great distance with those of Morocco, to preserve order in that country, and to provide assistance for the purpose of all administrative, economic, financial, and military reforms which it may require.

They declare that they will not obstruct the action taken by France for this purpose, provided that such action shall leave intact the rights which Great Britain, in virtue of treaties, conventions, and usage, enjoys in Morocco, including the right of coasting trade between the ports of Morocco, enjoyed by British vessels since 1901.

ARTICLE III.

His Britannic Majesty's Government, for their part, will respect the rights which France, in virtue of treaties,

conventions, and usage, enjoys in Egypt, including the right of coasting trade between Egyptian ports accorded to French vessels.

ARTICLE IV.

The two Governments being equally attached to the principle of commercial liberty both in Egypt and Morocco, declare that they will not, in those countries, countenance any inequality either in the imposition of customs, duties, or other taxes, or of railway transport charges.

The trade of both nations with Morocco and with Egypt shall enjoy the same treatment in transit through the French and British possessions in Africa. An agreement between the two Governments shall settle the conditions of such transit and shall determine the points of entry.

The mutual engagement shall be binding for a period of thirty years. Unless this stipulation is expressly denounced at least one year in advance, the period shall be extended for five years at a time.

Nevertheless, the Government of the French Republic reserve to themselves in Morocco, and His Britannic Majesty's Government reserve to themselves in Egypt, the right to see that the concessions for roads, railways, ports, etc., are only granted on such conditions as will maintain intact the authority of the State over these great undertakings of public interest.

ARTICLE V.

His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they will use their influence in order that the French officials now in the Egyptian service may not be placed under conditions less advantageous than those applying to the British officials in the same service.

The Government of the French Republic, for their part, would make no objection to the application of analogous conditions to British officials now in the Moorish service.

ARTICLE VI.

In order to ensure the free passage of the Suez Canal, His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they adhere to the stipulations of the Treaty of the 29th October, 1888, and that they agree to their being put in force. The free passage of the canal being thus guaranteed, the execution of the last sentence of paragraph 1 as well as of paragraph 2 of Article VIII. of that Treaty will remain in abeyance.

ARTICLE VII.

In order to secure the free passage of the Straits of Gibraltar, the two Governments agree not to permit the erection of any fortifications or strategic works on that portion of the coast of Morocco comprised between, but not including, Melilla and the heights which command the right bank of the river Sebou.

This condition does not, however, apply to the places at present in the occupation of Spain on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean.

ARTICLE VIII.

The two Governments, inspired by their feeling of sincere friendship for Spain, take into special consideration the interests which that country derives from her geographical position and from her territorial possessions on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean. In regard to these interests the French Government will come to an understanding with the Spanish Government.

The agreement which may be come to on the subject between France and Spain shall be communicated to His Britannic Majesty's Government.

ARTICLE IX.

The two Governments agree to afford to one another their diplomatic support, in order to obtain the execution

of the clauses of the present Declaration regarding Egypt and Morocco.

In witness whereof his Excellency the Ambassador of the French Republic at the Court of His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty's principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, duly authorised for that purpose, have signed the present Declaration and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at London, in duplicate, the 8th day of April, 1904.

APPENDIX IV.

SECRET ARTICLES ATTACHED TO THE PUBLIC DECLARATION
OF APRIL 8, 1904, PUBLISHED FOR THE FIRST TIME,
IN PART, BY *LE TEMPS*, IN NOVEMBER, 1911.

ARTICLE I.

IN the event of either Government finding themselves constrained, by the force of circumstances, to modify the policy in respect to Egypt or Morocco, the engagements which they have undertaken towards each other by Articles IV., VI., and VII. of the Declaration of to-day's date would remain intact.

ARTICLE II.

His Britannic Majesty's Government have no present intention of proposing to the Powers any changes in the system of the capitulations, or in the judicial organisation of Egypt.

In the event of their considering it desirable to introduce in Egypt reforms tending to assimilate the Egyptian legislative system to that in force in other civilised countries, the Government of the French Republic will

not refuse to entertain any such proposals, on the understanding that His Britannic Majesty's Government will agree to entertain the suggestions that the Government of the French Republic may have to make to them with a view of introducing similar reforms in Morocco.

ARTICLE III.

The two Governments agree that a certain extent of Moorish territory adjacent to Melilla, Ceuta, and other *présides* should, whenever the Sultan ceases to exercise authority over it, come within the sphere of influence of Spain, and that the administration of the coast from Melilla as far as, but not including, the heights on the right bank of the Sebou shall be entrusted to Spain.

Nevertheless, Spain would previously have to give her formal assent to the provisions of Articles IV. and VII. of the Declaration of to-day's date, and undertake to carry them out.

She would also have to undertake not to alienate the whole, or a part, of the territories placed under her authority or in her sphere of influence.

ARTICLE IV.

If Spain, when invited to assent to the provisions of the preceding article, should think proper to decline, the arrangement between France and Great Britain, as embodied in the Declaration of to-day's date, would be none the less at once applicable.

ARTICLE V.

Should the consent of the other Powers to the draft Decree mentioned in Article I. of the Declaration of to-day's date not be obtained, the Government of the French Republic will not oppose the repayment at par of the Guaranteed, Privileged, and Unified Debts after the 15th July, 1910.

Done at London, in duplicate, the 8th day of April, 1904.

APPENDIX V.

FRANCO-SPANISH PUBLIC DECLARATION [OCTOBER 3, 1904].

THE Government of the French Republic and the Government of His Majesty the King of Spain, having agreed to fix the extent of their rights and the guarantee of their interests which flow, for France from her Algerian possessions, and for Spain from her possessions on the coast of Morocco, and the Government of His Majesty the King of Spain having in consequence adhered to the Anglo-French Declaration of the 8th April, 1904, respecting Morocco and Egypt, which was communicated to them by the Government of the French Republic, declare that they remain firmly attached to the integrity of the Moorish Empire under the sovereignty of the Sultan.

In faith of which the undersigned, His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic and His Excellency the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King of Spain, accredited to the President of the French Republic, duly authorised for this purpose, have drawn up the present Declaration, to which they have affixed their seals.

Done in duplicate in Paris, on the 3rd October, 1904.

APPENDIX VI.

FRANCO-SPANISH SECRET CONVENTION [OCTOBER 3, 1904].

(First Published by *Le Matin*, November, 1911.)

THE President of the French Republic and His Majesty the King of Spain, being desirous of fixing the extent of their rights and the guarantee of their interests which flow, for France from her Algerian possessions and for Spain from her possessions on the coast of Morocco, have decided to conclude a convention, and have, for that

purpose, nominated as their plenipotentiaries, that is to say :

The President of the French Republic, His Excellency M. Th. Delcassé, Deputy, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, etc., and

His Majesty the King of Spain, His Excellency M. de Leon y Castillo, Marquis del Muni, his Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary accredited to the President of the French Republic ;

Who, having communicated to one another their respective full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon and concluded the following articles :—

ARTICLE I.

Spain adheres, by the terms of the present convention, to the Anglo-French Declaration of the 8th April, 1904, respecting Egypt and Morocco.

ARTICLE II.

The territory lying to the west and north of the line hereinafter laid down forms the sphere of influence which falls to Spain by virtue of her possessions on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean.

In this zone the same right of action is reserved to Spain as that which is reserved to France by the second paragraph of Article II. of the Declaration of the 8th April, 1904, respecting Egypt and Morocco.

In view, however, of present difficulties, and of the interest which both parties have in overcoming them, Spain declares that she will not exercise this right of action except with the consent of France during the first period during which the present convention is in force, a period which shall not exceed fifteen years from the date of the signature of the convention.

France, on her part, being desirous that the rights and interests reserved to Spain by the present convention shall always be respected, will, during the same period, inform the Government of the King previously of the

advice she may tender to the Sultan of Morocco so far as the Spanish sphere of influence is concerned.

When this first period has expired, and as long as the *status quo* is maintained, France will not exercise her right of action with the Moorish Government so far as the Spanish sphere of influence is concerned, except in agreement with the Spanish Government.

During the first period the Government of the French Republic will do all they can to ensure that in two of the customs ports of the territory defined below the delegate of the general representative of the bondholders of the Moroccan loan of the 12th July, 1904, shall be of Spanish nationality.

The line mentioned above shall run from the point where the Muluya flows into the Mediterranean, following the *thalweg* of this river as far as the line which forms the crest of the heights nearest to the left bank of the Wad Defla. From this point, and without in any case cutting the course of the Muluya, the line of demarcation shall run as directly as possible to the watershed which separates the basins of the Muluya and the Wad Inawen from that of the Wad Kert; it shall then run in a westerly direction, following the watershed separating the basins of the Wad Inawen and the Wad Sebu, and those of the Wad Kert and the Wad Wergha, and so reach the Djebel Mulai Bou Chta by the northernmost crest. The line shall then run towards the north, keeping at a distance of at least 25 kilometres to the east of the road from Fez to Alcazar via Wazan as far as the meeting with the Wad Loukkos or Wad-le-Kous. The line shall then follow the *thalweg* of this river to a distance of 5 kilometres below the point where the river crosses the above-mentioned road from Alcazar via Wazan. From this point the line shall run as directly as possible to the Atlantic Coast above the Ez Zerga lagoon.

This delimitation is in accordance with the line traced on map No. 1 annexed to the present convention.

ARTICLE III.

In case the continuance of the political status of Morocco and of the Shereefian Government should become impossible, or if, owing to the weakness of that Government and to its continued inability to uphold law and order or to any other cause the existence of which is acknowledged by both parties, the *status quo* can no longer be maintained, Spain may freely exercise her right of action in the territory defined in the preceding article, which henceforward constitutes her sphere of influence.

ARTICLE IV.

The Moorish Government having, by Article VII. of the treaty of the 26th April, 1860, ceded to Spain an establishment at Santa Cruz de Mar Pequeña (Ifni), it is agreed that the territory of that establishment shall not extend beyond the course of the Wad Tazerualt from its source to its confluence with the Wad Mesa, nor beyond the course of the Wad Mesa from its confluence with the Wad Tazerualt to the sea, in accordance with Map 2 annexed to the present convention.

ARTICLE V.

In order to complete the delimitation set out in Article I. of the convention of the 27th June, 1900, it is understood that the line of demarcation between the French and Spanish spheres of influence shall start from the intersection of the meridian $14^{\circ} 20'$ west of Paris with the 26th degree of north latitude, which it shall follow in an easterly direction as far as its intersection with the 11th meridian west of Paris. The line shall follow this meridian as far as the Wad Draa, then the *thalweg* of the Wad Draa as far as its meeting with the 10th meridian west of Paris, and lastly the 10th meridian west of Paris as far as the watershed between the basins of the Wad Draa and the Wad Sus, and then follow in a westerly direction the watershed between the basins of the Wad Draa and the Wad Sus, then between the basins bordering

the Wad Mesa and the Wad Noun as far as the nearest point to the source of the Wad Tazerualt.

This delimitation is in accordance with the line traced on map 2 already referred to and annexed to the present convention.

ARTICLE VI.

Articles IV. and V. shall come into force at the same time as Article II. of the present convention.

The Government of the French Republic agree, however, that Spain may establish herself at any moment in the territory defined in Article IV., on condition that an understanding is previously arrived at with the Sultan.

In like manner the Government of the French Republic acknowledge that Spain has henceforward full liberty of action in regard to the territory comprised between the 26° and 27° 40' north latitude and the 11th meridian west of Paris, which are outside the limits of Morocco.

ARTICLE VII.

Spain undertakes not to alienate or to cede in any form, even temporarily, the whole or any part of the territories defined in Articles II., IV., and V. of the present convention.

ARTICLE VIII.

If, in carrying out Articles II., IV., and V. of the present convention one of the contracting parties is obliged to take military action, the other contracting party shall at once be informed. In no case shall the assistance of a foreign Power be invoked.

ARTICLE IX.

The town of Tangier shall keep the special character which it derives from the presence of the diplomatic body and its municipal and sanitary institutions.

ARTICLE X.

So long as the present political status lasts, schemes for public works, railways, roads, and canals running from some point in Morocco into the territory defined in Article II., or *vice versâ*, shall be executed by such companies as may be formed by Frenchmen and Spaniards.

In the same way, Frenchmen and Spaniards in Morocco shall be free jointly to form companies for the purpose of working mines, quarries, and economic undertakings in general.

ARTICLE XI.

The Spanish schools and foundations at present existing in Morocco shall be respected. The circulation of Spanish currency shall not be stopped or hindered. Spaniards shall continue to enjoy in Morocco the rights which they possess by virtue of treaties, conventions, and custom, including the right of navigation and fishing in the waters and harbours of Morocco.

ARTICLE XII.

The French shall in the territories defined in Articles II., IV., and V. of the present convention, enjoy the same rights as those which are conceded in the preceding article to Spaniards in the rest of Morocco.

ARTICLE XIII.

In the event of the Moorish Government prohibiting the sale of arms and ammunition within their territory, the two contracting Powers engage to take the necessary measures in their African possessions to prevent the smuggling of arms and ammunition into Morocco.

ARTICLE XIV.

It is understood that the zone mentioned in the first paragraph of Article VII. of the Anglo-French Declaration of the 8th April, 1904, respecting Morocco and Egypt,

begins on the coast 30 kilometres to the south east of Melilla.

ARTICLE XV.

In the event of the mutual engagement set forth in Article IV. of the Anglo-French Declaration respecting Egypt and Morocco being denounced in accordance with the third paragraph of the same article, the French and Spanish Governments shall consult together with a view to establish an economic system which shall take special account of their mutual interests.

ARTICLE XVI.

The present convention shall be published when the two Governments decide, by mutual consent, that there is no objection to such publication.

In any case, the convention may be published by either Government on the expiration of the first period during which it is in force, the length of this period being fixed in paragraph III. of Article II.

In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the present convention and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate at Paris, the 3rd October, 1904.

APPENDIX VII.

LETTER FROM THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR TO THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE COMMUNICATING THE TEXTS OF THE FRANCO-SPANISH PUBLIC DECLARATION AND SECRET CONVENTION RESPECTING MOROCCO.

M. Cambon to the Marquess of Lansdowne.

DEAR LORD LANSDOWNE,

I AM instructed to communicate to you the arrangements which have just been concluded between France and Spain on the subject of Morocco. They were

signed on the 3rd inst. by our Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Spanish Ambassador at Paris; they consist of a general Declaration, which will be made public, and of a Convention, which is to be kept secret.

M. Delcassé, in instructing me to forward to you the text of this agreement, in accordance with Article 8 of our Declaration of the 8th April, 1904, pointed out the confidential character of this communication, and instructed me to request you to be good enough to keep the Convention entirely secret.

I have, etc.,

PAUL CAMBON.

LETTER FROM THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE TO THE
FRENCH AMBASSADOR ACKNOWLEDGING THE RECEIPT
OF THE TEXTS OF THE FRANCO-SPANISH PUBLIC
DECLARATION AND SECRET CONVENTION RESPECTING
MOROCCO.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to M. Cambon.

DEAR M. CAMBON,

I HAVE had the pleasure of receiving your letter of to-day's date, covering the two documents which you had been instructed to communicate to me in accordance with Article 8 of the "Declaration respecting Egypt and Morocco" of the 8th April last.

I need not say that the confidential character of the "Convention" entered into by the President of the French Republic and the King of Spain in regard to French and Spanish interests in Morocco is fully recognised by us, and will be duly respected. The shorter paper, or "Declaration" made by the two Governments is, I understand, public property.

With best thanks, I am, etc.,

LANSDOWNE.

APPENDIX VIII.

TEXT OF THE MOORISH GOVERNMENT'S REJECTION OF
M. DELCASSÉ'S PROPOSALS OF REFORMS, MAY 27, 1905.

"THE Moorish Government has already communicated to your Excellency¹ that the population of Morocco made it a condition of the acceptance of military reforms that the Powers who were signatories of the Madrid Convention should share in the negotiations regarding these reforms. We have submitted to His Shereefian Majesty the reply which the French Government vouchsafed, and from our answer your Government should have perceived that we did not desire, as they pretended to be the case, to bring about any alteration in the relations which result from the fact that France and Morocco are neighbours, when we suggested that a third Power should act as mediator in carrying out the reforms. We have submitted to His Shereefian Majesty your Excellency's demands that the Maghzen² should reconsider their position, which, you said, was dictated by want of confidence in the French Government.

"After mature consideration his Shereefian Majesty has directed me to reply to you that he has never forgotten that Algeria is a neighbouring country, and that he, like his ancestors, has always desired to have friendly relations with the French Government, to have confidence in them, and to give every consideration to their rights as the neighbours of Morocco. But when the negotiations carried on with your Excellency were submitted to the assembly of Moorish notables, they most decisively declared that they would allow no reform, either civil or military, to be carried out by any one foreign Power, if such reforms had not been previously discussed by an

¹ The French representative at Fez.

² Moorish Government.

international conference at Tangier,¹ at which the Powers who were signatories of the Madrid Convention should be represented; and that it should be the duty of this conference to discuss how these reforms should be introduced, and that a unanimous decision should be come to on the question; and also that the Powers should agree that regulations regarding the introduction of reforms should be rigorously kept to; and, in order to avoid further difficulties, that these regulations should not ever be transgressed.

"His Shereefian Majesty is unable to act against the will of his people especially regarding questions of such vital importance in which the people of Morocco certainly have a right to be heard. It has often been made clear that Foreign Powers desire to see reforms introduced into Morocco with which treaty rights are so closely connected. The decision of the notables can in no way alter the friendly relations existing between the two countries, and, therefore, the Shereefian representative at Tangier has received orders to invite through their representatives at Tangier the Powers who were signatories of the Madrid Convention to summon a conference to discuss with the Moorish Government the reforms which His Shereefian Majesty desires to see introduced into Morocco."

(Signed) ABDUL KARIM BEN SLIMEN.

May 27th, 1905.

APPENDIX IX.

THE SULTAN'S INVITATION TO THE POWERS TO MEET IN CONFERENCE.

"His Shereefian Majesty commands me to invite all the honourable Powers to hold a Tangier Conference in

¹ Tangier was suggested as the place where the Conference should take place. Germany supported that view. France opposed it. It was ultimately held at Algeciras in Spain.

which their honourable representatives and the representatives of the Moorish Government shall take part, in order to treat of the manner of putting into execution reforms which His Shereefian Majesty has decided to introduce into his Empire and the taking into consideration of affairs of the moment, and to consider also the question of the expenses which the introduction of these reforms will necessitate. We invite you, therefore, to inform your Government of all the preceding words and to request authorisation to take part in the said Conference. We ask you to let us have an answer when you have received your reply."

Given at Court of Fez. May 30th, 1905.

APPENDIX X.

FRANCO-GERMAN EXCHANGE OF NOTES AND DECLARATION, JULY 8, 1905.

EXCHANGE OF NOTES.

M. Rouvier, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Prince Radolin, German Ambassador, Paris, July 8, 1905.

THE Government of the Republic has acquired the conviction from the conversations which have taken place between the representatives of both countries in Paris and Berlin that the Imperial Government would not pursue in the Conference proposed by the Sultan of Morocco any course which would compromise the legitimate hopes of France in that country, which would be contrary to the rights of France resulting from her Treaties or Arrangements, which rights are in harmony with the following principles :—Sovereignty and independence of the Sultan, integrity of his Empire, economic liberty without any inequality, utility of police reforms and financial reforms, the introduction of which would be

settled for a short period by international agreement, recognition of the situation created for France in Morocco by the contiguity of a vast extent of territory of Algeria and the Shereefian Empire, and the special relations resulting therefrom between the two adjacent countries, as well as by the special interest for France, due to the fact that order should reign in the Shereefian Empire. Consequently the Government of the Republic abandons its original objections to the Conference, and agrees to take part in it.

Prince Radolin, German Ambassador in Paris, to M. Rouvier, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Paris, July 8, 1905.

The Government of the Republic having agreed to take part in the conference proposed by the Sultan of Morocco, the Imperial Government has commissioned me to confirm to you the verbal declaration according to which it will pursue at the conference no course compromising the legitimate interests of France in Morocco or contrary to the rights of France resulting from her treaties or arrangements, and in harmony with the following principles:—Sovereignty and independence of the Sultan, the integrity of his Empire, economic liberty without any inequality, utility of police reforms and financial reforms, the introduction of which would be settled for a short period by international agreement, recognition of the situation created for France in Morocco by the contiguity of a vast extent of territory of Algeria and the Shereefian Empire and by the special relations resulting therefrom between the two adjacent countries as well as by the special interest of France due to this fact that order should reign in the Shereefian Empire.

DECLARATION.

The Government of the Republic and the German Government agree first to recall to Tangier simultaneously their missions now at Fez when once the Conference has

been convened. Secondly to give to the Sultan of Morocco advice through their representatives in common agreement with a view to the fixing of the programme which he will propose to the Conference, on the bases indicated in the letters exchanged under date of July 8, 1905 between the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs and the German ambassador in Paris.

Done in Paris on July 8, 1905.

APPENDIX XI.

THE SECRET FRANCO-SPANISH TREATY OF 1ST SEPTEMBER, 1905.

(This Secret Treaty was signed in anticipation of the Conference of Algeciras.)

ARTICLE I.

THE military police bodies, which shall be organised as soon as possible in the ports of the Shereefian Empire, must be composed of native troops. France, in accord with Spain, admits that all the chiefs, officers and non-commissioned officers who will be invested with the instruction and command of the said troops in the ports of Tetuan and Larash must belong to the Spanish nation; on its side Spain, in accord with France, admits that all the chiefs, officers and non-commissioned officers who will be invested with the instruction and the command of the police bodies in the ports of Rabat and Casablanca must be of French nationality. As regards the port of Tangier, in virtue of the stipulations of Article IX. of the Treaty of 3rd October, 1904, it is understood that the police of this town will be confided to a Franco-Spanish corps commanded by a Frenchman. This *régime* will be subject to revision upon the expiry of a period of fifteen years foreseen in the Convention of 3rd October, 1904.

ARTICLE II.

Conformably with the spirit of Article XVIII. of the said Treaty, and in order to insure its execution, it is understood that on land the supervision and the repression of the smuggling of arms will remain under the charge of France in the sphere of her Algerian frontier, and under the charge of Spain in the sphere of all her African places and possessions. The supervision and repression of smuggling by sea will be confided to a naval division of the two Powers who will agree upon the units. This division will be alternately commanded for a year by a naval officer of one of the two Powers and following year by a naval officer of the other Power. The command will be exercised during the first year by a French naval officer. The two Governments will establish by common accord the rules to be observed for the repression of this smuggling trade when the right of visitation is exercised, in the event of the exercise of this right becoming indispensable to insure the efficacy of repression.

ARTICLE III.

In order to insure on both sides in the most friendly sense the exact interpretations of Articles X., XI. and XII. of the Convention of 3rd October, 1904, it remains understood:

(a) That all enterprises in connection with public works, railways, roads and canals, the exploitation of mines and quarries and all other enterprises of a commercial or industrial character on the territory of Morocco may be carried out by groups composed of Spaniards and Frenchmen. The two Governments mutually undertake to favour by the means of which they dispose the founding of these mixed enterprises on a basis of equality of rights of the participants in the proportion of the capital employed. Upon the expiry of the delay of fifteen years, foreseen by the Convention of 3rd October, 1904, the two high contracting parties will be able to carry out the public works referred to in the preceding paragraph in

conformity with the rules indicated therein in their respective zones of influence.

(b) Spaniards and Frenchmen, together with their establishments and schools already existing in the Empire of Morocco, will be respected; in any case they will enjoy for ever in Morocco in the exercise of their provisions and the execution of their commercial and industrial operations, existing or projected, the same rights and privileges in such a way that the juridical position of the subjects and participants of each nation will be constantly the same. The merchandise of the two countries will enjoy an identical treatment with regard to their import, circulation and sale in the Empire. The two high contracting parties will employ every pacific means in their power and will lend themselves mutual assistance with the Sultan and the Moorish Government, in order to prevent that now or in the future this clause should be modified by the Moroccan authorities through the establishment of different rules as regards the juridical condition of the persons and the conditions to which the merchandise of the two nations will be subject.

(c) Spanish silver coinage will continue to be freely imported as heretofore in the Empire, and neither directly nor indirectly, nor as the result of an existing or potential measure, either the medium of import, the circulation or the current value of the said coinage shall be affected. The two Governments respectively undertake not to permit obstacles directly or indirectly to be created as concerns the preceding paragraph through commercial or industrial organisations instituted in the Moroccan Empire by their respective subjects and to employ all the pacific means of which either disposes in order to secure that the participation in the capital and the work of all public enterprises shall be offered to the subjects of both nations.

(d) The Spanish and French Governments have agreed as to the necessity of creating in Morocco an establishment for credit under the name of the State Bank or any other name, establishment whose presidency will be reserved for France on account of the greater number

of shares subscribed by her, and also agree upon the following points:—

(1) Participation in profit-bearing shares of all kinds to be reserved to Spain will be in excess of the portion of each of the other Powers taken separately, France excepted.

(2) The Spanish *personnel* in the administration of this establishment and its branches will be proportionate to the capital subscribed by Spain.

(3) This establishment may take charge of works of public services in the Empire of Morocco with the assent of or by virtue of an accord with the Sultan. It can carry them out directly or transfer their execution to other groups or enterprises. Nevertheless, as regards the execution of all these works and public services, the stipulations of (1) and (2) above stated shall be observed.

(4) The Spanish and the French Governments will increase by common agreement the existing number of Spanish subjects delegated to the services of the Customs of the Empire, re-organised as a guarantee for the last loan contracted by the Sultan with the French banks, loan in which is absorbed the loan contracted previously by His Shereefian Majesty with the Spanish banks.

ARTICLE IV.

The two Powers undertake to observe this accord even in a case where the stipulations of Article XVII. of the Madrid Convention of 1880 might be extended to all economic and financial questions. They will attempt by their constant pacific action with the Sultan of Morocco and the Moorish Government to insure the loyal accomplishment of all that is stipulated in the present accord. Moreover, Spain has formally decided to endorse wholly French action in the course of the deliberations of the projected Conference, and France agreeing to act in the same manner towards Spain, it is understood between the two Governments that they will mutually assist each other and will proceed in accord in the said deliberations as regards the different objects of the present accord.

Finally, they undertake to assist one another in the most pacific manner on all general questions concerning Morocco as the cordial and friendly understanding which exists between them in regard to the affairs of the Shereefian Empire implies.

(This secret Treaty was not published in the White Book, which contained the secret Franco-Spanish Convention of 3rd October, 1904).

APPENDIX XII.

GENERAL ACT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE AT ALGECIRAS.

In the name of God Almighty!

HIS MAJESTY THE GERMAN EMPEROR, King of Prussia, in the name of the German Empire; His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia, etc., and Apostolic King of Hungary; His Majesty the King of the Belgians; His Majesty the King of Spain; the President of the United States of America; the President of the French Republic; His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India; His Majesty the King of Italy; His Majesty the Sultan of Morocco; Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands; His Majesty the King of Portugal and the Algarves, etc.; His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias; His Majesty the King of Sweden; inspired by the interest which attaches to the reign of order, peace, and prosperity in Morocco, and having recognised that this desirable end could only be attained by means of the introduction of reforms based upon the threefold principle of the sovereignty and independence of His Majesty the Sultan, the integrity of his dominions, and economic liberty without any inequality, have resolved, on the invitation which has been addressed to them by His Shereefian Majesty, to assemble

a Conference at Algeciras, in order to arrive at an understanding respecting the said reforms, as well as to examine the means of providing the resources necessary for their application, and have named as their Delegates Plenipotentiary, that is to say :—

His Majesty the German Emperor, King of Prussia, in the name of the German Empire; Joseph de Radowitz, his Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to His Catholic Majesty; and Christian, Count of Tattenbach, his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to His Most Faithful Majesty;

His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia, etc., and Apostolic King of Hungary; Rudolf, Count of Weisersheimb, his Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to His Catholic Majesty; and Leopold, Count Bolesta-Koziebrodzki, his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Morocco;

His Majesty the King of the Belgians; Maurice, Baron Joostens, his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to his Catholic Majesty; and Conrad, Count of Buisseret-Steenbecque de Blarenghien, his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Morocco;

His Majesty the King of Spain; Don Juan Manuel Sánchez y Gutiérrez de Castro, Duke of Almodóvar del Rio, His Minister of State; and Don Juan Pérez-Caballero y Ferrer, his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the King of the Belgians;

The President of the United States of America; Mr. Henry White, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to His Majesty the King of Italy; and Mr. Samuel R. Gummeré, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to Morocco;

The President of the French Republic; M. Paul Révoil, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the French Republic to the Swiss Confederation; and M. Eugène Regnault, Minister Plenipotentiary;

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India; Sir Arthur Nicholson,

his Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias;

His Majesty the King of Italy; Emile, Marquis Visconti Venosta, Knight of the Order of the Most Holy Annunciation; and Signor Julio Malmusi, his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Morocco;

His Majesty the Sultan of Morocco; El Hadj Mohamed Ben-el-Arbi Et-Torres, his Delegate at Tangier and Ambassador Extraordinary; El Hadj Mohamed Ben-Abdes-Selam El Mokri, his Minister of Expenditure; El Hadj Mohamed Es-Seffar; and Sid Abd-er-Rahman Ben Nis;

Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands; Jonkheer Hannibal Testa, her Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to His Catholic Majesty;

His Majesty the King of Portugal and the Algarves, etc.; Antoine, Count de Tovar, his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to His Catholic Majesty; François-Robert, Count de Martens Ferrão, Peer of the Kingdom, his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Morocco;

His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias; Arthur, Count Cassini, his Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to His Catholic Majesty; and Basil de Bacheracht, his Minister to Morocco;

His Majesty the King of Sweden; Robert Sager, his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to His Catholic Majesty and to His Most Faithful Majesty;

Who, furnished with full powers which have been found in good and due form, have, in conformity with the programme upon which His Shereefian Majesty and the Powers have agreed, successively discussed and adopted—

I. A Declaration relative to the organisation of the police;

II. Regulations concerning the detection and suppression of the illicit trade in arms;

III. An Act of Concession for a Moorish State Bank;

IV. A Declaration concerning an improved yield of the taxes and the creation of new sources of revenue;

V. Regulations respecting the Customs of the Empire and the suppression of fraud and smuggling;

VI. A Declaration relative to the public services and public works; and, having determined that these different documents might usefully be co-ordinated in a single instrument, have united them in a General Act consisting of the following Articles:—

CHAPTER I.—*Declaration relative to the Organisation of the Police.*

ARTICLE I.

The Conference, called by His Majesty the Sultan to pronounce on the measures necessary for the organisation of the police, declares that the measures to be taken are as follows:—

ARTICLE II.

The police shall be under the sovereign authority of His Majesty the Sultan. It shall be recruited by the Makhzen from among Moorish Mussulmans, commanded by Moorish Kaïds, and distributed in the eight ports open to commerce.

ARTICLE III.

In order to assist the Sultan in the organisation of this police, Spanish officers and non-commissioned officers acting as instructors, and French officers and non-commissioned officers acting as instructors, shall be placed at his disposal by their respective Governments, which shall submit their nominations for the approval of His Shereefian Majesty. A contract drawn between the Makhzen and the instructors in accordance with the regulations contemplated by Article IV., shall determine the conditions of their engagement and fix their pay, which shall not be less than double the pay corresponding to the rank of each officer or non-commissioned officer. They shall be paid, in addition, house allowance, varying according to the locality. Suitable quarters shall be placed at their disposal by the Makhzen, who shall likewise provide the necessary mounts and forage.

The Governments of the countries to which the instructors respectively belong reserve the right to recall them, and to replace them by others approved of and engaged on the same conditions.

ARTICLE IV.

These officers and non-commissioned officers shall, for a period of five years from the date of the ratification of the Act of the Conference, give their services to the organization of the Shereefian police forces. They shall be responsible for the instruction and discipline of those forces in accordance with the regulations to be drawn up on the subject; they shall likewise see that the men enrolled are fit for military service. Generally, they shall superintend the administration of the force and the issue of pay, which shall be in the hands of the Amin, assisted by the instructor acting as accounting officer. They shall give technical assistance to the Moorish authorities invested with the command of these forces, in the exercise of that command.

Regulations for the proper working of the recruiting, discipline, instructions, and administration of the police force shall be drawn up by common agreement between the Shereefian Minister of War or his delegate, the Inspector referred to in Article VII., and the French and Spanish instructors of the highest rank.

The regulations shall be submitted to the Diplomatic Body at Tangier, which shall formulate its opinion within one month. On the expiration of such period the regulations shall come into force.

ARTICLE V.

The total strength of the whole effective police force shall not exceed 2,500 men, nor be less than 2,000. It shall be distributed according to the importance of the ports, in detachments varying from 150 to 600 men. The number of Spanish and French officers shall be from 16 to 20; that of the Spanish and French non-commissioned officers, from 30 to 40.

ARTICLE VI.

The funds necessary for the maintenance and payment of the men and of the officers and non-commissioned officers acting as instructors shall be advanced to the Shereefian Treasury by the State Bank, within the limits of the annual budget assigned to the police, which shall not exceed 2,500,000 pesetas for a strength of 2,500 men.

ARTICLE VII.

The working of the police shall, during the same period of five years, be subject to a general inspection, which shall be intrusted by His Shereefian Majesty to a superior officer of the Swiss army, the choice of whom shall be submitted for his approval by the Swiss Federal Government.

This officer shall be styled "Inspector-General," and shall have his residence at Tangier.

He shall inspect the several police detachments at least once a year, and, as a result of such inspection, draw up a report addressed to the Makhzen.

Apart from the regular reports, he may, if he consider it necessary, draw up special reports on any question concerning the working of the police.

Without intervening directly in the command or the instruction of the force, the Inspector-General shall take note of the results achieved by the Shereefian police as regards the maintenance of order and security in the districts in which such police shall be installed.

ARTICLE VIII.

A copy of the reports and communications addressed to the Makhzen by the Inspector-General on the subject of his mission shall at the same time be handed to the dean of the Diplomatic Body at Tangier, in order that the Diplomatic Body may be in a position to satisfy itself that the Shereefian police are working in accordance with

the decisions arrived at by the Conference, and to observe whether they afford, in a manner effective and in conformity with the Treaties, security to the persons and property of foreigners as well as to commercial transactions.

ARTICLE IX.

In case of complaints which may be brought before the Diplomatic Body by the Legation interested, the Diplomatic Body may, on advising the Sultan's representative, request the Inspector-General to make an inquiry and to draw up a report on such complaints, available for any purposes.

ARTICLE X.

The Inspector-General shall receive a yearly salary of 25,000 francs. He shall be granted in addition an allowance of 6,000 francs for travelling expenses. The Makhzen shall place at his disposal a suitable residence and provide for the upkeep of his horses.

ARTICLE XI.

The material conditions of his engagement and of his establishment, as laid down in Article X., shall form the subject of a contract between him and the Makhzen. A copy of such contract shall be communicated to the Diplomatic Body.

ARTICLE XII.

The staff of instructors of the Shereefian police (officers and non-commissioned officers) shall be Spanish at Tetuan, mixed at Tangier, Spanish at Laraiche, French at Rabat, mixed at Casablanca, and French at the three other ports.

CHAPTER II.—*Regulations concerning the Detection and Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Arms.*

ARTICLE XIII.

Throughout the whole extent of the Shereefian Empire the importation of, and trade in, warlike arms, parts of arms, ammunition of all kinds, whether loaded or unloaded, powder, saltpetre, guncotton, nitro-glycerine, and all materials destined exclusively for the manufacture of ammunition are prohibited, except in the cases specified in Articles XIV. and XV.

ARTICLE XIV.

Explosives necessary for industrial purposes and for public works may, however, be imported. Regulations on the lines indicated in Article XVIII. shall determine the conditions on which such importation may take place.

ARTICLE XV.

Arms, parts of arms, and ammunition intended for the forces of His Shereefian Majesty shall be admitted on the following formalities being observed :—

A declaration, signed by the Moorish Minister for War, stating the number and kind of such supplies ordered from foreign industries, must be presented to the Legation of the country of origin, which shall affix its *visa*.

Cases and packages containing arms and ammunition, delivered to the order of the Moorish Government, shall be cleared through the Customs on the presentation of—

(i) The declaration aforesaid;

(ii) The bill of lading, specifying the number and weight of the packages, and the number and kind of the arms and ammunition which they contain. This document must be certified by the Legation of the country of origin, which must indorse thereon the successive amounts

previously cleared through the Customs. Such certification shall be refused so soon as delivery of the whole of the order has been completed.

ARTICLE XVI.

The importation of sporting and high priced arms, parts of arms, and cartridges, loaded or empty, is likewise prohibited. Provided, however, that such importation may be authorised—

(i) For the strictly personal requirements of the importer;

(ii) For the supply of the arms-stores licensed in conformity with Article XVIII.

ARTICLE XVII.

Sporting and high-priced arms and ammunition shall be admitted for the strictly personal requirements of the importer on presentation of a permit issued by the representative of the Makhzen at Tangier. If the importer be a foreigner, the permit shall only be made out on the demand of his Legation.

As regards sporting ammunition, each permit shall be for not more than 1,000 cartridges, or the materials necessary for the manufacture of not more than 1,000 cartridges.

Such permit shall be given to such persons only as shall not have been convicted of an offence.

ARTICLE XVIII.

The trade in non-rifled sporting or high-priced arms of foreign make, and in ammunition for the same, shall be regulated, as soon as circumstances permit, by a Sheereefian Order made in conformity with the advice of the Diplomatic Body at Tangier, whose decision shall be declared by a majority of votes. The same procedure shall be followed with regard to Orders made with the object of suspending or restricting this traffic.

Only persons who shall have obtained a special and

temporary license from the Moorish Government shall be permitted to open and carry on the business of retail stores for the sale of sporting arms and ammunition. Such license shall only be granted on receipt of a written request from the applicant, supported by a recommendation from his Legation.

The number of retail stores which may be opened at Tangier, and eventually in such ports as may hereafter be specified, shall be determined by regulations drawn up in the manner provided in the first paragraph of this Article. Such regulations shall prescribe the formalities to be observed in connection with the importation of explosives intended for industrial purposes and for public works, and of arms and ammunition to be stocked in the retail stores, and shall determine the maximum quantities that may be so stocked.

In cases of infraction of the regulations, the license may be withdrawn, either temporarily or definitively, without prejudice to such further penalties as may be incurred by the offenders.

ARTICLE XIX.

The penalty for importing, or attempting to import, prohibited goods shall be the confiscation of such goods, in addition to the penalties and fines specified below, which shall be inflicted by the competent courts.

ARTICLE XX.

The penalty for importing, or attempting to import, prohibited goods at a port open to commerce, or at a custom-house, shall be—

(i.) A fine of not less than 500 and not exceeding 2,000 pesetas, and a supplementary fine equal to three times the value of the imported goods;

(ii.) Imprisonment for a period of not less than five days and not exceeding one year;

Or by one of these two penalties only.

ARTICLE XXI.

The penalty for importing, or attempting to import, prohibited goods at a place other than a port open to commerce or a custom-house shall be—

(i.) A fine of not less than 1,000 and not exceeding 5,000 pesetas, and a supplementary fine equal to three times the value of the imported goods;

(ii.) Imprisonment for a period of not less than three months and not exceeding two years;

Or by one of these two penalties only.

ARTICLE XXII.

The penalties for fraudulently selling, receiving, or retailing goods prohibited by the present regulations shall be those laid down in Article XX.

ARTICLE XXIII.

Accessories to the offences specified in Articles XX., XXI., and XXII. shall be liable to the same penalties as the principal offenders. The question of what constitutes complicity shall be determined in accordance with the law administered by the court before which the particular case is heard.

ARTICLE XXIV.

Whenever there is good reason to suspect that a vessel anchored in a port open to commerce is carrying arms, ammunition, or other prohibited goods with a view to their importation into Morocco, the Shereefian Customs officers shall so inform the competent consular authority, in order that the latter may, with the assistance of an officer delegated by the Shereefian Customs, proceed to such inquiries, inspection, or search as may be deemed necessary.

ARTICLE XXV.

In cases of the importation, or attempted importation, of prohibited goods by sea, at a place other than a port open to commerce, the Moorish Customs authorities may take the vessel to the nearest port, to be there handed over to the consular authority, who shall have the right to seize and retain it until payment of the prescribed fines. The vessel shall, however, be released at any stage of the proceedings on the deposit with the consular authority of the maximum amount of the fine, or on good security for the payment of the same being accepted by the Customs, provided such release do not impede the judicial investigation.

ARTICLE XXVI.

The Makhzen shall retain the confiscated goods for its own use, if the goods are serviceable, provided always that the subjects of the Empire shall not obtain possession of them, or for the purpose of sale in a foreign country.

Boats used for illicitly landing goods may be confiscated, and shall, if so confiscated, be sold for the benefit of the Shereefian Treasury.

ARTICLE XXVII.

The sale of arms discarded by the Moorish Government shall be prohibited throughout the Shereefian Empire.

ARTICLE XXVIII.

Rewards, payable out of the proceeds of the fines imposed, shall be granted to informants who shall have been instrumental in discovering prohibited goods, as well as to the officials who shall have effected their seizure; such rewards shall be paid in the following manner, viz.: after deduction, if necessary, of the costs of the proceedings, one-third to be divided by the Customs

authorities amongst the informers, one-third amongst the officials who shall have seized the goods, and one-third to go to the Moorish Treasury.

If the seizure have been effected without the intervention of an informer, one-half of the amount of the fines shall be awarded to the officials who seized the vessel, and the remaining half to the Shereefian Treasury.

ARTICLE XXIX.

The Moorish Customs authorities shall notify direct to the foreign diplomatic or consular authorities any cases of infraction of the present regulations committed by the persons under their jurisdiction, in order that such persons may be prosecuted before the competent court.

Cases of similar infractions committed by Moorish subjects shall be notified by the Customs Administration direct to the Shereefian authorities.

An officer delegated by the Customs shall be charged with the duty of watching the proceeding in cases pending before the different courts.

ARTICLE XXX.

In the region adjoining the Algerian frontier the enforcement of the regulations respecting the illicit trade in arms shall be the exclusive concern of France and Morocco.

Similarly, in the Riff country, and in the regions adjoining the frontier of the Spanish possessions generally, the enforcement of the regulations respecting the illicit trade in arms shall be the exclusive concern of Spain and Morocco.

CHAPTER III.—*Act of Concession for a State Bank.*

ARTICLE XXXI.

A bank shall be established in Morocco under the name of "The Morocco State Bank," to exercise the rights hereinafter specified, which are granted to it by His

Majesty the Sultan for a period of forty years from the date of the ratification of the present Act.

ARTICLE XXXII.

The Bank, which shall have power to carry on all business within the proper province of banking, shall have the exclusive privilege of issuing notes to bearer, payable on presentation, and receivable as legal tender at the public treasuries of the Moorish Empire.

The Bank shall, for a period of two years from the date of starting business, maintain a cash reserve equal to not less than one-half the value of its notes in circulation, and, after the expiration of the said period of two years, equal to not less than one-third of such value. Not less than one-third of such cash reserve shall be in gold bullion or gold coin.

ARTICLE XXXIII.

The Bank shall, to the exclusion of any other bank or financial establishment, discharge the duties of disbursing Treasurer of the Empire. To this end the Moorish Government shall take the necessary measures to effect the payment into the Bank of the proceeds of the customs, except that portion thereof which is hypothecated for the service of the loan of 1904, as well as of such other revenues as the Government may indicate.

As regards the proceeds of the special tax established with a view of carrying out certain public works, the Moorish Government shall cause them to be paid into the Bank, together with such revenues as it may eventually hypothecate as security for its loans, the Bank being specially charged with the service thereof, with the exception, however, of the loan of 1904, which is governed by a special contract.

ARTICLE XXXIV.

The Bank shall be the financial agent of the Government, both within and outside the Empire, without

prejudice to the right of the Government to apply to other banking houses or financial establishments for its public loans. In respect of the said loans, however, the Bank shall enjoy a right of preference, other conditions being equal, over any other banking houses or financial establishments.

But, as regards Treasury bonds and other short term Treasury bills which the Moorish Government may desire to negotiate without having recourse to a public issue, the Bank shall, to the exclusion of any other establishment, be charged with their negotiation on behalf of the Moorish Government, whether in Morocco or abroad.

ARTICLE XXXV.

The Bank shall make advances to the Moorish Government on current account to an amount not exceeding 1,000,000 fr., chargeable against Treasury receipts.

The Bank shall likewise, for a period of ten years from its constitution, open a credit account for the Government, which shall not exceed two-thirds of its initial capital. The amounts so credited shall be spread over several years, and employed primarily to meet the expenses of the establishment and upkeep of the police forces organised in accordance with the decisions arrived at by the Conference, and, secondarily, to meet the expenditure on such works of public interest as may not be charged to the special fund contemplated by the Article next following.

The rate of interest for these two advances shall be at most 7 per cent., including bankers' commission, and the Bank shall be at liberty to require the Government to place in its hands, as security for the amount, an equivalent sum in Treasury bonds.

If the Moorish Government contract a loan before the expiration of a period of ten years, the Bank shall be entitled to the immediate repayment of the advances made in accordance with the second paragraph of the present Article.

ARTICLE XXXVI.

The proceeds of the special tax (Articles XXXIII. and LXVI.) shall form a special fund, for which the Bank shall keep a separate account. This fund shall be employed in accordance with the rules laid down by the Conference.

In case of an insufficiency of funds, and chargeable to subsequent receipts, the Bank may open a credit for such fund, of which the amount shall not exceed the total receipts for the preceding year.

The conditions respecting the rates of interest and commission shall be the same as those laid down in the preceding Article as regards the advance to the Treasury on current account.

ARTICLE XXXVII.

The Bank shall adopt such measures as it may deem expedient for ameliorating the monetary situation in Morocco. Spanish money shall continue to be permitted to circulate as legal tender.

Consequently, the Bank shall exclusively be charged with the purchase of the precious metals, with the minting and melting-down of coins, as well as with all other monetary operations, which it shall carry out on account and for the profit of the Moorish Government.

ARTICLE XXXVIII.

The Bank, of which the head office shall be at Tangier, shall establish branches and agencies in the principal towns of Morocco, and in such other places as it may deem expedient.

ARTICLE XXXIX.

The sites necessary for the premises of the Bank, and of its branches and agencies in Morocco, shall be placed at its disposal gratis by the Government, and, on the expiration of the Concession, the Government shall resume

possession thereof, and shall repay to the Bank the cost of the erection of such premises. The Bank shall, moreover, be entitled to acquire any building or site which it may need for the same purpose.

ARTICLE XL.

The Shereefian Government shall insure and be responsible for the security and protection of the Bank, its branches and agencies. With this view, it shall in each town place an adequate guard at the disposal of every such establishment.

ARTICLE XLI.

The Bank, its branches and agencies, shall be exempt from all taxes or dues, ordinary or extraordinary, whether now in force or to be hereafter imposed; this provision shall apply equally to the real property appropriated to its use as well as to the certificates and coupons of its shares and to its notes. The importation and exportation of bullion and coin intended for the operations of the Bank shall be authorised, and shall be exempt from all duty.

ARTICLE XLII.

The Shereefian Government shall exercise its high control over the Bank through a Moorish High Commissioner, whom it shall appoint after previous agreement with the board of directors of the Bank.

The High Commissioner shall have the right to examine into the management of the Bank; he shall control the issue of bank notes, and shall see that the provisions of the Concession are strictly observed.

The High Commissioner shall sign or affix his seal to every note; he shall be charged with the supervision of the relations between the Bank and the Imperial Treasury.

He shall not be at liberty to interfere in the adminis-

tration or business of the Bank, but he shall always have the right to attend the meetings of the Censors.

The Shereefian Government shall appoint one or two Assistant Commissioners, who shall be specially charged with the control of the financial dealings of the Treasury with the Bank.

ARTICLE XLIII.

Regulations determining the relations between the Bank and the Moorish Government shall be drawn up by the Special Committee contemplated in Article LVII., and shall be approved by the Censors.

ARTICLE XLIV.

The Bank, constituted, with the approval of His Shereefian Majesty, as a Limited Liability Company, shall be subject to the law of France governing the matter.

ARTICLE XLV.

Actions instituted by the Bank in Morocco shall be tried before the Consular Court of the defendant, or before the Moorish Courts, in accordance with the rules of competence laid down in the Treaties and Shereefian Firmans.

Actions brought against the Bank in Morocco shall be tried before a special court composed of three Consular magistrates and two assessors. The Diplomatic Body shall draw up annually the list of magistrates and assessors, and of their substitutes.

This court shall in such actions apply the rules of law, procedure, and competence laid down by French law in matters of commerce. Appeals from judgments pronounced by this court shall lie to the Federal Court at Lausanne, whose decision shall be final.

ARTICLE XLVI.

In case of dispute over the terms of the Concession, or of litigation between the Moorish Government and the

Bank, the issue shall be referred to the Federal Court at Lausanne without appeal or recourse.

In like manner, all disputes which may arise between the shareholders and the Bank as to the observance of the statutes or the conduct of the Bank's business, shall be referred to the same court, without appeal or recourse.

ARTICLE XLVII.

The statutes of the Bank shall be drawn up, in accordance with the following bases, by a special committee, as provided for in Article LVII. They shall be approved by the Censors and ratified by the general meeting of shareholders.

ARTICLE XLVIII.

The general meeting at which the company is constituted shall decide upon the place at which the meetings of shareholders and those of the board of directors shall be held; the latter shall, however, be at liberty to meet in any other town if it sees fit to do so.

The head office of the Bank shall be at Tangier.

ARTICLE XLIX.

The Bank shall be administered by a board of directors consisting of as many members as there are allotted portions in the initial capital.

The directors shall have the most extensive powers for the administration and management of the company; in particular, they shall appoint the managers, sub-managers, and members of the committee referred to in Article LIV., as well as the managers of branches and agencies.

The staff of the company shall, as far as possible, be recruited from among the nationals of the several Powers which have participated in the subscription of the capital.

ARTICLE L.

The directors, who shall be appointed by the general meeting of shareholders, shall, subject to the approval of

such meeting, be nominated by the groups subscribing the capital.

The first board shall remain in office for five years. On the expiration of this period, it shall be renewed at the rate of three members annually. The order in which the directors retire shall be determined by lot; they shall be eligible for re-election.

On the constitution of the company, each of the subscribing groups shall have the right to nominate as many directors as it shall have subscribed allotted portions of the capital, provided such groups shall be under no obligation to choose candidates of their own nationality.

The subscribing groups shall only preserve their right of nominating directors, on the occasion of the latter being replaced or their mandate renewed, so long as they are able to give proof of still being in possession of at least one half of each allotted portion in respect of which they exercise such right.

In the event of a subscribing group ceasing, in virtue of these provisions, to be in a position to nominate a director, the general meeting of shareholders shall itself make the nomination.

ARTICLE LI.

Each of the following institutions, viz. the German Imperial Bank, the Bank of England, the Bank of Spain, and the Bank of France, shall, with the approval of its Government, appoint a Censor to the State Bank of Morocco.

The Censors shall remain in office for four years. Retiring Censors may be reappointed.

In the event of death or resignation, the vacancy shall be filled by the bank which had appointed the previous holder, but only for the unexpired term of the vacated office.

ARTICLE LII.

The Censors, who shall exercise their functions in virtue of the present Act of the Signatory Powers, shall,

in the interests of the latter, watch over the proper working of the Bank and insure the strict observance of the clauses of the Concession and the statutes. They shall see that the provisions respecting the issue of notes are strictly carried out, and shall superintend the operations tending to place the monetary situation on a sound basis; but they shall not at any time, or under any pretext whatsoever, be allowed to interfere in the conduct of the business or in the internal administration of the Bank.

Each of the Censors may at any time examine the accounts of the Bank, call upon either the board of directors or the manager's office for information respecting the conduct of the business of the Bank, and attend at the meetings of the board of directors, but only in an advisory capacity.

The four Censors shall meet at Tangier in the exercise of their functions at least once in every two years at a date to be fixed by common agreement. Other meetings at Tangier or elsewhere shall be held on the demand of three of the Censors.

The four Censors shall draw up, in common agreement, an annual report which shall be annexed to that of the board of directors. The board of directors shall, without delay, forward a copy of such report to each of the Governments signatory to the Act of the Conference.

ARTICLE LIII.

The emoluments and travelling allowances to be assigned to the Censors shall be fixed by the committee charged with the task of preparing the statutes. They shall be paid directly to these officials by the banks who appoint the latter, and shall be reimbursed to those banks by the Morocco State Bank.

ARTICLE LIV.

A committee shall be set up at Tangier and attached to the head office, the members of which shall be selected

by the board of directors, without distinction of nationality, from amongst the persons of position residing at Tangier who hold shares in the Bank.

Such committee, which shall be presided over by one of the managers or sub-managers, shall give advice in matters of discounts and the opening of credit accounts.

It shall submit to the board of directors a monthly report on these different questions.

ARTICLE LV.

The capital, of which the amount shall be fixed by the special committee provided for in Article LVII., but which shall not be less than 15,000,000 fr. nor more than 20,000,000 fr., shall be composed of gold coin, and the shares, the certificates of which shall represent a value equivalent to 500 fr., shall be expressed in the different gold currencies at a fixed rate of exchange, as determined by the statutes.

This capital may eventually be increased at one or more times by decision of the general meeting of shareholders.

The subscription of such increases of capital shall be reserved to all the shareholders, without distinction of groups, in proportion to the number of shares held by each of them.

ARTICLE LVI.

The initial capital of the Bank shall be divided into as many equal portions as there are participants amongst the Powers represented at the Conference.

To this end each Power shall designate a bank which shall exercise, either on its own behalf or on behalf of a group of banks, the right of subscription above specified, as well as the right to nominate the directors under Article L. Every bank selected as the head of a group may, with the authorisation of its Government, be replaced by another bank belonging to the same country.

Those States which desire to avail themselves of their right of subscription shall notify their intention to do so

to the Spanish Government within four weeks from the date of the signature of the present Act by the Representatives of the Powers.

Two portions, however, of the capital equal to those reserved to each of the subscribing groups shall be assigned to the syndicate of banks signatories of the contract of the 12th June, 1904, as compensation for the cession by the syndicate to the State Bank of Morocco—

(i) Of the rights specified in Article XXXIII. of the contract;

(ii) Of the right specified in Article XXXII. (sect. 2) of the contract with regard to the available balance of the customs receipts, with the express reservation of the general preferential right to the total revenue from customs granted to the bondholders under Article XI. of the same contract.

ARTICLE LVII.

Within three weeks from the date of the closing of the subscription, as notified by the Spanish Government to the Powers interested, a special committee composed of delegates appointed by the subscribing groups, under the conditions laid down in Article L. for the appointment of directors, shall meet for the purpose of drawing up the statutes of the Bank.

The general meeting for constituting the company shall be held within two months from the date of the ratification of the present Act.

The functions of the special committee shall cease immediately after the formation of the company.

The special committee shall itself determine the place of its meetings.

ARTICLE LVIII.

No alteration shall be made in the statutes except on the proposal of the board of directors and with the previous approval of the Censors and of the Imperial High Commissioner.

Such alterations must be voted at a general meeting of

shareholders by a majority of three-quarters of the members present or represented.

CHAPTER IV.—*Declaration concerning an Improved Yield of the Taxes and the Creation of New Sources of Revenue.*

ARTICLE LIX.

As soon as the *tertib* shall have been regularly enforced on Moorish subjects, the Representatives of the Powers at Tangier shall impose it upon their nationals within the Empire. It is, however, understood that the said tax shall not be imposed on foreigners, except—

(a) Under the conditions prescribed by the regulations made by the Diplomatic Body at Tangier under date of the 23rd November, 1903;

(b) In the localities where it shall be actually collected from Moorish subjects.

The Consular authorities shall retain a proportion of the amounts levied upon their nationals, in order to cover the expenses incurred in drawing up the lists and collecting the tax.

The rate of such deduction shall be fixed by agreement between the Makhzen and the Diplomatic Body at Tangier.

ARTICLE LX.

In accordance with the right recognised as belonging to them by Article XI. of the Madrid Convention, foreigners shall be free to acquire real property throughout the whole extent of the Shereefian Empire, and His Majesty the Sultan shall give the necessary instructions to the administrative and judicial authorities to insure that authorisation to execute the deeds shall not be refused without good cause. Subsequent transfers by deed between living persons or after decease shall continue to be effected without any impediment.

In the ports open to trade, and within a radius of 10 kilometres around such ports, the consent required by

Article XI. of the Madrid Convention is granted by His Majesty the Sultan in a general manner, and without such consent having henceforth to be obtained specifically in respect of each purchase of real property by foreigners.

At Ksar-el-Kebir, Arzila, Azemur, and eventually in other localities on the coast or in the interior, the general authorisation mentioned above is likewise granted to foreigners, but only for purchases within a radius of 2 kilometres around these towns.

Wherever foreigners have acquired real property, they shall be at liberty to erect buildings, provided they conform to the regulations and usages.

Before authorising the execution of deeds of transfer of real property, the Cadi shall satisfy himself, in conformity with Mussulman law, that there is a good title.

The Makhzen shall designate, in each of the towns and districts specified in the present Article, the Cadi who shall be charged with the duty of effecting such verifications.

ARTICLE LXI.

With the object of creating new sources of revenue for the Makhzen, the Conference recognises, in principle, that a tax may be imposed on town buildings.

A portion of the revenue thus raised shall be set aside to meet the requirements of municipal roads and hygiene, and, in a general manner, to cover the cost of improvements and of conservancy in towns.

The tax shall be leviable on Moorish or foreign proprietors without any distinction; but the tenant or custodian of the key shall be responsible therefor to the Moorish Treasury.

Regulations made by common agreement between the Shereefian Government and the Diplomatic Body at Tangier shall fix the rate of the tax, lay down the manner of collecting and applying it, and determine what proportion of the resources thus created shall be devoted to meeting the cost of improvements and of conservancy in the towns.

At Tangier such proportion shall be paid to the Inter-

national Sanitary Council, which shall determine the manner of its application until a municipal organisation shall have been created.

ARTICLE LXII.

His Shereefian Majesty having decided in 1901 that the Moorish officials charged with the collection of the agricultural taxes should no longer receive from the people either *sokhra* or *mouna*, the Conference is of opinion that this rule should be made general as far as possible.

ARTICLE LXIII.

The Shereefian Delegates have drawn attention to the fact that certain *habou* property or Crown lands, notably estates belonging to the Makhzen, occupied at a rental of 6 per cent., are held by foreigners without regular title-deeds, or in virtue of contracts subject to revision. The Conference, desirous of remedying this state of affairs, charges the Diplomatic Body at Tangier to bring about an equitable settlement of these two questions in agreement with the Special Commissioner whom his Shereefian Majesty may be pleased to appoint for this purpose.

ARTICLE LXIV.

The Conference takes note of the proposals formulated by the Shereefian Delegates respecting the establishment of new taxes on certain trades, industries, and professions. If, as the result of the collection of such taxes from Moorish subjects, the Diplomatic Body at Tangier should consider that their levy should be extended to foreigners, it is hereby stipulated that the said taxes shall be exclusively municipal.

ARTICLE LXV.

The Conference accepts the proposal made by the Moorish Delegation to introduce, with the co-operation of the Diplomatic Body—

- (a) A stamp duty on contracts and notarial acts signed before an *adul*;
- (b) A transfer tax, not exceeding 2 per cent., on sales of real estate;
- (c) A statistical and weighing due, not exceeding 1 per cent. *ad valorem*, on goods transported by coasting vessels;
- (d) A passport fee, to be levied from Moorish subjects;
- (e) Eventually, quay and lighthouse dues, of which the proceeds shall be devoted to the improvement of the harbours.

ARTICLE LXVI.

As a temporary measure, goods of foreign origin shall, on their entry into Morocco, pay a special tax of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. *ad valorem*. The total revenue derived from this tax shall form a special fund, which shall be devoted to meeting the expenditure on, and execution of, public works undertaken for the development of navigation and trade generally in the Shereefian Empire.

The programme of the works and the order of their execution shall be settled by agreement between the Shereefian Government and the Diplomatic Body at Tangier.

All surveys, estimates, plans, and specifications relating thereto shall be prepared by a competent engineer appointed with the concurrence of the Diplomatic Body by the Shereefian Government. Such engineer may, if necessary, be assisted by one or more assistant engineers. Their salaries shall be charged to the special fund.

The moneys belonging to the special fund shall be deposited in the Morocco State Bank, which shall keep the accounts thereof.

Public contracts shall be awarded in the form and according to the conditions laid down in regulations which it shall be the duty of the Diplomatic Body at Tangier to draw up conjointly with the Representatives of His Shereefian Majesty.

The board of awards shall consist of a Representative

of the Shereefian Government, five delegates of the Diplomatic Body at Tangier, and the engineer.

The contract shall be awarded to the person or persons who, while complying with the terms of the specifications, shall have submitted the most generally advantageous offer.

As regards the sums yielded by the special tax which would be collected at the custom-houses established in the districts indicated in Article CIII. of the Customs Regulations, their employment shall, in agreement with the conterminous State, be determined by the Makhzen in accordance with the provisions of the present Article.

ARTICLE LXVII.

The Conference expresses the hope, subject to the observations submitted to it on this subject, that the export duties on the articles mentioned below may be reduced to the following extent:—

Chick peas	20 per cent.
Maize	20 „
Barley	50 „
Wheat	34 „

ARTICLE LXVIII.

His Shereefian Majesty agrees to increase from 6,000 to 10,000 the number of cattle which each Power has the right to export from Morocco. Such exportation may be effected through any custom-house. If, owing to unfortunate circumstances, a dearth of cattle should make itself felt in any particular district, His Shereefian Majesty may temporarily prohibit the export of cattle from the port or ports of such district. Such prohibition shall not exceed in duration a period of two years, nor shall it be enforced at all the ports of the Empire at one and the same time.

It is, moreover, understood that the preceding provisions do not modify the other conditions governing the export of cattle which are laid down in the Firmans of earlier date.

The Conference further expresses the hope that a system of veterinary inspection may be organised in the seaports as soon as possible.

ARTICLE LXIX.

In accordance with the former decisions of His Shereefian Majesty, and notably with that of the 28th September, 1901, the coasting trade in cereals, grains, vegetables, eggs, fruit, poultry, and generally in goods and animals of every kind, whether of Moorish origin or otherwise, with the exception of horses, mules, asses, and camels, for which a special permit from the Makhzen shall be required, is authorised between all the ports of the Empire. Such coasting trade may be carried on by vessels of any nationality, without the above-named articles being liable to pay export duty, but subject to the special duties and to the observance of the regulations governing this matter.

ARTICLE LXX.

The scale of berthage or anchorage dues levied from vessels in Moorish harbours being fixed by treaties with certain Powers, these Powers are prepared to consent to a revision of the said dues. The Diplomatic Body at Tangier is charged with the duty of drawing up, in agreement with the Makhzen, the conditions of such revision, which shall not be effected until after the improvement of the harbours.

ARTICLE LXXI.

In all ports where sufficient warehouse accommodation exists, warehouse dues on articles in bond shall be levied in accordance with the regulations drawn up, or to be drawn up, on this subject by the Government of His Shereefian Majesty in agreement with the Diplomatic Body at Tangier.

ARTICLE LXXII.

Opium and kiff shall continue to be a monopoly of the Shereefian Government. Nevertheless, the importation of opium specially destined for medicinal purposes shall be authorised by a special permit, issued by the Makhzen at the request of the Legation of the country to which the importing chemist or doctor belongs. The Shereefian Government and the Diplomatic Body shall, by common agreement, determine the maximum quantity that may be imported.

ARTICLE LXXIII.

The representatives of the Powers take note of the intention of the Shereefian Government to extend to tobacco of all kinds the monopoly which at present exists in the case of snuff. They reserve the right of their nationals to due compensation for any losses which the said monopoly may inflict on such of them as carry on a tobacco business under the present system. Failing an amicable arrangement, the amount of such compensation shall be fixed by experts nominated jointly by the Makhzen and the Diplomatic Body, who shall be guided by the provisions agreed upon in the matter of expropriations in the public interest.

ARTICLE LXXIV.

The principle of awarding contracts without regard to nationality shall be applied to the farming of the opium and kiff monopoly. The same course shall be adopted in respect to the tobacco monopoly if such be introduced.

ARTICLE LXXV.

Should occasion arise to modify any of the provisions of the present Declaration, an understanding on the subject must be arrived at between the Makhzen and the Diplomatic Body at Tangier.

ARTICLE LXXVI.

In all the cases dealt with by the present Declaration in which the intervention of the Diplomatic Body is required, decisions shall be taken by a majority of votes, except in respect of Articles LXIV., LXX., and LXXV.

CHAPTER V.—*Regulations respecting the Customs of the Empire and the Suppression of Fraud and Smuggling.*

ARTICLE LXXVII.

Every captain of a merchant-vessel coming from a foreign or a Moorish port shall, within twenty-four hours of his receiving pratique at any of the ports of the Empire, deposit at the custom-house an exact copy of his manifest signed by himself and certified to be correct by the consignee of the vessel. He shall, moreover, if required to do so, produce before the Customs officers the original of his manifest.

The Customs authorities shall have power to place one or more watchmen on board to prevent all illicit traffic.

ARTICLE LXXVIII.

The following are exempted from the obligation to deposit the manifest:—

1. Men-of-war or vessels chartered on behalf of a Power.
2. Boats belonging to private individuals kept by them for their personal use, and not employed in the carriage of merchandise.
3. Boats or vessels used for fishing within sight of shore.
4. Yachts solely used for pleasure cruises and registered as such at their home ports.
5. Vessels specially fitted out for the laying and repair of telegraphic cables.
6. Boats exclusively employed in life-saving operations.

7. Hospital-ships.

8. Training-vessels of the mercantile marine which do not engage in commercial enterprise.

ARTICLE LXXIX.

The manifest deposited at the custom-house shall state the nature and origin of the cargo, together with the marks and numbers of the cases, bales, packages, barrels, etc.

ARTICLE LXXX.

Should there be material grounds for mistrusting the correctness of the manifest, or should the captain of the vessel refuse to allow the visit and inspection of the Customs officers, the case shall be notified to the competent Consular authority, in order that the latter may proceed, with the assistance of a delegate of the Shereefian Customs, to such inquiries, search, and inspection as may be deemed necessary.

ARTICLE LXXXI.

If, after the expiration of the period of twenty-four hours allowed under Article LXXVII, the captain have not deposited his manifest, he shall, unless the delay be due to circumstances beyond control, be liable to a fine of 150 pesetas for each day's delay, provided that such fine shall not exceed 600 pesetas. If the captain fraudulently present an inaccurate or incomplete manifest, he shall be personally liable to pay a sum equal to the value of the goods for which he has failed to produce a manifest as well as a fine of not less than 500 and not exceeding 1,000 pesetas, and the vessel and its cargo shall, moreover, be liable to seizure by the competent Consular authority as security for such fine.

ARTICLE LXXXII.

Every person shall, at the time of clearing goods through the Customs, whether for import or for export,

file a detailed statement in the custom-house specifying the kind, quality, weight, number, size, and value of the goods, as well as the kind, marks, and number of the packages containing the same.

ARTICLE LXXXIII.

Should the Customs officers, on visiting the vessel, find that there are fewer packages or less merchandise than have been declared, the declarant, unless able to prove that he has acted in good faith, shall pay double the amount of the duty on the missing goods, and the goods declared shall be detained as security for this double duty; if, on the contrary, an excess be found at the time of the visit, either in the number of packages or in the quantity or weight of the goods, such excess shall be seized and confiscated for the benefit of the Makhzen, unless the declarant can prove his good faith.

ARTICLE LXXXIV.

If the declaration should be found to be incorrect as to either kind or quality, and if the declarant be unable to prove his good faith, the goods incorrectly declared shall be seized and confiscated by the competent authority for the benefit of the Makhzen.

ARTICLE LXXXV.

Should the declaration be found to be incorrect as regards the value declared, and should the declarant be unable to prove his good faith, the Customs Administration may either levy the duty in kind there and then, or, in case the goods be indivisible, acquire the said goods on an immediate payment to the declarant of the declared value, plus 5 per cent.

ARTICLE LXXXVI.

If the declaration be found to be false as regards the nature of the goods, the latter shall be considered as not

having been declared, and the offence shall be dealt with as laid down in Articles LXXXVIII. and XC. herein below, and the penalties shall be those provided in the said Articles.

ARTICLE LXXXVII.

The penalty for smuggling or attempting to smuggle dutiable goods into or out of the country, whether by sea or by land, shall be the confiscation of the goods, without prejudice to such penalties and fines hereinafter provided as may be inflicted by the competent courts.

In addition, vehicles or animals employed in transporting smuggled goods by land shall be seized and confiscated in all cases where such goods constitute the principal part of the load.

ARTICLE LXXXVIII.

The penalty for illicitly importing or exporting, or attempting illicitly to import or export, at a port open to commerce, or through a custom-house, shall be a fine not exceeding three times the value of the goods so illicitly dealt with, and imprisonment for a period of not less than five days and not exceeding six months, or one only of these penalties.

ARTICLE LXXXIX.

The penalty for illicitly importing or exporting, or attempting illicitly to import or export, at places other than a port open to commerce, or a custom-house, shall be a fine of not less than 300 and not exceeding 500 pesetas, and a supplementary fine equal to three times the value of the goods, or imprisonment for a period of not less than one month and not exceeding one year.

ARTICLE XC.

Accessories to the offences specified in Articles LXXXVIII. and LXXXIX. shall be liable to the same

penalties as the principal offenders. The question of what constitutes complicity shall be determined in accordance with the law administered by the court before which the particular case is heard.

ARTICLE XCI.

Any vessel importing or attempting to import, or exporting or attempting to export, merchandise illicitly at or from a place other than a port open to trade may be taken by the Moorish Customs authorities to the nearest port, to be handed over to the Consular authority, which may seize such vessel and detain it in custody until it shall have paid the amount of the fines imposed.

The vessel shall be released at any stage of the proceedings, on the deposit with the Consular authority of the maximum amount of the fine, or upon good security for payment being accepted by the Customs, provided such release do not impede the judicial investigation.

ARTICLE XCII.

The provisions of the preceding Articles shall be applicable to vessels engaged in the coasting trade.

ARTICLE XCIII.

Goods not liable to export duty and embarked at a Moorish port for shipment by sea to another port in the Empire shall be accompanied by a certificate of export issued by the Customs, on pain of having to pay the import duty or even of being confiscated, if not entered in the manifest.

ARTICLE XCIV.

Shipment by coasting-vessels of goods liable to export duty shall not be effected except after deposit, against receipt, at the custom-house of the place of shipment, of the amount of the export duties payable on such goods.

Such deposit shall be repaid to the depositor by the custom-house into which it was paid, on production of a declaration on which the Customs authorities shall have endorsed the arrival of the goods, and the receipt for the amount of the duties deposited. The documents proving the arrival of the goods shall be produced within three months of their shipment. On the expiration of this term, the sum deposited shall be appropriated by the Makhzen, unless the delay be due to circumstances beyond control.

ARTICLE XCV.

Import and export duties shall be paid in ready money at the custom-house where the clearance has been effected.

The *ad valorem* duties shall be paid on the basis of the cash and wholesale value of the goods entered at the custom-house, free of customs and warehouse duties. In the case of damaged goods, the depreciation they have undergone shall be taken into account in their valuation. Goods shall not be removed except after payment of customs and warehouse duties.

A formal receipt, to be made out by the official charged with the business, shall be given for all goods and payments received.

ARTICLE XCVI.

The value of the principal goods taxed by the Moorish Customs Administration shall be fixed annually, in accordance with the conditions laid down in the preceding Article, by a Customs Valuation Committee, sitting at Tangier, and consisting of—

1. Three members nominated by the Moorish Government.
2. Three members nominated by the Diplomatic Body at Tangier.
3. One delegate of the State Bank.
4. One agent of the Commission representing the Moorish 5 per cent. loan of 1904.

The committee shall nominate from twelve to twenty honorary members, resident in Morocco, whom it shall consult in connection with the valuation, and whenever it may see fit. Such honorary members shall be chosen from the lists of prominent residents, drawn up in the case of foreigners by the respective Legations, and, in the case of Moorish subjects, by the Representative of the Sultan.

They shall be nominated, as far as possible, in numbers proportionate to the importance of the trade of the respective nations.

The committee shall be appointed for three years.

The schedule of values fixed by the committee shall serve as a basis for the valuation which shall be made at every custom-house by the Moorish Customs Administration. It shall be posted up in the custom-houses and in the chanceries of the Legations or consulates at Tangier.

The schedule shall be subject to revision at the end of six months if any notable change shall have taken place in the value of certain goods.

ARTICLE XCVII.

A permanent committee, styled the "Customs Committee," shall be organised at Tangier, and appointed for a term of three years. It shall consist of a Special Commissioner of His Shereefian Majesty, of a member of the Diplomatic or Consular Body nominated by the Diplomatic Body at Tangier, and of a delegate of the State Bank. The committee may add to its number one or several representatives of the Customs Administration, with a consultative voice.

This Committee shall watch over the proper working of the Customs Administration, and shall have power to propose to His Shereefian Majesty such measures as would, in their opinion, tend to improve the service and to assure the regularity and proper control of the transactions and charges (landing, loading, land transport, handling, import, and export of goods, warehousing, valuation, payment and collection of duties). The rights

stipulated for in favour of the bondholders by Articles XV. and XVI. of the loan contract of the 12th June, 1904, shall be in no way impaired by the establishment of the "Customs Committee."

Detailed provision as to the application of Article XCVI. and of the present Article shall be made by means of instructions to be drawn up by the Customs Committee and the services interested; such instructions shall be submitted to the Diplomatic Body for their opinion.

ARTICLE XCVIII.

At custom-houses having sufficient warehouse accommodation the Customs Administration shall take charge of the goods landed, from the time when they are handed over, against receipt, by the captain of the vessel to the officials in charge of the lighterage service, until the time when they are formally cleared.

The Customs Administration shall be responsible for any damage caused by loss of or injury to goods due to the fault or negligence of its officials. It shall not be responsible for damage due either to natural deterioration of the goods, or to their having been stored too long in the warehouse, or to circumstances beyond control.

At custom-houses not having sufficient warehouse accommodation, the officials of the Makhzen are only bound to employ such means of preservation as may be at the disposal of the custom-house.

The Warehousing Regulations at present in force shall be revised in agreement with the Shereefian Government, by the Diplomatic Body, whose decision shall be taken by a majority of votes.

ARTICLE XCIX.

Confiscated goods and boats or transport vehicles or animals shall be sold by the Customs within eight days from the pronouncement of the final judgment by the competent court.

ARTICLE C.

The net proceeds of the sale of confiscated goods and articles definitely become the property of the State; those of the money fines, as well as any amounts paid by way of compounding, shall, after deduction of costs of every kind, be divided between the Shereefian Treasury and such persons as may have aided in the prevention of fraud or smuggling.

One-third to be divided by the Customs among the informers;

One-third to go to the officials who seized the goods; and

One-third to the Moorish Treasury.

If the seizure have been effected without the intervention of an informer, one-half of the amount of the fines shall be awarded to the officials who seized the goods, and the other half to the Moorish Treasury.

ARTICLE CI.

The Moorish Customs authorities shall notify direct to the Diplomatic or Consular officials any case of infringement of the present regulations by their respective nationals, with a view to the latter being proceeded against before the competent court.

Cases of similar infringements by Moorish subjects shall be brought by the Customs before the Shereefian authorities direct.

A delegate of the Customs shall be charged with the duty of watching the proceedings in cases pending before the different courts.

ARTICLE CII.

Every confiscation, fine, or penalty shall be pronounced, in the case of foreigners, by the Consular courts, and in the case of Moorish subjects by the Shereefian courts.

ARTICLE CIII.

In the region bordering on the Algerian frontier, the application of the present regulations shall remain the exclusive concern of France and Morocco; similarly in the Riff country and in the regions bordering on the Spanish possessions the application of the present regulations shall remain the exclusive concern of Spain and Morocco.

ARTICLE CIV.

The provisions of the present regulations, other than those respecting penalties, shall, on the expiration of a period of two years from their coming into force, be open to revision by the Diplomatic Body at Tangier, whose decisions shall be unanimous, acting in agreement with the Makhzen.

CHAPTER VI.—*Declaration relative to the Public Services and Public Works.*

ARTICLE CV.

With a view to insure the application of the principle of economic liberty without inequality, the Signatory Powers declare that in no case shall the rights of the State over the public services of the Shereefian Empire be alienated for the benefit of private interests.

ARTICLE CVI.

Should the Shereefian Government consider it necessary to have recourse to foreign capital or to foreign industries for the working of public services or for the execution of public works, roads, railways, ports, telegraphs or other, the Signatory Powers reserve to themselves the right to see that the control of the State over such large undertakings of public interest remain intact.

ARTICLE CVII.

The validity of such concessions as may be granted for the purposes specified in Article CVI., or for furnishing supplies to the State, shall, throughout the Shereefian Empire, be subject to the principle of public awards on tenders, without respect of nationality, as regards all matters which, by the rules observed under the laws of foreign countries, admit of the application of that principle.

ARTICLE CVIII.

So soon as it shall have been decided to proceed to the execution of particular public works by calling for tenders, the Shereefian Government shall notify such decision to the Diplomatic Body, to which it shall, in due course, communicate the plans, specifications, and all documents annexed to the call for tenders, so that the nationals of all the Signatory Powers may obtain information respecting the projected works, and be in a position to compete for them. A sufficient time limit shall be fixed for this purpose in the call for tenders.

ARTICLE CIX.

The specifications shall not contain, either explicitly or implicitly, any condition or provision of a nature to violate the principle of free competition, or to place the competitors of one nationality at a disadvantage as against the competitors of another.

ARTICLE CX.

The contracts shall be made in the form and according to the general conditions prescribed by regulations to be drawn up by the Shereefian Government, with the assistance of the Diplomatic Body.

The contract shall be awarded by the Shereefian

Government to the person or persons who, while complying with the terms of the specifications, shall have submitted the most generally advantageous offer.

ARTICLE CXI.

The rules laid down in Articles CVI. to CX. shall be applied to concessions for the working of cork-tree forests, in accordance with the laws governing this matter in the respective foreign countries.

ARTICLE CXII.

A Shereefian Firman shall lay down the conditions of the concession and of the working of mines, ores, and quarries. In drawing up this Firman the Shereefian Government shall be guided by the laws governing this matter in foreign countries.

ARTICLE CXIII.

If, in the cases mentioned in Articles CVI. to CXII., it should be necessary to enter into occupation of particular properties, it shall be lawful to proceed to expropriation, conditionally upon the previous payment of proper compensation and the observance of the following rules.

ARTICLE CXIV.

Expropriation shall not take place except on the ground of public interest, and provided the necessity for it shall have been established by an administrative inquiry, held in accordance with rules to be laid down in Shereefian regulations drawn up with the assistance of the Diplomatic Body.

ARTICLE CXV.

Where the owners of property are Moorish subjects, His Shereefian Majesty shall take the necessary measure to insure that no obstacles are placed in the way of the

execution of such works as he may have declared to be of public interest.

ARTICLE CXVI.

Where the owners are foreigners, expropriation shall be effected in the following manner:—

In case of disagreement between the competent Government Department and the owner of the property to be expropriated, the amount of compensation shall be determined by a special jury, or, if need be, by arbitration.

ARTICLE CXVII.

Such jury shall consist of six expert valuers, of whom three shall be chosen by the owner and three by the Government Department interested in the expropriation. The opinion of the absolute majority shall prevail.

If no majority can be formed, the owner and the Government Department shall each appoint an arbiter, and these two arbiters shall nominate a third arbiter.

Failing an agreement as to the nomination of the third arbiter, the latter shall be appointed by the Diplomatic Body at Tangier.

ARTICLE CXVIII.

The arbiters shall be chosen from a list drawn up at the beginning of each year by the Diplomatic Body, and, as far as possible, from such experts as are not resident in the locality where the work is to be carried out.

ARTICLE CXIX.

The owner shall have the right to appeal to the competent court against the award pronounced by the arbiters. Such appeal shall be lodged in accordance with the rules laid down in the matter of arbitration by the laws of the country to which the owner belongs.

CHAPTER VII.—*General.*

ARTICLE CXX.

With a view to bring their respective legislations, if necessary, into harmony with the engagements entered into by virtue of the present General Act, all the Signatory Powers undertake, so far as they are severally concerned, to promote such legislation as may be necessary.

ARTICLE CXXI.

The present General Act shall be ratified in accordance with the constitutional laws peculiar to each individual State; the ratifications shall be deposited at Madrid as soon as may be, and at the latest on the 31st December, 1906.

Such deposit shall be recorded in a protocol, of which a copy, certified to be correct, shall be transmitted to the Signatory Powers through the diplomatic channel.

ARTICLE CXXII.

The present General Act shall come into force on the day on which all the ratifications shall have been deposited, and, at the latest, on the 31st December, 1906.

Should the special legislative measures which may be necessary in certain countries in order to insure the application of some of the provisions of the present General Act to the nationals of such countries residing in Morocco, not have been enacted before the date fixed for ratification, such provisions shall not become applicable, so far as such nationals are concerned, until after the promulgation of such legislative measures.

ARTICLE CXXIII. AND LAST.

All existing Treaties, Conventions, and Arrangements between the Signatory Powers and Morocco remain in force. It is, however, agreed that, in case their

provisions be found to conflict with those of the present General Act, the stipulations of the latter shall prevail.

In witness whereof the Delegates Plenipotentiary have signed the present General Act, and have thereto affixed their seals.

Done at Algeciras, the 7th day of April, 1906, in single copy, which shall remain deposited in the archives of His Catholic Majesty's Government, and of which copies, certified to be correct, shall be transmitted to the Signatory Powers through the diplomatic channel.

For Germany :

(L.S.) Radowitz.

(L.S.) Tattenbach.

For Austria-Hungary :

(L.S.) Welsersheimb.

(L.S.) Bolesta-Koziebrodzki.

For Belgium :

(L.S.) Joostens.

(L.S.) Comte Conrad de Buisseret.

For Spain :

(L.S.) El Duque de Almodovar del Rio.

(L.S.) J. Pérez-Caballero.

For the United States of America (with the reservation contained in the declaration made at the plenary meeting of the Conference on April 7, 1906):

(L.S.) Henry White.

(L.S.) Samuel R. Gummeré.

For France :

(L.S.) Révoil.

(L.S.) Regnault.

For Great Britain :

(L.S.) A. Nicholson.

For Italy :

(L.S.) Visconti Venosta.

(L.S.) G. Malmusi.

For Morocco :

For the Netherlands :
(L.S.) H. Testa.

For Portugal :
(L.S.) Conde De Tovar.
(L.S.) Conde De Martens Ferrão.

For Russia :
(L.S.) Cassini.
(L.S.) Basile Bacheracht.

For Sweden :
(L.S.) Robert Sager.

Certified to be correct :
The Under-Secretary of State,
(L.S.) E. DE OJÉDA.

Additional Protocol.

At the moment of proceeding to the signature of the General Act of the Algeciras Conference, the Delegates of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Spain, the United States of America, France, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, and Sweden, having regard to the declaration made by the Moorish delegates that they are not in a position, for the moment, to affix their signatures thereto, the distance preventing them from obtaining an early reply from His Shereefian Majesty on the points which they considered themselves bound to refer to him, mutually engage, in virtue of their same full powers, to unite their efforts with a view to the ratification by His Shereefian Majesty of the said General Act in its entirety, and with a view to the simultaneous carrying out of the reforms therein contemplated, which are mutually interdependent.

They accordingly agree to charge his Excellency M. Malmusi, Italian Minister in Morocco and dean of the Diplomatic Body at Tangier, to take the necessary steps

to this end, calling the attention of His Majesty the Sultan to the great advantages which must accrue to his Empire from the provisions unanimously adopted at the Conference by the Signatory Powers.

The accession of His Shereefian Majesty to the General Act of the Algeciras Conference shall be communicated through the intermediary of His Most Catholic Majesty's Government to the Governments of the other Signatory Powers. Such accession shall have the same effect as if the Moorish Delegates had affixed their signatures to the General Act, and shall take the place of ratification by His Shereefian Majesty.

In witness whereof the Delegates of Germany, Belgium, Austria-Hungary, Spain, the United States of America, France, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, and Sweden have signed the present Additional Protocol, and have thereto affixed their seals.

Done at Algeciras, the 7th day of April, 1906, in single copy, which shall remain deposited in the archives of His Most Catholic Majesty's Government, and copies of which, certified to be correct, shall be transmitted to the Signatory Powers through the diplomatic channel.

(Signed as before.)

Declaration by the United States' Delegates.

The Government of the United States of America, having no political interests in Morocco, and having taken part in the present Conference with no other desires or intentions than to assist in assuring to all the nations in Morocco the most complete equality in matters of commerce, treatment, and privileges, and in facilitating the introduction into that Empire of reforms which should bring about a general state of well-being founded on the perfect cordiality of her foreign relations, and on a stable internal administration, declares: that in subscribing to the Regulations and Declarations of the Conference by the Act of signing the General Act, subject to ratification according to constitutional procedure, and the Additional Protocol, and in consenting to their application to

American citizens and interests in Morocco, it assumes no obligation or responsibility as to the measures which may be necessary for the enforcement of the said Regulations and Declarations.

*Credentials granted to Commendatore Malmusi by
King of Italy.*

VICTOR EMANUEL III., by the grace of God and the will of the nation King of Italy, to the most High and Mighty Prince His Majesty Abd-el-Aziz, Emperor of Morocco.

Most High and Mighty Prince, my dear and good friend. A Conference having met, by your Majesty's invitation, at Algeciras, at which there assembled the Representatives of the Powers friendly to your Empire, the decisions reached by common agreement are now collated in a General Act to which the signatures of your Majesty's Delegates only are wanting, they having wished to reserve its acceptance for the high judgment of their Sovereign. The Conference have therefore desired, and I have most willingly consented, that my Minister accredited to your Court, who is also doyen of the Diplomatic Body at Tangier, should repair to the presence of your Majesty, should present to your Majesty the General Act which has been agreed upon, and, speaking in the name of all the Powers assembled at Algeciras, should ask for your Majesty's adhesion and your Majesty's entire ratification.

Your Majesty is aware of the affection which, as a tradition bequeathed us by our ancestors, unites me to your Majesty's person; these sentiments and the conviction that, by the adoption of the General Act in its entirety, much honour will accrue to your Majesty, and incalculable good to your Majesty's Empire, make me rejoice that the Powers should have intrusted this important duty to my Minister, whom I recommend by these presents to your Majesty's favour. I further wish your Majesty every happiness, while assuring your

Majesty of my high esteem and my unalterable friendship.

Given in Rome, the 26th day of April, 1906.

Most affectionate and good friend,

(Signed) VICTOR EMANUEL.

(Counter-signed) GUICCIARDINI.

Count de Bosdari to Sir Edward Grey (Received July 18).

Italian Embassy, July 17, 1906.

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

I have been instructed by my Government to inform your Excellency that the Mission intrusted to Commendator Malmusi, the Italian Minister at Tangier, by the Powers represented at the Conference at Algeciras, has been happily accomplished. The Sultan of Morocco has declared his acceptance and ratification of the General Act of Algeciras in its entirety, and has handed to Commendator Malmusi the Imperial Rescript, dated the 18th June, 1906, a translation of which, in French, is enclosed herewith.

In accordance with the desire expressed by the Sultan, Commendator Malmusi, who returned to Tangier with the personnel of the Mission on the 9th inst., has been authorised by the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs to proceed to Madrid, in order to hand in person the original of the Rescript to the Spanish Secretary of State, in whose archives the document will be deposited, together with the other ratifications of the Act of Algeciras.

I have the honour to inform your Excellency at the same time that Commendator Malmusi has notified to the Maghzen, as had been decided, the resolution accepted by the Conference on the motion of the British Delegate with regard to the suppression of slavery in Morocco.

I have, etc.,

(Signed) A. De BOSDARI.

Glory to the Only God : His reign alone is eternal.
(Seal of the Sultan Abdulaziz-ben-Hassan.)

By the present Edict we make known that we have read what has been prepared by our Shereefian Delegates and the Delegates of the great and high friendly Powers in the sittings of the Conference assembled in the town of Algeciras in the year 1324 of the Hegira, corresponding to the year 1906 of the Christian era, to examine the reforms (to be introduced) in this Moghrebin Empire, based, in the first instance, on three principles, namely : maintenance of our sovereignty (*in the text* ; of our sovereign rights), of the independence of our aforesaid Empire, and of economic liberty in the matter of public works. The reforms based on the aforesaid principles, have been summed up in seven chapters, which are as follows :—

1. A Declaration relative to the organisation of the police in the ports of our Empire open (to trade).

2. A Regulation concerning the detection and suppression of the illicit trade in arms in the territories of this Empire.

3. An act of concession for a Moorish State Bank.

4. A Declaration concerning an improved yield of existing taxes and the creation of new sources of revenue.

5. A Regulation respecting the customs of the Empire and the suppression of fraud and smuggling.

6. A Regulation concerning the manner of carrying out public works.

7. General provisions for the ratification and execution of the General Act.

Each of these chapters includes a number of Articles, in all 123 Articles.

After examining the Act which consolidated the aforesaid Articles, and which is dated the 12th Safar of the current year, corresponding to the 7th April, 1906, and after carefully studying this same Act, from beginning to end, we have taken the Shereefian decision to approve it, to ratify it, to accept it, to carry it out in its entirety.

Given by our order, order, strong and powerful by the will of God, the 26th day of Rabi' II., 1324, corresponding to the 18th June, 1906, of the Christian era.

(French) Translation certified to be correct by the Vice-Consul, Interpreter to the Italian Legation.

(Signed) A. M. LAREDO.

Fez, June 18th, 1906.

APPENDIX XIII.

THE CONTEMPLATED FRANCO-SPANISH NAVAL AND MILITARY ACTION IN MOROCCO (DECEMBER, 1906).

Text of the note presented on December 5th by the Ambassadors of France and Spain to the Governments represented at the Algeciras Conference on the affairs of Morocco.

"RECENT events in the district of Tangier and the repeated incidents which have taken place in that town are calculated to lead to the apprehension that foreigners there may no longer enjoy sufficient guarantee for their safety. If this situation should grow so far worse as to involve more serious disorders, the establishment of the police provided for under the Act of Algeciras would become a matter of urgent necessity, and France and Spain would have to take measures to hasten the organisation of such a force under the conditions accepted by the Powers which took part in the Conference of 1905. It is in this spirit that the two Governments have decided to send to Tangier naval forces capable of coping with any emergency. As circumstances may demand, the French and Spanish Ministers, having previously come to an agreement to this effect, shall be empowered, after concerting arrangements with their colleagues and the Diplomatic Body at Tangier, to call upon the commanders of the naval forces to land detachments necessary for the maintenance of order in the town and in its environments. In case of an immediate attack, the Ministers of France

and Spain, acting in common accord, may call for the immediate landing of such detachments, and they shall report the same to their colleagues. The command shall devolve upon the officer of the highest rank, and where the rank is the same upon the senior of either nationality. The proposal would then immediately be made to the Maghzen to create a regular police force under cover of this indispensable, but purely provisional, protection. The detachment would be re-embarked as soon as possible, and at latest as soon as the police should be in working condition. The authority of the Government of Tangier would be maintained, and the Sultan of Morocco would be asked to re-establish the operation and the jurisdiction of his representative at Tangier and the district under the normal conditions which had previously prevailed. The Shereefian flag would alone remain hoisted on the buildings of Tangier.

"The two Governments being desirous, even before its ratification, to afford the Powers who signed the Act of Algeciras every guarantee that they will conform to its spirit in the accomplishment of the special mission which has been recognised as theirs, of ensuring the safety of foreigners in Morocco, wish to inform the Powers in advance of their eventual plans in order to show forth clearly the character of their action."¹

APPENDIX XIV.

FRANCO-GERMAN DECLARATION RESPECTING MOROCCO (FEBRUARY 8, 1909).

THE Government of the French Republic and the Imperial German Government, being equally anxious to facilitate the execution of the Algeciras Act, have agreed to define the meaning which they attach to the articles of that Act

¹ The German Government eventually raised no objection to the contemplated step, which was rendered unnecessary by the action of the Moorish Government, as explained in Chapter XV.

with a view to avoid in the future all sources of misunderstanding between them.

Therefore,

The Government of the French Republic, firmly attached to the maintenance of the independence and integrity of the Shereefian Empire, being resolved to safeguard the principle of economic equality, and, consequently, not to obstruct German commercial and industrial interests in that Country;

And the Imperial German Government, pursuing only economic interests in Morocco, recognizing on the other hand that the special political interests of France in that country are closely bound up with the consolidation of order and internal peace, and being resolved not to impede those interests;

Declare that they do not pursue nor encourage any measure of a nature to create in their favour or in that of any Power an economic privilege, and that they will endeavour to associate their nationals in affairs for which the latter may obtain a concession.

JULES CAMBON.

KIDERLEN-WAECHTER.

APPENDIX XV.

FRANCO-GERMAN CONVENTION RESPECTING MOROCCO (NOVEMBER 4, 1911).

IN consequence of the troubles which have risen in Morocco, and which have shown the necessity of carrying on, in that country, in the interests of all, the work of pacification and progress provided for by the Algeciras Act, the Government of the French Republic and the Imperial German Government have deemed it necessary to define more precisely and to complete the Franco-German Agreement of the 9th February, 1909.

Therefore M. Jules Cambon, Ambassador Extraordinary of the French Republic accredited to His Majesty the

German Emperor, and M. de Kiderlen-Waechter, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the German Empire, having communicated to one another their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following articles :—

ARTICLE I.

The Imperial German Government declare that, having only economic interests in Morocco, they will not obstruct such action as may be taken by France with a view to assist the Moorish Government in the introduction of any administrative, judicial, economic, financial, and military reforms of which they may stand in need for the good government of the Empire, as also of any new regulations and modifications in existing regulations which these reforms may entail. Consequently, the German Government adhere to the measures of reorganisation, of control, and of financial guarantee, which the French Government, after obtaining the consent of the Moorish Government, may consider it necessary to take with this object in view, with the reservation that French action will ensure economic equality between the nations in Morocco.

In the event of France being led to strengthen and to extend her control and her protection, the Imperial German Government, recognising France's full liberty of action, will raise no objection, subject to the reservation that the commercial liberty guaranteed by former treaties is respected.

It is agreed that the rights and proceedings of the Morocco State Bank, as defined in the Algeciras Act, shall not be in any way impeded.

ARTICLE II.

With this view it is agreed that the Imperial Government will raise no objection to France, after obtaining the consent of the Moorish Government, proceeding with such military occupation of Moorish territory as she may consider necessary for the maintenance of order and the security of commercial transactions, and to her exercising all rights of police on land and in Moorish waters.

ARTICLE III.

From now henceforward, if His Majesty the Sultan of Morocco should entrust to the diplomatic and consular agents of France the representation and protection of Moorish subjects abroad, the Imperial Government declare that they will raise no objection.

If, on the other hand, His Majesty the Sultan handed over to the French representative at the Moorish Court the duty of acting as intermediary with the other foreign representatives, the German Government would raise no objection.

ARTICLE IV.

The French Government declare that, firmly attached to the principle of commercial liberty in Morocco, they will not permit any inequality either as regards the establishment of customs duties, taxes, or other contributions, or as regards the establishment of tariffs for transport by rail, river, or other means, and especially as regards all questions of transit.

The French Government will also use their influence with the Moorish Government with a view to prevent any differential treatment of subjects of the different Powers; they will more particularly oppose any measure, the promulgation, for instance, of administrative decrees dealing with weights and measures, gauging, stamping, etc. which might place the merchandise of a Power in a position of inferiority.

The French Government engage to use their influence with the State Bank with a view to the posts of delegate which are in the gift of the bank, on the Commission of Customs Valuation and on the Standing Customs Committee being conferred in turn on the members of the management of the bank at Tangier.

ARTICLE V.

The French Government will see that no export duty is levied in Morocco on iron ore exported from Moorish ports. Mines of iron ore will be subject to no special

tax on their output or methods of working. They shall, apart from the general taxes, pay only a fixed charge, calculated by the hectare and yearly, and a charge in proportion to the gross output. These charges, which shall be fixed in accordance with Articles XXXV. and XLIX. of the draft mining regulations attached to the protocol of the 7th June, 1910, of the Paris conference, shall be paid equally by all mining undertakings.

The French Government will see that the mining taxes are collected regularly, and that on no pretext whatever the whole or a part of these taxes shall be remitted.

ARTICLE VI.

The Government of the French Republic engage to see that the contracts for works and materials, which may be necessary in connection with any future concessions for roads, railways, harbours, telegraphs, etc., are allotted by the Moorish Government in accordance with the rules of adjudication.

They engage further to see that the conditions for tendering, more especially as regards the supply of materials and the limit of time within which tenders must be submitted, do not place the subjects of any Power in a position of inferiority.

The working of the great undertakings mentioned above shall be reserved to the Moorish State or entrusted, by a concession, to third parties, who may be asked to furnish the funds necessary for the purpose. The French Government will see that as regards the working of railways and other means of transport, as also the application of the regulations which govern such working, no differential treatment is accorded to the subjects of the different Powers who use such means of transport.

The Government of the Republic will use their influence with the State Bank with a view to the post of delegate on the General Commission of Tenders and Contracts being conferred in turn on the members of the Management of the bank at Tangier.

Similarly, the French Government will use their

influence with the Moorish Government in order that, so long as Article LXVI. of the Algeciras Act remains in force, one of the three posts of Shereefian delegate on the Special Committee of Public Works is conferred on a subject of one of the Powers represented in Morocco.

ARTICLE VII.

The French Government will use their influence with the Moorish Government in order that the owners of mines and other industrial or agricultural undertakings, without distinction of nationality, and in accordance with the regulations which may be issued on the model of French legislation on the same subject, may be authorised to build light railways connecting their centres of production with the lines of general public utility and with the ports.

ARTICLE VIII.

Each year a report on the working of the railways in Morocco shall be presented, drawn up in the same form and under the same conditions as the reports which are laid before the meetings of shareholders in French railway companies.

The Government of the Republic shall entrust to one of the directors of the State Bank the duty of drawing up this report which, together with the materials on which it is based, shall be submitted to the Censors, and then published, with, if necessary, such observations as the latter may wish to append thereto, founded on their own information.

ARTICLE IX.

In order to avoid, as far as possible, diplomatic representations, the French Government will urge the Moorish Government to refer to an arbitrator, nominated *ad hoc* in each case by agreement between the French consul and the consul of the Power interested, or, failing them, by the two Governments, such complaints brought by foreign

subjects against the Moorish authorities or agents acting in the capacity of Moorish authorities as shall not have been found capable of adjustment through the intermediary of the French consul and the consul of the Power interested.

This mode of procedure shall remain in force until such time as a judicial system, founded on the general principles embodied in the legislation of the Powers interested, shall have been introduced, which shall ultimately, by agreement between those Powers, replace the consular courts.

ARTICLE X.

The French Government will see that foreign subjects continue to enjoy the right of fishing in Moorish waters and harbours.

ARTICLE XI.

The French Government will urge the Moorish Government to open to foreign commerce new ports from time to time in accordance with the growing requirements of trade.

ARTICLE XII.

In order to meet a request of the Moorish Government, the two Governments undertake to urge, in agreement with the other Powers and on the basis of the Madrid Convention, the revision of the lists and the reconsideration of the position of foreign-protected subjects and mokhalats (*associés agricoles*) which are dealt with in Articles VIII. and XVI. of that convention.

They likewise agree to urge upon the signatory Powers any modifications of the Madrid Convention which may be made necessary, when the time comes, by the change in the status of foreign-protected persons and mokhalats (*associés agricoles*).

ARTICLE XIII.

Any clause of an agreement, convention, treaty, or regulation which may conflict with the foregoing stipulations is, and remains, abrogated.

ARTICLE XIV.

The present agreement shall be communicated to the other signatory Powers of the Algeciras Act, and the two Governments engage to give their mutual support with a view to obtain the adhesion of those Powers.

ARTICLE XV.

The present convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications exchanged at Paris as soon as possible.

Done in duplicate at Berlin, the 4th November, 1911.

APPENDIX XVI.

EXCHANGE OF NOTES ATTACHED TO THE FRANCO-GERMAN
CONVENTION OF NOVEMBER 4, 1911.

M. de Kiderlen-Waechter, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to M. Jules Cambon, Ambassador of the French Republic at Berlin.

Berlin, November 4th, 1911.

MY DEAR AMBASSADOR,

In order to make quite clear the agreement of the 4th November, 1911, respecting Morocco, and to define its meaning, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that, in the event of the French Government deeming it necessary to assume the Protectorate of Morocco, the Imperial Government would place no obstacle in the way.

The adherence of the German Government, accorded

in a general manner to the French Government in the first article of the said convention, applies of course, to all questions as are provided for in the Algeciras Act, which require regulating.

You were good enough to inform me, on the other hand, that, should Germany wish to acquire from Spain Spanish Guinea, Corisco Island, and the Elobey Islands, France would be prepared to waive in Germany's favour the exercise of her preferential rights which she holds by virtue of the treaty of the 27th June, 1900, between France and Spain. I have pleasure in taking note of this assurance, and in adding that Germany will not intervene in any special agreements which France and Spain may think fit to conclude with each other on the subject of Morocco, it being understood that Morocco comprises all that part of Northern Africa which is situated between Algeria, French West Africa, and the Spanish colony of Rio de Oro.

The German Government, while they abstain from asking that the share to be granted to German industry in the construction of railways shall be fixed in advance, rely on the readiness of the French Government always to welcome the association of interests between nationals of both countries in schemes for which they may respectively obtain a concession.

They rely likewise on the construction of no other Moorish railway being put up to public tender before the railway from Tangier to Fez, in which all the nations are interested, is put up to public tender, and on the French Government proposing to the Moorish Government the opening of the port of Agadir to international commerce.

Finally, when the system of railways of general interest is planned, the German Government request the French Government to see that the Moorish administration show a genuine regard for the economic interests of Morocco, and that, more particularly the alignment of the lines of public interest is such as to facilitate, so far as may be possible, connections between the mining districts and the lines of public interest or the ports which form their natural outlet.

Your Excellency was good enough to assure me that as soon as the judicial system referred to in Article IX. of the above-mentioned convention shall have been introduced, and the consular courts replaced, the French Government will ensure that German nationals are placed under the new jurisdiction in exactly the same conditions as French nationals. I have pleasure in taking note of this assurance, and at the same time in informing your Excellency that, when this judicial system is put into force, in agreement with the Powers, the German Government will consent to the abolition of their consular courts at the same time as those of the other Powers. I would add that, in my view the expression "changes in the status of protected persons" which is used in Article XII. of the convention of the 4th November, 1911, respecting Morocco, implies the abrogation, if it be thought necessary, of that part of the Madrid Convention which deals with protected persons and *mokhalats* (*associés agricoles*).

Finally, being desirous of giving to the said convention the character of an act destined not only to remove every cause of conflict between our two countries, but also to strengthen their good relations, we unite in declaring that any disputes which may arise between the contracting parties on the subject of the interpretation and the application of the stipulations of the convention of the 4th November, and which shall not have been settled diplomatically, shall be submitted to a court of arbitration constituted in accordance with the terms of the Hague Convention of the 18th October, 1907. Terms of Reference shall be drawn up, and the procedure shall follow the rules laid down in the same convention so far as provision to the contrary has not been made by an agreement between the parties at the time of going to arbitration.

DE KIDERLEN.

M. JULES CAMBON, AMBASSADOR OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC AT BERLIN, TO M. DE KIDERLEN-WAECHTER, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

Berlin, November 4, 1911.

MY DEAR SECRETARY OF STATE,

I have the honour to take note of the declaration which your Excellency has been good enough to make to me that, in the event of the French Government deeming it necessary to assume a protectorate over Morocco, the Imperial Government would place no obstacle in the way, and that the adherence of the German Government, accorded in a general manner to the French Government in the first article of the agreement of the 4th November, 1911, respecting Morocco, applies as a matter of course to all questions which require regulating provided for in the Algeciras Act.

On the other hand, I have the honour to confirm the statement that, should the German Government wish to acquire from Spain, Spanish Guinea, Corisco Island, and the Elobey Islands, France is prepared to waive in Germany's favour the exercise of her preferential rights which she holds by virtue of the treaty of the 27th June, 1900, between France and Spain. I am glad, on my part, to receive the assurance that Germany will not intervene in any special agreements which France and Spain may think fit to conclude with each other on the subject of Morocco, it being understood that Morocco comprises all that part of Northern Africa which is situated between Algeria, French West Africa, and the Spanish Colony of Rio de Oro.

I have pleasure also in informing you that, while the German Government abstain from asking that the share to be granted to German industry in the construction of railways shall be fixed in advance, the French Government will welcome the association of interests between nationals of both countries in schemes for which they may respectively obtain a concession.

You may also rest assured that the construction of

no other Moorish railway will be put up to public tender before the railway from Tangier to Fez, in which all nations are interested, is put up to public tender, and that the French Government will propose to the Moorish Government the opening of the port of Agadir to international commerce.

Finally, when the system of railways of public interest is planned, the French Government will see that the Moorish administration show a genuine regard for the economic interests of Morocco, and that, more particularly the alignment of the lines of public interest is such as to facilitate, so far as may be possible, connections between the mining districts and the lines of public interests or the ports which form their natural outlet. Your Excellency may likewise rest assured that as soon as the judicial system referred to in Article IX. of the convention of the 4th November, 1911, respecting Morocco is introduced, and the consular courts replaced, the French Government will insure that German nationals are placed under the new jurisdiction in exactly the same conditions as French nationals.

I have, on the other hand, pleasure in taking note of the statement that when this judicial system is put into force, in agreement with the Powers, the German Government will consent to the abolition of their consular courts at the same time as those of the other Powers. I take note also of the statement that, in your Excellency's view, the expression "changes in the status of protected persons," which is used in Article XII. of the above-mentioned convention, implies the abrogation, if it be thought necessary, of that part of the Madrid Convention which deals with protected persons and *mokhalats* (*associés agricoles*).

Finally, being desirous of giving to the convention of the 4th November, 1911, respecting Morocco, the character of an act destined not only to remove every cause of conflict between our two countries, but also to strengthen their good relations, we are agreed in declaring that any disputes which may arise between the contracting parties on the subject of the interpretation and the application

of the stipulations of the said convention, and which shall not have been settled diplomatically, shall be submitted to a court of arbitration constituted in accordance with the terms of The Hague Convention of the 18th October, 1907.

Terms of Reference shall be drawn up and the procedure shall follow the rules laid down in the same convention, so far as provision to the contrary has not been made, by an agreement between the parties at the time of going to arbitration.

JULES CAMBON.

APPENDIX XVII.

THE FRANCO-GERMAN CONVENTION RESPECTING THE CONGO, 4th NOVEMBER, 1911.

(This Convention, which it is quite as important that the British public should be familiar with as the Convention signed at the same time respecting Morocco, was not published in the British White-Book, C.D. 1153, and neither was the exchange of notes between the German and French Governments relating thereto. The British White-Book is therefore quite incomplete and the House of Commons is unable therefrom to appreciate the full character of the Franco-German settlement. In view of the definite attitude taken up by the British Foreign Office in regard to this part of the Franco-German negotiations (*vide* Chapters XIX. and XX.), this omission from the British White-Book is the more remarkable.)

THE Government of the French Republic and the Government of the German Emperor, following and completing the Convention of the 4th November, 1911, relating to Morocco, and by reason of the rights of protection over the Shereefian Empire recognised to France, have agreed to proceed to territorial exchanges in their possessions in equatorial Africa and have resolved to conclude a Convention to that effect. In consequence M. Jules Cambon, Ambassador Extraordinary of the French Republic to His Majesty the German Emperor, and Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for the

German Empire, after having communicated to one another their full powers seen to be in good and due form, have agreed to the following:

ARTICLE I.

France cedes to Germany the territories of which the boundaries are fixed as follows: the frontier will start from the Atlantic coast to a point to be determined upon on the eastern bank of the Bay of Monda towards the mouth of the Massolie; proceeding towards the north-east the frontier will oblique towards the south-east angle of Spanish Guinea; it will cut the Ivondo river at its confluence with the Djoua river, will follow that river as far as Madjingou (which will remain French) and from that point will be directed eastwards to end at the confluence of the N'Goko and of the Sangha to the north of Ouessou; the frontier will then start from the Sangha river to a point situate to the south of Ouessou (which will remain French) to a distance of six kilometres at least and twelve kilometres at the most from this locality according to local geographical conditions; the frontier will oblique towards the south-west to rejoin the valley of the Kandeko until its confluence with the Bokida; it will descend the latter and the Likouala as far as the right bank of the Congo river; it will follow the Congo river to the mouth of the Sangha and in such a way as to occupy on the Congo river the extent of from six to twelve kilometres which will be determined according to geographical conditions; the frontier will ascend the Sangha as far as the Likoula *aux herbes*¹ which it will then follow to Botungo; it will then proceed from the south to the north in almost a straight line as far as Bera N'Goko; it will then inflect in the direction of the confluence of the Bodingue and of the Lobay and will descend the course of the Lobay as far as the Ubanghi to the north of Mongo-umba; on the right bank of the Ubanghi and following the local geographical conditions the German territory will be determined in such a way as to extend over a

¹ The Likoula *aux herbes* is distinct from the Likoula.

space of six kilometres at least and twelve kilometres at most; the frontier will then oblique towards the north-west in order to attain the river Pama at a point to be determined on the west of its confluence with the Mbi, will ascend the valley of the Pama and will then rejoin the eastern Logone about the spot where this river meets the eighth parallel at the elevation of Gore; the frontier will then follow the course of the Logone towards the north until its confluence with the Shari.

ARTICLE II.

Germany cedes to France the territories situate north of the actual frontier of the French possessions in the Chad territories and comprised between the Shari on the east and the Logone on the west.

ARTICLE III.

Within a period of six months dating from the exchange of the ratifications of the present Convention a Technical Commission whose members will be appointed in equal number by the two French and German Governments will determine the tracing of the frontier whose general indication is specified in the text of Articles I. and II. Within a period of eighteen months, to be reckoned from the signature of the *procès verbal* of the works of the Technical Commission, the settlement of the frontiers in conformity with the said *procès verbal* and the selection and settlement of the areas leased to the French Government as specified in the following Article will be proceeded with by common accord and as rapidly as possible.

ARTICLE IV.

The Technical Commission and the agents charged with the delimitation mentioned in the preceding Article will be entitled by common accord to take into consideration the configuration of the ground and local circumstances, such, for example, as facilities for supervising the frontier, and the unity of race and population. They will

also as far as possible cause the frontier to follow the natural boundaries indicated by the course of the rivers and in the event of a frontier cutting the direction of the rivers, to make it follow the line of the watershed. The *procès verbaux* of the Technical Commission and those of the agents of delimitation will only become conclusive after ratification by the two Governments.

ARTICLE V.

The present exchanges of territory are made in the conditions in which these territories are found at the time of the conclusion of the present accord; that is to say, both Governments shall respect public and private concessions which may have been consented to by either of them. The two Governments will communicate to one another the text of the agreements by which these concessions have been granted. The German Government is substituted for the French Republic in all the advantages, rights, and obligations resulting from the agreements mentioned above in regard to concessionaire companies which will pass under the sovereignty, the authority and the jurisdiction of the German State. A special Convention will regulate the application of the above stipulation. The same will apply as far as the French State is concerned to concessions which might be situate in the territories which will pass under its sovereignty, its authority, and its jurisdiction.

ARTICLE VI.

The German Government will bring no obstacle to bear upon the exploitation, the upkeep and the works of repair and improvement of the French telegraphic line now existing along the Ubanghi, and it will remain French where it crosses German territory. The German authorities will be entitled to transmit their communications by this line on conditions which will be ultimately settled.

ARTICLE VII.

If the French Government desires to prosecute across German territory the railway between the Gaboon and the Middle-Congo and between the latter and the Ubanghi-Shari, the German Government will not place any obstacle thereto. The survey and the works will take place according to arrangements which will be effected when the time has come between the two Governments, the German Government undertaking to make it known if it desires to take part in the execution of these works upon its territory. If the German Government desires to continue to prosecute upon French territory a railway established in the Cameroons, the French Government will not place any obstacle thereto. The survey of the works will take place according to arrangements which will be made when the time has come between the two Governments, the French Government reserving to itself the right of making it known if it desires to take part in the execution of these works upon its territory.

ARTICLE VIII.

The Imperial Government will cede on lease to the French Government, on conditions to be determined by a special Act, on the banks of the Benue, the Mayo-Kebi and above in the direction of the Logone, plots to be chosen in view of the establishment of victualling stations and workshops erected for the creation of a victualling route. Each of these plots, whose length at high water should be at the most 500 metres, will have an area which must not exceed 50 hectares. The spots chosen for these plots shall be settled according to local conditions. If in the future the French Government desires to establish between the Benue and the Logone above and below the Mayo-Kebi a route or a railway, the Imperial Government would not place any obstacle thereto. The French and the German Governments will come to an understanding on the conditions on which this work can be accomplished.

ARTICLE IX.

France and Germany, desiring to confirm their good relations in their possessions in Central Africa, undertake not to erect any fortified work along the rivers which serve for common navigation. This undertaking will not apply to works of mere defence erected to protect the stations against native attacks.

ARTICLE X.

The French and German Governments will come to an understanding for the works to be executed in view to facilitate the navigation of boats and craft on the water-courses whose navigation will be common to both.

ARTICLE XI.

In the case of stoppage of navigation on the Congo or the Ubanghi, liberty of passage will be assured to France and to Germany on the territories belonging to either nation at the points where the latter touch the rivers.

ARTICLE XII.

The Governments of France and Germany renew the declarations contained in the Act of Berlin of 26th February, 1885, and ensure the commercial liberty and freedom of navigation on the Congo and the affluents of that river, as on those of the Niger. In consequence, German goods in transit across French territory situate on the west of the Ubanghi and French goods in transit across the territories ceded to Germany or following the routes indicated in Article VIII. will be free of all duty. An accord concluded between the two Governments will determine the conditions of this transit and the points of penetration.

ARTICLE XIII.

The German Government will place no obstacle to the passage of French troops, of their arms or munitions or of their stores by the Congo, the Ubanghi, the Benue, the Mayo-Kebi and the railway to be ultimately constructed to the north of the Cameroons. The French Government will place no obstacle to the passage of German troops, of their arms and munitions, also their stores, by the Congo, the Ubanghi, the Benue, the Mayo-Kebi and the railway to be eventually constructed from the coast to Brazzaville. In one and the other case the troops, if they are purely native troops, must always be accompanied by a European officer, and the Government of the territory over which the troops will pass must take all necessary measures to avoid that any difficulty should be opposed to their passage, and may, if necessary, delegate an agent to accompany them. The local authorities will settle the conditions in which the passage of the troops will take place.

ARTICLE XIV.

Equality of treatment for the transport of persons and of goods will be assured to the subjects of both nations on the railways in their possessions of the Congo and the Cameroons.

ARTICLE XV.

The French and German Governments will cease from the date of the reciprocal cession of the territories ceded by Germany to France and by France to Germany to exercise any sort of protection and authority over the natives of the territories respectively ceded by them.

ARTICLE XVI.

In the event of the territorial status of the Conventional Basin of the Congo such as it has been described

by the Act of Berlin of 26th February, 1885, being modified through one or other of the contracting parties, the latter must confer between them, as also between the other Powers signatory to the Act of Berlin.

ARTICLE XVII.

The present Convention will be ratified, and the ratifications will be exchanged at Paris as soon as possible.

APPENDIX XVIII.

EXCHANGE OF NOTES BETWEEN THE GERMAN AND FRENCH GOVERNMENTS RELATING TO THE ABOVE CONVENTION.

(Herr Von Kiderlen-Waechter, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for the German Empire, to M. Jules Cambon, Ambassador to the French Republic at Berlin.)
November 4, 1911.

MY DEAR AMBASSADOR,

In order to vindicate thoroughly the spirit in which the Convention that we have just signed relating to territorial exchanges in Central Africa will be applied, it is understood between the two Governments that divergencies which might arise between the contracting parties on the subject of the interpretation and of the application of the stipulations of this Convention will be submitted to an arbitral tribunal constituted by the terms of the Hague Convention of 8th October, 1907, a compromise must be drawn up, and proceedings will follow the regulations of the said Convention, in so far as they are not out of harmony with a special accord concluded at the time of the divergencies. However, if misunderstandings arise between the members of the Technical Commission instructed to fix the delimitations of frontier, an arbitrator nominated by common accord between the two Governments and belonging to a third Power will have the casting vote. The German Government will

always be happy to see the creation of business undertakings between the subjects of the two countries or enterprises which they might undertake in the French and German possessions which form the subject of this Convention. It is understood that the application of the said Convention will be made according to the rules provided by the Franco-German Convention of 18th April, 1908, on the Congo-Cameroons frontier by the protocols annexed thereto.

(Here follows the enumeration of the eleven Articles wholly relating to the character of the regulations affecting the potential lease of plots of land on the Benue and the Mayo-Kebi by the Germans to the French Government).

Signed conjointly by M. Jules Cambon and Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter.

APPENDIX XIX.

THE *TIMES* PARIS DESPATCH OF JULY 19 (*TIMES*, JULY 20): INTRODUCTORY EDITORIAL NOTE AND EDITORIAL OF JULY 20, AND THE *TIMES* EDITORIAL OF JULY 22 ON MR. LLOYD GEORGE'S SPEECH.

Times, July 20, 1911.

*The Moroccan Crisis—German Demands in West Africa—
Strong Feeling in France.*

WE understand that the conversations which have been conducted in Berlin between Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter, the German Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and M. Jules Cambon, the French ambassador in Germany, have now resulted in the formulation of extensive German demands. These amount to the complete cession by France of the coast and interior of the French Congo up to the Sangha River, together with the contingent reversion held by France over the Congo State.¹

¹ This, as will be observed, is not mentioned in the Paris despatch.

As will be seen from the accompanying map, the Sangha River is a tributary of the Congo, flowing north-east in such a way as to cut the French Congo in half at the point where the German Cameroons project most nearly to the frontier of the Congo State. Under the suggested arrangement France would retain the *Hinterland* of the French Congo, but it would be entirely cut off from communication with the Atlantic except through German or Belgian territory.

In the Cameroons the German Empire already possesses a colony of nearly 200,000 square miles in area. The suggested extension would add to this an area of at least another 200,000 square miles, with two existing ports at Libreville and Loango. It would leave the German territory on the Gulf of Guinea divided from German South-West Africa only by the narrow strip of the Congo State which reaches down to the Atlantic and by the Portuguese colony of Angola. With the cession of the French contingent rights over the Congo State Germany would moreover obtain a special position in regard to the only territory which would still divide her possessions on the Gulf from her possessions in German East Africa.

These "compensations" would obviously touch British interests in Africa in several very important directions; and they are so disproportionate to any interest which Germany can cede in Morocco that it is difficult to regard them as seriously claimed.

German Policy and British Interests.

(From our own Correspondent.)

Paris, July 19.

There is, unfortunately, little ground for optimism with regard to the aspect which the Franco-German negotiations are assuming. Mr. Asquith, in replying to Mr. Balfour in the House of Commons on July 6, said that, in the opinion of the British Government, "a new situation" had arisen "in which it is possible that future

developments may affect British interests more directly than has hitherto been the case." Unless all the symptoms are misleading, these developments affecting British interests are already in progress.

According to all appearances Germany is using her continued "demonstration" at Agadir, as well as the Franco-Spanish tension at Alcazar, in order to press proposals which, as German statesmen must be well aware, could not for one moment be entertained by any conceivable French Government. It has not been asserted on the German side that France has been guilty of any contravention of the Algeciras Act or of the Franco-German agreement of February, 1909. Yet Germany is demanding impossible "compensations," which embrace the whole of the Gabun territory in the French Congo, including the very important harbour of Libreville. Compensations for what? For an undertaking to remove her warships from Agadir. That is what it all comes to. There appears to be no proposal that any of the valuable economic rights secured to Germany in Morocco by the Algeciras Act and by the Franco-German Agreement of 1909 should be relinquished. Nor is there any word of German guarantees for the better fulfilment of Germany's promise in the 1909 Agreement not to impede (*entraver*) the acknowledged "political interest" of France in Morocco. The danger of future German interventions would remain as great as before.

Motives of the Proposal.

The proposed bargain is so monstrously unfair that its proposers cannot seriously have believed that it would be entertained in Paris. What, then, can be their object? The opinion is spreading here that Germany desires to narrow the practical choice for France to relinquishment of the Agadir *enclave* by the Sultan of Morocco in favour of Germany. This solution would have two advantages from the German point of view. It would satisfy Pan-German and naval ambitions in Germany, and by directly compromising British interests it would put a, perhaps,

fatal strain upon the Anglo-French Entente. Kindred suggestions, such as the establishment of a "chartered company" or companies in the *Hinterland* of Agadir, would, if realized, be mere steps towards the radical solution of a German acquisition of territory. They in any case amount to a violation of the integrity and independence of Morocco, since the rights of a "chartered company" imply the local exercise of independent authority.

It is true that on all sides the assurance is given here that France, both in her own interest and in that of her partner in the Entente Cordiale, will never consent to any of these solutions at the expense of Moroccan territory. In that case she is left face to face with the impossible German demands in the French Congo or with the alternative of the continued "demonstration" at Agadir and the possibility of a German landing and occupation in force, which its effect upon the natives may at any moment produce.

Another Alternative.

There is, however, another set of suggestions which has been tentatively put forward by the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, and which represents a return to the German aims which were frustrated by Prince Bülow's policy of "bluff" in 1905 and at the Algeiras Conference. These suggestions amount to nothing less than a general reconciliation of France and Germany on the basis of the unreserved opening of the French Money Market for the benefit of the German national credit and German industrial enterprises at home and abroad. I am assured that at this time of day this project is not favoured in any influential quarter in France—not even among those who may be called the political heirs of the late M. Rouvier. It has now been universally recognised that the political consequences of a settlement on this scale would be too far-reaching, and that, quite apart from the question of Anglo-French relations, it would mean the death-blow to the Russian Alliance. And behind these and other

insuperable objections there remains the vital question of Alsace-Lorraine.

All these considerations tend to show how easily the present Franco-German conversations may lead to a deadlock, and also at how many points "future developments may affect British interests." In this connexion the leading article in *The Times* of to-day is widely quoted with manifest approval, and it would be regarded as entirely in keeping with Mr. Asquith's statement on July 6 if Great Britain should decide to see for herself what the Germans are doing at Agadir.

(The concluding portion of the despatch is concerned with an interview between the Sultan of Morocco and a correspondent of *Le Temps*.)

The German Demands.

Times, July 20, 1911.

"The German demands are at last known. They are understood to be surrender by France to Germany of the whole of French Congo from the sea to the River Sangha, and also the renunciation in Germany's favour of the contingent claims of France to the acquisition of the Congo State should circumstances at any time lead to the alienation of that vast and important territory by its present possessors. This is the 'compensation' which Germany demands for the aid which France has given to the Sultan of Morocco at his express request for the maintenance of his sovereignty and the restoration of order and peace within a portion of his dominions. The world has been accustomed to large demands by Germany, but it will hardly learn without extreme surprise of pretensions so far-reaching as these. They are, indeed, so extravagant that we shall be slow to regard them as seriously made. German statesmen, as our Paris correspondent says, must know perfectly well that no French Government could for a moment entertain them. They must know equally well that no British Government could consent to suffer so great a change to be made in the

distribution of power in Africa, even were a French Government to be found feeble enough to sanction it. A glance at the map and a very elementary knowledge of African politics are enough to show how this immense transfer of territory, which apparently Germany proposes to effect by an arrangement confined to France and herself, would prejudice the interests of other States, and, in particular, interests that are of the deepest concern to this Empire. German statesmen must surely understand that when the Prime Minister of England employs such language as Mr. Asquith used on July 6 in Parliament his words have a serious meaning. He affirmed on that occasion that, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, a new situation had even then arisen in Morocco. That, he said, he wished to be clearly understood. He added that in this new situation 'it was possible that future developments might affect British interests more directly than had hitherto been the case,' and after expressing his confidence that diplomatic discussion would find a solution, he went on to declare that 'in the part that we shall take in it, we shall have due regard to the protection of those interests,' as well as to 'the fulfilment of our treaty obligations with France.' That statement was made long before we had any inkling of the dimensions which German pretensions were to assume. It was made just after a German gunboat had been despatched to Agadir, and was doubtless intended in the first instance to refer to that incident, despite the semi-official German assurance that the presence of the *Panther* in a closed Moroccan port was of a wholly temporary character. It applies, we need hardly say, to the present astonishing development even more fully. By it British interests, and other foreign interests as well, would be far more directly affected than by any step which Germany has yet taken in Morocco or in Africa. The nation will expect the Prime Minister to make good his words, as doubtless he for his part is determined to do—to see to it that we take an active and decided part in any international discussion which is to concern the future of the African coasts, and to uphold effectively our interests.

"It is unnecessary for the moment to follow our Paris correspondent in his re-statement of the unanswerable objections which French opinion is raising against an indefensible claim. It is enough to note with him that Germany does not pretend to tender France any real equivalent for the concession she requires. She has again and again declared by the mouths of her leading statesmen and in her official Press that her interests in Morocco are wholly commercial, and it is little more than two years ago since she re-affirmed this statement in the most explicit terms in a solemn compact with France. She does not pretend that her commercial interests have been prejudiced by France. She has acknowledged the 'special political interests of France' in Morocco, and has announced her resolve 'not to impede those interests.' Nevertheless, she seizes on the opportunity given her by France's vindication of those 'special political interests' to invite the Republic to hand her over a vast colonial dominion acquired by French energy, money, and blood, and to surrender to her claims over an adjoining territory vaster still, the possession of which would make her the dominant Power of Central Africa, give her one of the best harbours and coaling stations on the Atlantic coast,¹ bring her into immediate contact with our possessions at several new points, and cut off British South Africa from the North.² The claims to the Congo State which she asks to have transferred to her are, it may be pleaded, but contingent claims. That no doubt is the case, but when her proximity to Belgium is considered, it is easy to imagine means which might be employed to ensure the early falling in of this desirable reversion.³ Even the acquisition of the territory of which she seeks immediate possession would leave her territory on the Gulf of Guinea divided from German South-West Africa only by the little slice of seaboard belonging to the Congo State and the Portuguese colony of Angola.⁴ Would

¹ *I.e.* Libreville.

² British South Africa is "cut off" now if it comes to that!

³ The argument applies equally to France which now actually possesses these "contingent claims."

⁴ Or, say, 1000 miles.

Portugal be more exempt from German blandishments and German pressure in such a case than Belgium, or better able of her own strength to resist them? ¹

"When our possessions in South Africa were much less important than they are to-day, we refused to allow even a weak Power like Portugal to assert claims which would have cut off our Southern Colonies from the interior.² The reasons which forbade us to tolerate such action on the part of Portugal apply with tenfold force to the great and progressive Power which desires to acquire rights by means of which she might one day repeat the threatened Portuguese manœuvre. That our South African countrymen will realise very clearly, perhaps to the correction of certain arguments recently advanced in two Boer organs. We are, however, as we have said already, not at present disposed to regard the German claim as seriously intended.³ Our Paris correspondent tells us that French opinion is divided as to what may be the real purpose it is meant to cover. Some suggest that Germany, despite her devotion to the Algeciras Act and the integrity and independence of the Sultan's dominions, wants, after all, to establish herself at Agadir. Others suppose that her true aim is to induce France to open the Paris money market to German transactions. Both objects, and the International political ends involved in them, may no doubt be cherished in German hearts. We doubt, however, whether they are adequate to explain this new diplomatic disturbance of the tranquillity of the world. We do not, and cannot, believe that the claims for the French Congo and for the contingent reversion of the Congo State are anything more than audacious and not very skilful or judicious 'bluff'—possibly not without its electioneering aspects. But we also believe that Germany has not yet shown her hand. It is time that she was invited to do so. Possibly the visit of one or two British ships to Agadir, such as we suggested yesterday, might hasten developments."

¹ It is notorious that Britain and Germany came to an understanding twelve years ago on this very subject.

² What "interior?" Is *all* Africa to be our "interior?"

³ It was never put forward so far as the Congo State is concerned.

*The European Crisis.**Times*, July 22, 1911. 1

"Mr. Lloyd George's clear, decisive, and statesmanlike reference at the Bankers' Dinner last night, to the European situation created by the German demands in West Africa will be endorsed without distinction of party by all his countrymen. In making public the amazing character of those demands on Thursday last we called attention to the extreme gravity of the claim which they imply. It is not merely that Germany, in advancing them, demands concessions out of all proportion to the interests which she is able and prepared to cede, though that aspect in itself is serious enough. Far more serious, because the present *démarche* is only the last of several attempts of a kindred nature, is the light which it throws upon the whole method and purpose of German statesmanship. Some indignation is expressed in the German Press at the fact that Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter's suggestions have been brought into the light and at the criticism which they have evoked. We cannot pretend to regret either the publicity or the criticism. Europe has nothing to lose by revelations which show the true pretensions of its greatest military Power, even though the diplomacy of that Power itself may prefer to move, as Dick Turpin preferred to move, in the dark.¹ The purport of such demands as were outlined in Berlin last week is nothing less than a claim for absolute European predominance. Neither France nor Great Britain could have entertained them for a moment without confessing themselves overborne by German power. That is not the intention of our French neighbours, nor is it our own. Mr. Lloyd George made that perfectly clear last night. 'If a situation were to be forced on us,' he said, 'in which peace could only be preserved by the surrender of the great and beneficent position Britain has won by centuries of heroism and achievement, by allowing Great Britain to be treated

¹ The whole Moroccan record of Britain, France, and Spain since 1904, is a record in the dark: Germany has acted in the broad light of day.

where her interests were vitally affected, as if she were of no account in the Cabinet of Nations, then I say emphatically that peace at that price would be a humiliation intolerable for a great country like ours to endure.' We have insisted on the gravity of the position, because humiliation of that kind for the interested Powers was implicit in the German demands, but we have every confidence that, with the better understanding of British temper which Mr. Lloyd George's speech is calculated to produce, those demands will assume a more reasonable form. Mr. Lloyd George is under no suspicion of Jingoism, and it may be taken that in what he said last night he spoke not only for himself, but for the British Government. He spoke, indeed, for his countrymen as a whole. Even at such a moment of internal crisis as the present, party divisions can in no way affect the unity of English sentiment upon a question involving the honour as well as the interests of the country in the outside world. We ourselves know that that is so; it is time it were realised abroad."

APPENDIX XX

THE BRITISH AND GERMAN VERSION OF THE GREY-WOLF METTERNICH CONVERSATION ON JULY 21

The British Version.

(Extract from Sir E. Grey's speech in the House of Commons
on November 27, 1911.)

"A LITTLE later it appeared in the Press, and indeed it was the case, that the German Government had made demands with regard to the French Congo of an extent to which it was obvious to everybody who thought of it that neither the French Government nor the French Chamber could agree. That at once made me anxious as to the development of the situation. If Germany was going to negotiate with France an arrangement by which

Germany received from France something in the French Congo, and left France in Morocco as she was under our Agreement in 1904, then, of course, we were prepared to stand aside and not to intrude. If, however, Germany, starting negotiations on that basis with France, made demands, not for a portion, but for the greater part of the French Congo, or for anything of that kind, it was quite clear France must refuse those demands, the negotiations would be thrown back on some other basis, and the question of the possible partition would arise again. That is why I became anxious. I therefore asked the German Ambassador to see me again on July 21. I said to him, I wished it to be understood that our silence in the absence of any communication from the German Government, our silence since the Cabinet communication of July 4, and since the Prime Minister's statement of July 7 in this House, our silence since then must not be interpreted as meaning that we were not taking in the Moroccan question the interest which had been indicated by our statement of the 4th of that month.

"We knew that a rectification of the frontier of the French Congo had been proposed as the basis for negotiations with France. We thought it possible that a settlement might be come to between Germany and France on this basis without affecting British interests. We would be very glad if this happened, and in the hope that it would happen at a later stage we had hitherto put it aside. But I had been made anxious by the news which had appeared the day before as to the demands which the German Government had made on the French Government; demands which were in effect not a rectification of the frontier, but a cession of the French Congo, and which it was obviously impossible for the French Government to concede. I heard that negotiations were still proceeding, and I still hoped that they might lead to a satisfactory result, but it must be understood that if they were unsuccessful a very embarrassing situation would arise. I pointed out to the German Ambassador that the Germans were in the closed port of Agadir; that according to native rumours, they were landing and negotiating

with the tribes, so that for all we knew they might be acquiring concessions there, and that it might even be that the German flag had been hoisted at Agadir, which was the most suitable port on that coast for a naval basis. We could not say to what extent the situation might be altered to our disadvantage, and if the negotiations with France came to nothing we should be obliged to watch over British interests and to become a party to a discussion of the matter. The longer the Germans remained at Agadir the greater the risks of their developing a state of affairs which would make it more difficult for them to withdraw, and more necessary for us to take some steps to protect British interests. I wished to say all this now while we were still waiting in the hope that the negotiations with France would succeed, for if I did not say this now, it would cause resentment later on if the German Government had been led to suppose by our previous silence—our silence since July 4—that we did not take an interest in the matter. The German Ambassador was not in a position to give me any information, but he deprecated the assumption that what I had sketched as a possible damage to British interests was accomplished. He was sure that his Government had no intention of acquiring commercial monopolies and unfairly prejudicing our interests. On this I observed that the fact that Germany remained in occupation of a closed port involved at least a monopoly of commercial opportunities. I waited before saying anything further between July 4 and July 21. I made that statement on July 21 because I was getting anxious, because the situation seemed to me to be developing unfavourably, and the German Ambassador was still not in a position to make any communication to me from the German Government."

The German Version.

(Extract from the German Foreign Secretary's Statement before the German Reichstag on November 17.)

"The ambassador had reported on this conversation, which had taken place on July 21, that Sir E. Grey had

asked him for the interview. The Minister had expressed the wish to discuss the Morocco question with him in an unofficial manner, as he had, since the first *démarche* of the ambassador, heard nothing further from him. The Minister was compelled to touch now again on the Morocco question, because he feared that a situation might arise when his taking up a position on the Morocco question would have greater significance than a preliminary expression of views in the present phase of the question. He had from the very beginning never felt any doubt that in any settlement of the Morocco question England, owing to her great economic interests in that country, must take part. He had waited in the hope of an understanding between Germany and France. Since, however, as he now heard, our demands were so extensive that it was obvious that France would not be able to accept them, there was imminent danger that the negotiations would terminate without results; and in that case the question would again come to the front: "what was Germany doing in the closed port of Agadir and in its hinterland?" He had no news of what was going on there—whether German troops had been landed or whether treaties were being concluded which might be prejudicial to the economic participation of others. Agadir was very suitable for a naval base; no one knew what Germany intended to do there. Questions of this sort would be sure to be put to him in Parliament, and he was not in a position to give an explanatory answer.

"If the Franco-German negotiations failed, which, in view of our demands, appeared by no means unlikely, then the Agadir question, in which British interests were also involved, would at once come into the foreground. Therefore he believed that the time had come when England also should take part in the Franco-German negotiations. As long as there had been a well-founded hope of a Franco-German understanding outside Morocco, he had held aloof, as it would not disturb British policy if Germany and France endeavoured to reach a settlement on a colonial basis—for instance, by rectification of the Cameroon frontier, as had at first been said. As France,

however, could not accept the German demands, it was highly probable that the Morocco question proper would again be reopened, a question in which British interests were involved in a high degree, and in that case the question as to what our intentions were with regard to the closed port of Agadir and its hinterland would again become acute.

"He wished once more to declare that he had brought about this conversation only in the desire that he should not subsequently find himself face to face with facts which would oblige him too on his side to take up a definite position and whereby the already sufficiently complicated political situation might become still more difficult and serious.

"The ambassador had answered that he had no detailed information regarding the course of our negotiations with France, but that he could nevertheless not admit that our demands were, as the Minister had said, of course unacceptable, as otherwise we should not have put them forward. With this proviso the ambassador could naturally only express his own personal views. Sir E. Grey had stated, though not officially, that, as British interests were involved, the time had now come for negotiations *à trois*, and he had based this pretension on the idea that we might eventually establish a naval base in Agadir and cut off the hinterland. These were suppositions of which the Ambassador had no knowledge, and on mere suppositions no claim could be founded. Should, however, British interests have been injured by our proceedings, perhaps the Minister would be so good as to name them. As he was not in a position to do so, it would be more correct to wait until he could show that an English interest or right was affected. The Ambassador repeated that we had not the slightest intention of injuring English rights or interests. He could not admit that this had been done by the despatch of a warship to Agadir. He had communicated to the Minister the object and intention of this act when he made his first statement to him on the subject, namely, the protection of the interests of German subjects by the presence of a

warship until peace and quiet were restored. Hitherto it had been a generally recognised principle that a European nation is justified in personally undertaking the protection of her interests in a semi-barbaric country which does not belong to a third party. No third Power was bound by the Anglo-French Convention of 1904. Since this Convention Germany was only bound by the Algeciras Act and one treaty with France of 1909. Both the Act and our Convention assumed as a condition for everything else the independence of the Sultan and the integrity of Morocco. After the lasting occupation of the Shawia, and after the recent French expedition of conquest ('*Eroberungszug*') in a great part of Morocco, no one could seriously maintain that the territory of Morocco had not been violated, and that its Sultan was still independent. We made no complaint on this score, as the Ambassador had already likewise stated in the first conversation. Owing to the course events had taken, however, the moment had arrived when we were compelled to come to an understanding with France on the Moroccan question. We had now undertaken this step. If, as Sir E. Grey assumed, our proposals in other directions were considered unacceptable, this merely showed that France appeared to attach less importance than might have been expected to a free exercise of those pretensions of hers in Morocco which had not obtained international recognition. The presence of a foreign warship in a Moorish port had now to be taken into account.

"A glance at the map would show that a North African Colonial Empire, extending from the Tripolian frontier to Senegambia, together with supremacy in Morocco, was no small thing. England had obtained compensation from France in Egypt, which was also no small thing; we, however, had obtained nothing. If France desired that, we, like England, but always subject to the protection of our commercial interest, to step into the background in Morocco, she must offer some compensation approximately equivalent in value to the great goal she had in view. If not, we should know how to safeguard our independent position in Morocco. The Minister appeared to attach

great importance to the fact that we had despatched a warship to a closed port of Morocco, and that this port should have been Agadir, the appearance at which of a French warship last autumn had led us to address an inquiry to the French Government. To this the ambassador had to observe that last autumn the French expedition of conquest ('*Eroberungszug*') to Fez had not yet been entered upon. He could not conceal from the Minister that he seemed to be applying two standards, one standard for France and another for Germany. According to his (Sir E. Grey's) conception, a situation had arisen by the despatch of a German warship to Agadir which, looked at from the standpoint of English interests, demanded an explanation. If he attached so much importance to the inviolability of Moroccan territory, he should apply first and foremost to France for explanations. The occupation of the Shawia territory, the fact that a French army was spreading itself over the interior of Morocco meant, undoubtedly, a more active intervention in Moroccan affairs than the German action, so far as it went.

"The Minister (Grey) replied that he would in no wise stand in the way of an extension of German colonial possessions in the heart of Africa; he could not, however, shut his eyes to the fact that English interests might be most seriously affected by the Moroccan question itself. He had, therefore, honestly hoped for an understanding between France and Germany. It was only in view of the unwished-for possibility of the failure to arrive at such an understanding that he was compelled forthwith to make it clear that the *démarche* in Agadir would lead to an exchange of views between us and England. He considered that the situation would become less acute if an exchange of views took place between us before fresh events occurred at Agadir, which would compel England to take up a definite attitude in regard thereto. He had always hoped for an understanding between France and ourselves on Moroccan questions, and had, therefore, also welcomed our agreement with France of 1909.

"The Secretary of State indicated that it appeared from the interview with Sir E. Grey that the Minister had

obviously assumed that we intended to establish ourselves in Morocco, in spite of the communications made to him by the Ambassador immediately upon the despatch of the *Panther* to Agadir. The telegram in regard to the interview had reached Berlin on July 22, and the reply was despatched from here forthwith. In this reply the Ambassador was instructed to inform the Minister that we had declared from the very beginning that our ship at Agadir was solely intended to protect German interests there. A special motive for this was, amongst other things, the attack by natives on a German farm. Nothing had occurred up till now to justify a belief that we had changed our intentions. Not a man had yet been landed. We regretted that people in England should seem to think that credence should be attached to insinuations in regard to our intentions which clearly emanated from a source hostile to us. We had never thought of procuring a naval harbour on the coast of Morocco, nor would we ever think of such a thing. These were hallucinations. We had also no design on Moroccan territory, though we had to demand that France should either observe strictly the Algeciras Act or, if she thought she could not do so, come to an understanding with us.

“We had thought that the latter coincided more with French interests and made the proposal to the French—hitherto only in quite a general manner—to give us compensation in colonial territory for the renunciation of our right to protest against the action of France in Morocco.

“The negotiations had begun; both parties had mutually promised to observe the strictest secrecy. We took this obligation seriously and did not even inform our allies. France adopted a different course and, unfortunately, communicated not only to the press but, it appears, also in part to her friends information which, inaccurate and incomplete as it was, was calculated to arouse suspicion as to our intentions. We, therefore, did not negotiate further for a time, so long as the secrecy of the negotiations was not guaranteed. The negotiations could not be advanced by the chauvinistic tone of the French press, which also some English papers seemed recently to have

adopted, and which was especially directed towards threatening us with the intervention of France's allies and friends. If these negotiations should break down, we had still no designs on Moroccan territory. We should, however, in that event have been compelled to call on France with emphasis and determination to observe fully both the letter and the spirit of the Algeciras Act.

"As a great Power we could not permit France to infringe our rights in contravention of written treaties. We continued to hope, however, that a friendly conversation, *à deux*, would prevent its going so far as this. We counted upon the support of the other Powers, especially on that of England, should the French not be willing to come to an understanding on the basis proposed by us, and we had to demand the restoration of the *status quo ante* in Morocco.

"The Secretary of State declared that, therefore, after the communication with regard to the despatch of a ship had been made in the early days of July, no inquiry had been made by the British Government or the Imperial Government either in London or here. The first conversation which took place at the invitation of Sir E. Grey, after the communication respecting the despatch of a ship, was on July 21, and our reply to it was already in London on July 23. Therefore the assertion made by a portion of the German press that the German Government had for a fortnight returned no answer to a question addressed to them by the British Government fell to the ground."

APPENDIX XXI

THE BRITISH AND GERMAN VERSIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF THE GREY-WOLF METTERNICH CONVERSATIONS OF JULY 24 AND 27: MR. ASQUITH'S STATEMENT IN THE HOUSE ON JULY 27 AND THE GERMAN CHANCELLOR'S COMMENTS ON DECEMBER 5.

The British Version.

(Extract from Sir E. Grey's speech in the House of Commons on November 27, 1911.)

"ON July 24, three days after the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the German Ambassador came to see me. He informed me that the German intention in sending a ship to Agadir had not changed. Not a man had been landed there. The German Government regretted the credence which was given to the insinuations as to the intentions of Germany that came from hostile quarters. Germany had never thought of creating a naval port on the coast of Morocco and never would think of it. Such ideas were hallucinations. As to the negotiations with France, if the German demands were rather high his Government were ready to make concessions in Morocco as well as in Colonial matters: but the Chauvinistic tone of the French Press and a part of the British Press, menacing Germany with the interference of the friends of France, did not tend towards a settlement. I said that I was likely to be asked in Parliament what was happening at Agadir, and I should like to know whether I might say that the German Government had informed me that not a man had been landed. The Ambassador asked me to make no public statement with regard to this communication until he had had time to communicate with his Government. The next day, July 25, the German Ambassador came to see me again, and told me that the information that he had given me on the previous day was confidential, and that the German Government could not consent to its being

used in Parliament in view of the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He then made to me in regard to that speech a communication which has now been published by the German Government, and which I need not read in full to the House because it has been in the Press here already, except to say about it that that communication was a strong criticism upon the effect of the speech on the Press rather than upon the substance of the speech itself. The communication, however, was exceedingly stiff in tone, and I felt it necessary, for of course I had not expected any communication of this kind, to say at once that as the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer seemed to me to give no cause for complaint the fact that it had created surprise in Germany was in itself a justification of the speech, for it could not have created surprise unless there had been some tendency to think that we might be disregarded. The speech had not claimed anything except that we were entitled to be considered as one of the great nations. It had claimed no pre-eminence and it had not even indicated that there was a crisis. It dealt in general terms with remote contingencies. The German Government had said that it was not consistent with their dignity, after the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, to give explanations as to what was taking place at Agadir. I said to the Ambassador that the tone of their communication made it inconsistent with our dignity to give explanations as to the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Of course, by that I meant a public explanation. Explanations as to Agadir had already been given me by the German Ambassador, but it was the public explanation that the Government could not consent to. Then I thought it right to say further on the question generally, knowing that the interests of France were involved as well as our own, and that it was the desire of France that the negotiations should go smoothly—I said to the German Ambassador that it was not intended by anything that had been said or would be said here to embroil the negotiations between Germany and France. On the contrary, we sincerely desired that they should succeed, but

the tone of the German communication was unfavourable with regard to France as well as with regard to us, and made it more than ever evident that a very difficult situation would arise if the negotiations with France should not succeed.

“There the matter was left by that conversation, and there it remained for two days until July 27. Then the German Ambassador came to me again and made another communication from his Government in conversation, so that I took down the words. The communication he made to me on July 27 was this—I put it in the words I took down :

“‘We trust that Sir Edward Grey by our very open and candid communication has gathered the conviction that our *pourparlers* with France at the moment do not touch British interests. We trust the Minister’s great loyalty that he has so often shown and that he will find it possible to state this fact in Parliament, without, however, giving any details of our confidential communication. We acknowledge with pleasure that the Minister has stated that he desires an agreement between Germany and France, and feel quite convinced that this will prove most helpful to the progress of the negotiations. But, having in view the wish expressed by Sir Edward Grey, we cannot quite see how he can in the present state of the *pourparlers* describe our demands as obviously impossible without knowing what we on our side have the intention to offer to France in the political and Colonial territorial field. It is not possible in regard to the formal pledge of secrecy we have given’—‘we’ means the German Government—‘to go into details, but as the territories to be eventually exchanged are exclusively German and French, we do not believe that special English interests could be touched, and that it seems advisable to leave it to the two parties immediately concerned to form an estimation of the value of the objects to be eventually exchanged. Adverse criticism from the English side must obviously render the negotiations more difficult. On the other hand, a public statement that England would be pleased to see a successful conclusion to the

Franco-German *pourparlers* would have a most beneficial influence on an auspicious result for which we most earnestly hope. We most seriously wish to diminish any points of friction we have with France in the Colonial sphere, especially in Africa, and hope it may eventually be possible to make them entirely disappear. We could not look forward, even if this was done, to establishing intimate relations with France, but we believe that it would do away with a cause of frequently recurring contention. If the wishes of England are in the same direction the best way to help to bring about this result would be by having a calming influence on public opinion in France, which just now, by half-truths and inaccurate statements, has been brought to considerable excitement.'

"The House will observe that the tone of that communication was exceedingly friendly, not only to ourselves, but to France. I at once expressed appreciation of the friendly tone in which the communication was couched. The German Ambassador and myself then had some further conversation of a general and informal kind, in the course of which he expressed some regret at the way in which our public opinion had been misled to adverse conclusions as to German action. I asked on that what else could have been expected when the German Government suddenly sent a ship to Morocco to a closed port which was said to be the most suitable place on the west coast of Morocco for a naval base. Of course this action had mobilised British public opinion. I also pointed out that after I had made to him on July 4 a declaration on behalf of the British Government, we had had no communication from the German Government until July 24,¹ and even then their denial of any intention to establish a naval base had been in a form which I could not use to allay the suspicions which had been aroused here. I suggested to the Ambassador—and he received the suggestion very cordially—that we should not pursue this point. I expressed the hope that this latest German communication might be taken as a new point of departure, and that

¹ This is from the *Times* report. Sir Edward Grey evidently meant to say July 12.

we need not go back upon things which might lead to mutual recrimination. In the afternoon of the same day the Prime Minister made a statement in the House."

The German Version.

(From the German Chancellor's speech in the Reichstag on November 9, 1911.)

"Now it has been asserted—and this assertion has eaten deep into the people—that we retreated before England. A speech made at a banquet by the British Minister, Mr. Lloyd George, has specially served in this connection. (Laughter and cheers on the Left.)—Gentlemen, I am speaking of a grave matter, and I beg you to allow me to finish my speech without interruption.—One of the Conservative papers, indeed, by substituting 'Germany' for 'England' right through the speech, brought out clearly that the speech taken by itself, might equally have been made by a German statesman without giving occasion for criticism. What gave significance to the speech was the fact that the whole of the French Press, and a great portion of the English Press, interpreted it in a chauvinistic sense, and in a manner spiteful towards Germany, and that this interpretation was in no way repudiated from the English side. I found myself constrained to instruct the Imperial Ambassador in London to speak about the matter. My representation was to the effect that we were discussing the Morocco question with France; that England's interests were not so far affected thereby; and that if England should consider her interests to be affected by the result of the discussions, we expected the British Government to urge those interests upon the two contracting Governments only through the usual diplomatic channel. The British Government, after this, intimated no more desire of any kind to take part in our negotiations with France.

"For all that, the ill-effects of that after-dinner speech remained. Owing more particularly to the interpretation given to it by the English and French Press, it produced in wide German circles a very bitter feeling, which naturally found expression in a more or less forcible

manner in our Press. To judge by its effect, this speech was, it must be admitted, not such as to further a good understanding with England."

(From the German Foreign Secretary's speech before the Budget Commission of the Reichstag on November 17, 1911.)

"When the answer to the questions raised by Sir E. Grey had been despatched to the German Ambassador, the text became known in Berlin of the speech delivered by Mr. Lloyd George at the Mansion House on the evening of July 21, that is to say, on the very day on which the interview took place between the Ambassador and the English Minister of Foreign Affairs. It had not been possible for us to comply with the request made in the meantime by the British Minister that we should authorise him to make use in Parliament of our notification that we had no designs on Moroccan territory. This would have made it appear as if the explanation had been given as a result of Mr. Lloyd George's speech.

"On July 24 the Ambassador in London was instructed to point out that the speech of the English Chancellor of the Exchequer, the text of which had just become known, had given rise to violent attacks against Germany on the part of a large portion of the English Press and the whole of the French Press. It might remain an open question as to how far the British Minister had intended to produce this effect. The British Government could not, in any case, fail to perceive that this effect of a speech delivered by one of its Members was bound to produce a bad impression here.

"We were negotiating with France for the removal of differences, which were the result of France having unceremoniously set aside the obligation arising from the International Treaty at Algeiras. Germany stated explicitly and repeatedly that she wished to come to a direct agreement with France in a peaceful and friendly manner without recriminations as to the past. France accepted this, and agreed with us to conduct the negotiations in secret for the present. Germany had made

proposals to France which appeared to be entirely loyal and acceptable. They concerned territories in which English interests were neither directly nor indirectly involved. If, in spite of this, England considered it necessary to express wishes, it was open to her to convey such wishes through the usual diplomatic channel. If, instead of doing so, the English Government caused public declarations to be made by one of its members which could be interpreted at least as a warning addressed to us, and which were, as a matter of fact, interpreted by English as well as French papers as a warning bordering on a threat, it was difficult to recognise the reasons for such action. The English Government could not doubt that a friendly understanding between Germany and France, which they themselves professed to desire, would not be advanced thereby. In view of the tone adopted against Germany for some time past by a portion of the English Press and by nearly all French papers, the English Government could not have been in doubt as to the result to be anticipated from the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. If the English Government had intended to complicate and embroil the political situation and to bring about a violent explosion, they would certainly have chosen no better means than the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, which took so little into account for us the dignity and position of a Great Power which was claimed by him for England.

“The Ambassador reported thereupon that Sir E. Grey had indeed consented to make no parliamentary use of the communications in regard to the intention of Germany not to acquire any territory in Morocco, but that he had observed that he would then have no means of allaying the public anxiety as to our alleged designs on Agadir. The Minister had defended the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer as being moderate, and had maintained that it was thoroughly correct that it should have been delivered. It contained no threat against Germany. The Ambassador had then again pointed out that the Anglo-French Press had represented the speech of the Chancellor as a threat against Germany.

"The Minister had laid stress on the fact that Germany's contingent intention to undertake alone the restoration of the *status quo ante*, that is to say, to proceed independently even without the other signatory Powers, was calculated to give a still more serious significance to the Morocco question. The Minister had protested against the idea that the English Government did not desire a Franco-German agreement. He would also make it clear in Parliament that the English Government desired a Franco-German agreement; he must, however, at the same time point out that, should English interests be affected in the course of the Moroccan question, the English Government would be compelled to protect them.

"The Ambassador observed on this that no one disputed England's right in this matter. We had never intended to dispose of English interests or rights. This intention existed only in English imagination. The English Government had no ground for this suspicion, which also betrayed itself in the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and was the cause of its provocative effect. Should the occasion arise, Germany would welcome the co-operation of the other signatory Powers in the restoration of the *status quo*. Only in the event of such co-operation not being forthcoming would she enforce her rights unaided. The Ambassador was not able to conceal from the Minister that threatening warnings would only have the effect of encouraging Germany to uphold her rights.

"An answer was thereupon sent to Sir E. Grey, by fresh instructions addressed to the Ambassador on July 26, to the effect that he must have seen from the official communications that British interests had not been touched upon in the negotiations with France; it was, therefore, expected of his proved loyalty that he would mention this in Parliament without going into the confidential details of our communication.

"The Ambassador was further instructed to take note of the fact with satisfaction that Sir E. Grey had stated that he desired to see an understanding arrived at between France and Germany, and also to express the

conviction that this would contribute in a high degree to the success of the negotiations. It was, however, difficult to reconcile this desire with the fact that, without any knowledge of what we were giving up in the way of political influence, our colonial demands were characterised in England as unacceptable.

“As we had bound ourselves to secrecy *vis-à-vis* of France, we could not give further details; we thought also that where it was a question exclusively of the exchange of territories which were the absolute possessions of Germany and France the interests of a third party, and especially English interests, could not be effected, and that it must, therefore, be left entirely to the two contracting parties to balance against one another the value of the objects to be exchanged. Adverse judgments on the part of England on the subject of the German demands could only therefore impede the negotiations. On the other hand, an open declaration to the effect that England would welcome a Franco-German agreement could only have a favourable influence upon the attainment of our sincere desire for such an agreement. It was Germany's ardent desire to lessen or to entirely do away with the causes of friction with France on Colonial, and more especially African, territory. Even if thereby intimate relations between ourselves and France were not established, we nevertheless promised ourselves as a result of this policy that countless causes for more or less serious tension would be removed. If England equally desired this she could only contribute to it by exercising a soothing influence on the very excited state of feeling then prevailing in France, a state of feeling which had been brought about by the dissemination of false reports and by semi-indiscretions.

“On July 27 an obviously inspired communication had then been published through Reuter's Telegraphic Bureau. No new factor, it was stated therein, had arisen which could disturb the Franco-German *pourparlers*. The scope of the negotiations was unchanged, and it would be a mistake to draw from the deliberations of British Ministers the conclusion that the British Government

intended to take a direct or active part in the present negotiations with Germany. The public utterances of English statesmen left no doubt that the question was being followed by the Government with the greatest attention. The Conference at the Foreign Office on the previous day, in which the British Ambassador at Paris had taken part, had been due to a desire of a prominent member of the Cabinet to obtain first hand information in regard to the situation. It was quite false to believe that England had in any way attempted to place limitations on the discussions, except so far as limitations resulted from Asquith's communications.

"The changes in the distribution of the Home and Atlantic fleets had nothing to do with the events in Morocco.

"From that moment our negotiations with France had made better progress."

Mr. Asquith's Speech of July 27.

Mr. Asquith, who was received with cheers, said—

"In answer to an inquiry from the Right Hon. Gentleman opposite, I said, I think, two days ago, that it would be more convenient instead of replying to the question, that we should take the occasion of the Foreign Office Vote to make a statement on this question which has so largely and so generally absorbed public attention and on the questions which have arisen in the International sphere with regard to Morocco. I think it will be in the general interest as well as the convenience of the House, that I should make that statement at once before any debate or discussion has arisen. It is obvious that this Moroccan question has reached the point at which it will become increasingly difficult, embarrassing, and anxious, unless a solution be found. Too close an analysis, at the present moment, of the causes and antecedents might provoke in more than one quarter recrimination and retorts which it is on every ground desirable to avoid.

"I propose simply to state to the House what is the

actual situation to-day. Conversations are proceeding between France and Germany; we are not a party to those conversations; the subject-matter of them may not affect British interests. On that point, until we know the ultimate result, we cannot express a final opinion. But it is our desire that those conversations should issue in a settlement honourable and satisfactory to both the parties and of which his Majesty's Government can cordially say that it in no way prejudices British interests. We believe that to be quite possible. We earnestly and sincerely desire to see it accomplished. The question of Morocco itself bristles with difficulties, but outside Morocco in other parts of West Africa we should not think of attempting to interfere with territorial arrangements considered reasonable by those who are more directly interested. Any statements that we have so interfered to prejudice negotiations between France and Germany are mischievous inventions without the faintest foundation in fact. But we have thought it right from the beginning to make it quite clear that, failing a settlement such as I have indicated, we must become an active party in discussion of the situation. That would be our right as a signatory to the Treaty of Algeciras; it might be our obligation under the terms of our agreement of 1904 with France; it might be our duty in defence of British interests directly affected by further developments.

"There have been times when we were not sure how far this was fully understood. I am glad to say we are now quite satisfied that that is not the case. The statement which I made here at this table more than three weeks ago, and the speech since made elsewhere by my right hon. friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer have, I hope and believe, made it perfectly clear that we claim, not any predominant or pre-eminent position, but that of one party interested in possible developments and in seeing a solution of the present difficulties. Sir, in our judgment, it would have been a grave mistake to let such a situation drift until an assertion of our interest in it might, owing to our previous silence, cause surprise and resentment at the moment when this assertion became

most necessary and imperative. That, I trust, we have sufficiently guarded against by the statements already made. I repeat that we earnestly desire a successful issue of the conversations now in progress, and I would venture in the general interest to make a strong appeal to the House not, on the present occasion, to enter into further details or open up controversial ground."

The German Chancellor's Comments on December 5.

"But even if this reply had not appeared to be sufficient, a further explanation could easily have been obtained by reference to us before July 21, the day of the next conversation between Sir E. Grey and Count Metternich and the speech of the British Chancellor of the Exchequer. Far be it from me to complain of the fact that this course was not adopted. For the choice of means, the interest of one's own country, in this case, therefore, England's interest, is the only deciding factor. I cannot, however, pass over the effects as they appear to me. And I must certainly say that in my opinion the tension and the fact that the situation had become more acute could have been avoided if greater confidence had been placed in our declarations of July 1, and if the period of silence had not been broken on the part of England by a prominent member of the English Cabinet.

"Following the good example set by the English Minister, I will not enter into recriminations. For they will not help the future. I will, therefore, also not reopen the question of the effect of the above-mentioned statement on public opinion three weeks ago, and it found still more passionate expression in speeches made in this House, speeches which—in this I cannot follow Sir E. Grey—cannot be placed on a parallel with the actual assertions of an English Member of Parliament respecting preparations for war in England. The English Minister will not be able to recognise as we do the justice of this feeling, which dominated a large section of our people, but he will at least find it intelligible, in view of the public demonstration made by the British Government on

July 21. I would like to add a further observation, one which appears to me to be not without importance for the establishment of future relations. Sir Edward Grey said that the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lloyd George, by his speech wished to make it clear, without provocation, that where English interests were affected England could not be treated as if she did not count. If the day ever came when that could no longer be clearly stated, then England would have ceased to exist as a Great Power.

"Gentlemen, I claim the same right for Germany. When, however, I look back into the past, I find that the Moroccan complications arose because this right had not always been accorded to Germany. The year 1904, in which England and France disposed of Morocco without consideration for the interest which Germany had for the settlement of the Moroccan problem, was the *proton pseudos*. Out of this rose the necessity for us to go to Algeciras and then to Agadir, *i.e.* the necessity for us to safeguard our economic interests ourselves, and to show the world that we are firmly resolved not to allow ourselves to be pushed on one side.

"If, as the ultimate result of this, alleged or actual readiness for war ensued in England—which of these is true I cannot decide—and, further, an acute state of excitement arose, which the English Minister has called 'political alcoholism,' we can only note it with regret. But we must also refuse to take the responsibility for this, just as we had to refuse to allow ourselves to be diverted from the path which the maintenance of our interests and the dignity of the Empire had marked out for us. That state of excitement led to playing with the idea of war. To a sober observer the facts from a German point of view are as follows:—

"What did we negotiate about with France? About the cession of considerable political rights to France; that was not in opposition to the Anglo-French agreements of 1904. About the increased guarantees for our economic interests in Morocco, not only of our interests, no! of all Powers, including English interests, in accordance with the principle of the open door, which has been

the fundamental principle of the English view of government and law. About colonial compensations in Africa. And Sir Edward Grey expressly declared that England did not think of standing in our way if we wished to conclude peaceful agreements with other Powers in respect to Africa.

"Our negotiations with France were also carried out by both sides in the most difficult moments, as has been proved, with the invariable good will to arrive at a peaceful understanding. This was also not unknown in England, for Sir Edward Grey stated that it never seemed probable to him that the negotiations would be broken off.

"And, finally, as I proved in detail on November 9, we have attained the object that we had in view from the outset. This object did not directly affect any English interests and, therefore, contains in itself the refutation of the English apprehensions. The best proof lies in the fact that England has officially expressed her satisfaction at the conclusion of the negotiations.

"And, in spite of all this, a situation has developed which in English eyes brought near a war against us, *i.e.* a world war. If all the bearings run so hot, Gentlemen, then the machine must have a serious defect."


MAP 1.



Stanford's Geog.^l Estab^t London

Map of Morocco, showing towns and districts mentioned in the text.

MAP II.



Standard's Geog. Estab. London

Map of Morocco illustrating the Sphere recognized to Spain under the Franco-Spanish secret Convention of October, 1904, which remained secret until published in the *Paris Matin* in November, 1911.

MAP III.



Stanford's Geogr. Estab., London.

Map of part of West-Central Africa showing the area affected by the Franco-German negotiations of June–November, 1911; and the neighbouring dependencies.

MAP IV.



Stanford's Geog. Estab^l, London

Map indicating the area which formed at one time in the Franco-German negotiations, the subject of special discussion.

MAP V.



Area ceded by France to Germany under the Convention of November 4, 1911

Area ceded by Germany to France under the same Convention

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